Judge: Lee W. Tsao, Case: 23NWCV01683, Date: 2023-08-16 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23NWCV01683 Hearing Date: March 6, 2024 Dept: C
EDWARD SANTISTEVAN v. SEAN DE LA ROSA, ET AL.
CASE NO.: 23NWCV01683
HEARING: 3/6/24 @ 10:30 AM
#9
TENTATIVE RULING
Defendant Sean De La Rosa’s demurrer to
plaintiff’s first amended complaint is SUSTAINED in part, with 30 days leave to
amend, and OVERRULED in part.
Moving Party to give NOTICE.
Defendant Sean De La Rosa demurs to the First
Amended Complaint’s (FAC) first cause of action for quiet title, second cause
of action for conversion, third cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, fifth
cause of action for constructive trust, and sixth cause of action for
declaratory relief on the grounds that they do not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action.
Plaintiff
Edward Santistevan alleges that he and decedent Sylvia M. De La Rosa were
registered domestic partners, commencing in 2012. From 2012 to her death in
2021, they purchased various real properties from their community assets. Plaintiff
seeks a determination of the community contribution. Plaintiff also seeks quiet
title to real property owned by the trust, damages for conversion of
Plaintiff’s personal property, and declaratory relief.
Legal
Standard
A demurrer is an
objection to a pleading, the grounds for which are apparent from either the
face of the complaint or a matter of which the court may take judicial
notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30,
subd. (a); see also Blank v. Kirwan
(1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The purpose
of a demurrer is to challenge the sufficiency of a pleading “by raising
questions of law.” (Postley v. Harvey (1984) 153
Cal.App.3d 280, 286.) The court
“treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not
contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. . .” (Berkley
v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525 (Berkley).) “In the
construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its
allegations must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice
between the parties.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 452; see also Stevens v. Super.
Ct. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 594, 601.)
“When a court evaluates a complaint, the plaintiff is entitled to
reasonable inferences from the facts pled.”
(Duval v. Board of Trustees
(2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 902, 906.)
Demurrers for
uncertainty are disfavored and are granted only if the pleading is so
incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond. (Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Ins. Agency, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841, 848, fn.
3.)
Requests
for Judicial Notice
Defendant
requests judicial notice of the following: (1) First Amended Complaint; (2)
Notice of Errata filed on August 28, 2023, in the instant case; (3) Quitclaim
Deed for 82108 Rosemead Blvd., Pico Rivera, California; (4) Grant Deed for
15792 N. Crystal Springs Drive, Palms Springs, California 92262 recorded on
June 4, 2013; (5) Quitclaim Deed for 15792 N. Crystal Springs Drive, Palms
Springs, California 92262 recorded on February 20, 2020; (6) Grant Deed for
2887 Echo Springs Drive, Corona, California 92883 recorded on December 31, 2013;
(7) Grant Deed for 2887 Echo Springs Drive, Corona, California 92883 recorded
on April 15, 2016; and (8) Quitclaim deed for 2887 Echo Springs Drive, Corona,
California 92883 recorded on February 20, 2020.
A court may take
judicial notice of the contents of its own records. (Dwan v. Dixon
(1963) 216 Cal.App.2d 260, 265.) Thus, the Court grants the first two requests.
A court may take
judicial notice of the fact of a document's recordation, the date the document
was recorded and executed, the parties to the transaction reflected in a
recorded document, and the document's legally operative language, assuming
there is no genuine dispute regarding the document's authenticity. (Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2011) 198
Cal.App.4th 256, 265.) From this, the court may deduce and rely upon the legal
effect of the recorded document, when that effect is clear from its face. (Ibid.) Thus, the Court grants judicial notice of the remaining
requests.
First
Cause of Action – Quiet Title
As a preliminary matter, the parties have
sufficiently met and conferred. (Decl. Haydt ¶¶ 4-6.) (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41,
subd. (a)(3).)
