Judge: Lee W. Tsao, Case: 23NWCV01629, Date: 2024-03-28 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23NWCV01629 Hearing Date: March 28, 2024 Dept: C
PLASCENCIA v.
GENERAL MOTORS LLC
CASE NO.: 23NWCV01629
HEARING: 03/28/24
#5
TENTATIVE RULING
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorney’s Fees is GRANTED in the amount
of $24,350.97 to be paid by no later
than 90 days from the date of the Court’s issuance of this Order. This date may
be extended by agreement of the parties.
Moving Party to give
notice.
The relevant
procedural history of this case is as follows: This lemon law action was filed
on May 24, 2023. The parties exchanged about one round of discovery each, which
includes Plaintiff’s preparation of Motions to Compel Further Responses. A
Notice of Settlement was filed on June February 7, 2024.
Cal. Civ. Code
§1794(d) states, “[i]f the buyer prevails in an action under [the Song Beverly
Act], the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the
judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including
attorneys fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have
been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and
prosecution of such action.”
Here, it is
undisputed that Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this action, and is
entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees. The only issue pending before this
Court is the amount of the award.
The matter of
reasonableness of a party’s attorney fees is within the sound discretion of the
trial court. (Bruckman v. Parliament Escrow Co. (1989) 190 Cal.App.3d
1051, 1062.) When
assessing the amount of any attorney’s fee award, courts typically determine
what is reasonable through the application of the “lodestar” method. Under the
lodestar method, a base amount is calculated from a compilation of (1)
time reasonably spent and (2) the reasonable hourly
compensation of each attorney. (Serrano v. Priest (“Serrano
III”) (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 48); (See also Meister v. Regents of
University of California (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 437, 448-449 holding
that the lodestar method applies to statutory attorney fees award unless the
underlying statute provides for another method of calculation). Normally,
a “reasonable” hourly rate is the prevailing rate charged by attorneys of
similar skill and experience in the relevant community. (PLCM Group, Inc. v.
Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) That amount may then be adjusted
through the consideration of various factors, including “(1) the novelty and
difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting
them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other
employment by the attorneys, and (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th
1122, 1132.)
The Court is vested with discretion to determine which claimed hours were
reasonably spent, and what an attorney’s reasonable hourly rate is. (Dover
Mobile Estates v. Fiber Form Products, Inc. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d
1494, 1501); (See also Flannery v. California Highway Patrol (1987) 61
Cal.App.4th 629, 644.) [“We readily acknowledge the discretion of the trial
judge to determine the value of professional services rendered in his or her
court.”].
Plaintiff’s Motion seeks attorney’s
fees based on 68.8 hours spent by the attorneys litigating this case, which
comes out to: (1) $30,960.00 (base); (2) $3,096.00 (multiplier); (3) $1,310.97
(costs and expenses); (4) $2,700.00 (anticipated fees for drafting the Reply
brief, and oral argument for this hearing.) (Total = $38,066.97)
Plaintiff’s
Counsel’s hourly rate is $450/hr. (Chae Decl., ¶18.) . A “reasonable” hourly
rate is the prevailing rate charged by attorneys of similar skill and
experience in the relevant community. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexier
(2000) 22 Cal.4th 1064, 1095.) The Court finds that Plaintiff’s Counsel’s
hourly rates are reasonable.
Plaintiff has established an entitlement
to reasonable fees in the amount of $24,350.97 (51.2 hours plus costs). The
Court’s determination is undertaken in the exercise of its discretion to
determine whether or not rates or hours are reasonable. (Dover Mobile
Estates v. Fiber Form Products, Inc. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1494, 1501.)
The Court determines the following:
·
$3,960.00 (8.8
hours) for “all time incurred prior to the drafting of the Complaint” is
block-billed. This amount is reduced by
$3,060.00 (6.8 hours) to $900.00 (two hours).
·
$585.00 (1.3 hours) for
time billed between the Settlement Demand and Notice of Settlement is reasonable. Counsel exchanged various emails during this
period.
·
$7560.00 (16.8
hours) for motions to compel further responses to Plaintiff’s first set of
special interrogatories and requests for production of documents is reduced by $5,760
(12.8 hours) to $1800.00 (four hours).
Although the motions were filed well in advance of the trial date, they are
standard motions which were neither opposed nor heard by the court.
·
$3,780.00 (8.4
hours) for drafting the fee motion is reasonable; $2,700.00 (6 hours) for
drafting the reply brief and attending the hearing is not. This amount is reduced by $1,800.00 (4 hours)
to $900.00 (two hours).
·
A reduction of
$3,096.00. The Court declines to award any lodestar multiplier to these
attorney’s fees based upon the relative non-complexity of this routine lemon
law case.
As stated above, Plaintiff also seeks to
recoup costs in the amount of $1,310.97. “A prevailing party who claims costs must
serve and file the memorandum of costs within 15 days after the date of service
of the notice of entry of judgment or dismissal by the clerk… or the date of
service of written notice of entry of judgment or dismissal, or within 180 days
after entry of judgment, whichever is first.” (CRC Rule 3.1700(a)(1).) “After
the time has passed for a motion to strike or tax costs or for determination of
the motion, the clerk must immediately enter the costs on the judgment.” (CRC
Rule 3.1700(b)(4).) Although Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Costs has not been
separately filed with this Court, it is attached as Exhibit 11 to the
Declaration of Larry Chae, and Defendant addresses Plaintiff’s claimed costs in
Opposition (which this Court can construe as a “Motion to Strike Costs”). The
Court finds that all of Plaintiff’s sought costs were reasonably incurred and
declines to reduce Plaintiff’s costs amount.
Accordingly, the Court grants attorney
fees in the reduced, but reasonable, amount of $24,350.97.