Judge Lee W. Tsao, Case Number: 23NWCV01633, Date: 2024-01-30 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lee W. Tsao, Case: 23NWCV01633, Date: 2024-01-30 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23NWCV01633 Hearing Date: January 30, 2024 Dept: C

Adam Agathakis vs Daniel Joseph Botton, et al.

Case No.: 23NWCV01633

Hearing Date: January 30, 2024 @ 9:30 AM

Tentative Ruling

Defendants Joseph Botton and the City of Los Angeles’s Demurrer is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

Defendants to give notice.

Background

In a Complaint filed May 26, 2023, Plaintiff ADAM AGATHAKIS alleges he was injured when Defendant DANIEL JOSEPH BOTTON, driving a vehicle owned by Defendant CITY OF LOS ANGELES, negligently collided into Plaintiff’s vehicle. The collision occurred on December 9, 2021. Based thereon, Plaintiff brings a single cause of action for Negligence seeking property damages and damages for medical and related expenses.

Judicial Notice

California Evidence Code section 452(c) authorizes judicial notice of “[o]fficial acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state of the United States,” which includes the records of a public entity. (Fowler v. Howell (1996) 42 CA.4th 1746, 1752.) “Official acts” include reports, records, files and notices maintained by the City of Los Angeles concerning government matters. (See Commercial Union Assurance Company v. City of San Jose (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 730, 740; Pan Pacific Properties, Inc. (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 244, 255, fn. 2; Harney v. State of California (1963) 217 Cal.App.2d 77, 86.) Official records of a public entity include government claims. Courts are permitted to take judicial notice of the filing and contents of a government claim. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c); Ludwig v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 8, 15.) Here, each of the three documents to be judicially noticed constitute an official record of a public entity and the Court may take judicial notice of them. Accordingly, the request for judicial notice is GRANTED.

Legal Standard

The party against whom a complaint has been filed may object to the pleading, by demurrer, on several grounds, including the ground that the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (CCP § 430.10(e).) A party may demur to an entire complaint, or to any causes of action stated therein. (CCP § 430.50(a).)

Discussion

Defendants argue that the Complaint is jurisdictionally barred by Plaintiff’s failure to file a government claim with the City prior to filing suit as required by Government Code section 905.2, subdivisions (a)-(b), and section 911.2, subdivision (a).

A claimant who wishes to sue a public entity or employee based on a cause or causes of action relating to alleged personal injuries, like the Plaintiff here, must present a claim to the entity within six months of the date the cause or causes of action accrue. (Gov. Code, § 911.2; J.J. v. County of San Diego (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1214, 1219; Ovando v. County of Los Angeles (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 42, 62-63.) Failure to present a claim for money or damages bars a plaintiff from filing a lawsuit against a public entity or employee. (Gov. Code, § 945.4; State of California v. Superior Court (Bodde) (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1239-140.)

If a claimant wishing to sue a public entity based on personal injury or injuries fails to present a government claim within six months of the date of accrual of the cause(s) of action(s), they may apply to a public entity for leave to present a late claim; however, such application to file a late claim must be filed within a reasonable time not to exceed one year from the date of accrual. (Gov. Code, § 911.4; Ovando v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at 63.) This requirement that the application to present a late claim be made no later than one year after accrual of the claim is jurisdictional in nature. Neither the public entity, nor the Court, can grant the application after the one-year period has expired. (Gov. Code, § 946.6; Santee v. Santa Clara County Office of Education (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 702, 713.)

Here, Plaintiff alleges that immediately following the December 9, 2021 incident, Plaintiff, through his attorneys of record, contacted his insurance carrier, Garrison Property and Casualty Insurance Company (“Garrison”), to notify them of the subject collision. (Complaint, ¶ 9.) The parties do not dispute that Garrison timely filed a claim with the City on February 18, 2022. (RJN, Ex. A, Claim for Damages.) However, Garrison’s claim was limited to property damage only; specifically, Garrison sought damages in the amount of $3,863.04 for “Damage to the right side of the 2000 Dodge B2500 Wagon.” (Ibid.) It is also undisputed that the City issued a draft on August 30, 2022 as payment in full for the $3,863.04 in property damages sought by Garrison. (RJN, Ex. C, Draft for Payment.)