In an action for quiet title, Plaintiff must plead the following: (a) a description of the property
that is the subject of the action,” specifically the location of tangible
personal property and the legal description and street address or common
designation of real property, (b) the title of the plaintiff as to which a
determination under this chapter is sought and the basis of the title, (c) the
adverse claims to the title of the plaintiff against which a determination is
sought, (d) the date as of which the determination is sought, and (e) a prayer
for the determination of the title of the plaintiff against the adverse claims.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 761.020.) If the determination is sought as of a date other
than the date the complaint was filed, the complaint shall include a statement
of the reasons why a determination as of that date is sought. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 761.020, subd. (d).)
Defendant demurs on
the grounds that Plaintiff has not pleaded facts that would support that he has
a community property interest in three real properties because of his purported
domestic partnership status. However, as stated above, that is not the
requirement to plead a quiet title action. Plaintiff only needs to state the
title he seeks. Plaintiff does not need to plead facts that would support the
title he seeks.
Thus, Defendant’s
demurrer to the first cause of action is overruled.
Second Cause of
Action –
Conversion
“Conversion is the
wrongful exercise of dominion over the property of another. The elements of a
conversion claim are the following: (1) the plaintiff’s ownership or right to
possession of the property; (2) the defendant’s conversion by a wrongful act or
disposition of property rights; and (3) damages.” (Lee v. Hanley (2015)
61 Cal.4th 1225,1240.)
Plaintiff alleges that as an
omitted spouse, he had an interest in decedent’s personal property. (FAC, ¶ 31.) Plaintiff alleges that the defendant converted the decedent’s
personal property. (FAC, ¶ 30.)
Defendant demurs on the
grounds that the decedent transferred her personal property to the trust on
December 7, 2019. Defendant asserts that the domestic partnership registration between
Plaintiff and the decedent was purportedly executed on April 3, 2020. Based on
this, the personal property is the property of the successor trustee.
A domestic partnership is
established in California when both persons file a Declaration of Domestic
Partnership with the Secretary of State and all of the following requirements
are met: (1) neither person is married to someone else or is a member of
another domestic partnership with someone else that has not been terminated,
dissolved, or adjudged a nullity; (2) the two persons are not related by blood
in a way that would prevent them from being married to each other in this
state; (3) both persons are at least 18 years of age; and (4) both persons are
capable of consenting to the domestic partnership. (Fam. Code, § 297, subd.
(b).)
As Plaintiff alleges, he and the
decedent entered a domestic partnership on April 21, 2012 and that on April 3,
2020, they executed the Secretary of State Form DP-1. (FAC, ¶¶ 7,
8.) It was not filed. (FAC, ¶ 10.)
Thus, no domestic partnership has been established.
Plaintiff argues that
even though he and the decedent did not file a Declaration of Domestic
Partnership, he and decedent were putative domestic partners, citing In re Domestic P ‘ship of Ellis
& Arriaga
(2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1000. A person with a reasonable, good faith
belief in the validity of his or her registered domestic partnership is
similarly entitled to protection as a putative registered domestic partner,
even if the domestic partnership was not properly registered. (In re Domestic P ‘ship of Ellis & Arriaga (2008) 162
Cal.App.4th 1000, 1008.) This good faith belief is an objective, not
subjective, standard. (See Id., at 1005.)
Plaintiff alleges that he
and the decedent entered a domestic partnership on April 21, 2012, and that on
April 3, 2020, they executed the Secretary of State Form DP-1. (FAC, ¶¶ 7, 8.) Plaintiff further alleges that due
to the decedent’s mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, the form was not
filed with the Secretary of State. (FAC, ¶ 10.)
However, nowhere in the first amended complaint does Plaintiff allege that he
had a reasonable, good faith belief in the validity of registered domestic
partnership. Plaintiff argues that they swore that the domestic partnership has
existed since 2012. (Opp. Mot, pg. 4.) Contrary to what Plaintiff argues, nowhere
does he allege that he and the decedent swore a registered domestic partnership
existed since 2012. Paragraph 8 of the
First Amended Complaint refers to a Declaration of Domestic Partnership
attached as Exhibit 1, but no attachments were filed. Nor does Plaintiff allege facts that would
cause a reasonable person to believe in the existence of a valid registered
domestic partnership with good faith between Plaintiff and the decedent. Therefore,
Plaintiff has not properly alleged that he is a putative registered domestic
partner. Hence, he has not established an interest in decedent’s personal
property.
Thus, Defendant’s
demurrer as to the second cause of action is sustained with 30 days leave to
amend.
Defendant also demurs
that the second cause of action is uncertain. However, this issue is moot
because Defendant has sustained the demurrer as to the second cause of action
for not stating facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
Fourth Cause of Action
– Breach of Fiduciary Duty
The elements of a
cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty are the existence of a fiduciary
relationship, breach of fiduciary duty, and damages caused by the breach. (Oasis
West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 820.)
Defendant demurs on the
grounds that Plaintiff is not a beneficiary or heir of the decedent; thus,
there is no fiduciary relationship between Defendant and Plaintiff. Defendant
also asserts that Plaintiff has not proven that he is the putative spouse of
the decedent. In opposition, Plaintiff asserts that he is a putative registered
domestic partner.
Plaintiff alleges that as
successor trustee of the trust and executor of the decedent’s will, defendants
owed Plaintiff, a domestic partner, fiduciary duties. (FAC, ¶ 38.) However, as
discussed above, Plaintiff has not established he is a domestic partner or a
putative registered domestic partner.
Thus, the Court sustains the
demurrer as to the fourth cause of action with 30 days leave to amend.
Fifth Cause of Action –
Constructive Trust
In an action for constructive
trust, Plaintiff must plead the following: 1) a wrongful act
(underlying claim incorporated into the cause of action), 2) specific,
identifiable property or property interest, or excuse for inability to describe
it, 3) plaintiff’s right to the property; and 4) defendant’s title to the
property or property interest. (Stansfield v. Starkey (1990) 220
Cal.App.3d 59, 76.) “The wrongful act giving rise to a constructive trust need not
amount to fraud or intentional misrepresentation. All that must be shown is
that the acquisition of the property was wrongful and that the keeping of the
property by the defendant would constitute unjust enrichment.” (Calistoga Civic Club v. Calistoga (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 111,116.)
Defendant demurs on the
grounds that the decedent transferred her personal property to the trust prior
to the execution of the domestic partnership registration on April 3, 2020.
Based on this, the personal property was the property of the successor trustee.
As discussed above, Plaintiff
has not pleaded that he is a putative registered domestic partner of the
decedent. Thus, he has not established an interest in the said personal
property.
Thus, the Court sustains the
demurrer as to the fifth cause of action with 30 days leave to amend.
Sixth Cause of Action –
Declaratory Relief
“To qualify for declaratory relief, a
party would have to demonstrate its action presented two essential elements:
(1) a proper subject of declaratory relief, and (2) an actual controversy
involving justiciable questions relating to the party’s rights or obligations.”
(Jolley v. Chase Home Finance, LLC (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 872, 909.) Any
person who desires a declaration of his or her rights or duties with respect to
another over property may bring an original action for a declaration of his or
her rights and duties in the premises, including a determination of any
question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or contract. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1060.) “The ‘actual controversy’ language encompasses
a probable future
controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the parties.” (Environmental
Defense Project of Sierra County v. County of Sierra (2008)
158 Cal.App.4th 877, 885.)
Defendant demurs on the
grounds that the decedent transferred her personal property to the trust prior
to the execution of the domestic partnership registration on April 3, 2020.
Based on this, the personal property was the property of the successor trustee.
Defendant also asserts that Plaintiff has no community claim to the real or
personal property already in the trust.
However, the above is not the
subject of a demurrer as to declaratory relief. Defendant argues that Plaintiff
has no claim to the said property, but Plaintiff need only plead a proper
subject of declaratory relief and that an actual controversy exists.
Thus, Defendant’s
demurrer as to declaratory relief is OVERRULED.
Defendant Sean De La Rosa’s demurrer to plaintiff’s first amended
complaint is SUSTAINED in part, with 30 days leave to amend, and OVERRULED in
part.