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’ is limited to the property damages Garrison recovered in its claim because Plaintiff never filed a separate claim for medical damages.

As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff argues that the demurrer should be overruled because nothing within the four corners of the complaint clearly and unambiguously shows that Plaintiff never filed a government claim. The Court is unpersuaded. As Defendants point out, Plaintiff’s Complaint admits that he did not file a separate claim: “Plaintiff, ADAM AGATHAKIS, did not submit a separate claim so as to not file duplicate claim for the same accident.” (Complaint, ¶ 12.) The Court will now address the merits of the Demurrer.

Put another way, the issue here is whether the pre-litigation claim for property damages filed by Plaintiff’s insurer (Garrison) preserves Plaintiff’s right to sue for medical damages. The Court concludes that it does not.

The case of Cal. ex rel. Dep't of Transp. v. Superior Court (1984) 159 Cal. App.3d 331 is instructive. There, several property owners filed timely claims pursuant to the California Tort Claims Act after a freeway embankment gave way and caused a mudslide. The claims sought only property damages and were denied by the State. The property owners then filed suit alleging not only property related damages, but also damages for physical and mental injury. The appellate court determined that the State’s demurrer should have been sustained. “Courts have consistently interpreted the Tort Claims Act to bar actions alleging matters not included in the claim filed with the public entity.” (Id. at 336.) The appellate court found that the property owners alleged “a factual basis for recovery which was not fairly reflected in the claim filed with the State.” (Id. at 336.) The same is true here. Plaintiff’s claim for medical damages is not fairly reflected in Garrison’s claim for property damages.

Plaintiff argues that the demurrer should be overruled because there was substantial compliance with the California Tort Claims Act. (Alderson v. County of Santa Clara (1954) 124 Cal.App.2d 334.) In Alderson, the plaintiff filed a claim on behalf of her minor sons for personal injuries suffered in a car accident caused by the defendant's negligent maintenance of a roadway. Plaintiff neglected to file a claim with respect to costs she incurred in obtaining medical treatment for her sons. The court found substantial compliance with the claims statute because of the close relationship of the parties and the subject matter of their causes of action. (Id. at 344.) In Alderson, the damages at issue in the lawsuit were of the same kind (medical) as those sought under the claims statute. Unlike Alderson, Plaintiff here seeks medical damages, but he only claimed property damages under the claims statute. The difference in kind between the two types of damages distinguishes this case from Alderson.

The Court’s ruling is consistent with the purpose of the claims statutes: “It is not the purpose of the claims statutes to prevent surprise. Rather, the purpose of these statutes is to provide the public entity sufficient information to enable it to adequately investigate claims and to settle them, if appropriate, without the expense of litigation. It is well-settled that claims statutes must be satisfied even in face of the public entity's actual knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the claim. Such knowledge -- standing alone -- constitutes neither substantial compliance nor basis for estoppel.” (Cal. ex rel. Dep't of Transp. v. Superior Court, supra, 159 Cal. App.3d 331, 335.) Given the state of the law, the City was under no duty to investigate a claim for medical damages when Garrison only claimed property damages. By suing for medical damages, Plaintiff frustrated the purpose of the claims statute because the City is now required to incur legal expenses it could have avoided had Plaintiff given proper notice.

Plaintiff argues that he did not file a separate claim with the City because Garrison had already filed its claim and the City instructed applicants not to file “duplicate claims.” For the reasons stated above, the court determines that Garrison’s claim for property damages is different in kind from the medical damages Plaintiff now seeks. Therefore, filing a separate claim for medical damages would not “duplicate” Garrison’s claim for property damages. To the extent Plaintiff relied upon the City’s instructions when he decided not to file a separate claim, such reliance was unreasonable.

The Court determines that Garrison’s pre-litigation claim for property damages did not preserve Plaintiff’s right to sue for medical damages. Because Plaintiff’s claim accrued on December 9, 2021, it is now beyond the one-year jurisdictional limit for Plaintiff to file a separate claim.

Accordingly, the Demurrer is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.