Judge: Lee W. Tsao, Case: 23NWCV01842, Date: 2024-06-11 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23NWCV01842 Hearing Date: June 11, 2024 Dept: C
David John Kearney, et al. vs Briana Gonzalez,
et al.
Case No.: 23NWCV01842
Hearing Date: June 11, 2024 @ 10:30 a.m.
#10
Tentative Ruling
I.
Defendant Briana Gonzalez’s Demurrer is SUSTAINED
with 20 days leave to amend as to Plaintiff David John Kearney and OVERRULED as
to Plaintiff Jimmy Rey Patrick and Plaintiff/Successor-in-Interest Tonia Perez.
II.
Defendant Joseph Hoban’s Demurrer is SUSTAINED
with 20 days leave to amend.
Defendants to give notice.
Background
This is a personal injury action.
Plaintiff/Successor-in-Interest Tonia Perez and Plaintiff Jimmy
Rey Patrick are the surviving parents of Decedent Alex Christopher Villeda
(“Decedent”). Plaintiff David John Kearney is the surviving partner and friend of
Decedent.
The Complaint alleges that on June 16, 2021 Defendant
Briana Gonzalez hired Decedent to perform chores and tasks at 8645 Springer
Street, Downey, CA 90242. Defendant Gonzalez instructed Decedent to remain on
the premises to help out during a house party.
During the party, and while visibly and noticeably intoxicated, Decedent
was instructed to drive to the nearest grocery store to purchase several items
such as firewood and more alcoholic beverages. Plaintiff Kearney accompanied
Decedent on the trip. Due to Decedent’s level of intoxication, Decedent and Plaintiff
Kearney were involved in a car crash resulting in injuries to both individuals and
decedent’s loss of life. The Complaint alleges
Defendant Joseph Hoban was the insured of the subject property and allowed the
party and Decedent’s intoxicated driving to occur. Decedent was not in a state of mind to make
sound decisions on his own. He was
following orders from, and under the supervision of, Defendant Gonzalez. Based thereon, the Complaint brings causes of
action for 1) Negligence, and 2) Vicarious Liability.
Defendants Briana Gonzalez and Joseph Hoban demur to
Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action for Negligence on the grounds that it fails
to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and is too uncertain,
vague and ambiguous to constitute a cause of action.
Legal Standard
A
general demurrer lies where a pleading “does not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action.” (Code of Civ. Proc. § 430.10(e).)
A
demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the
pleading under attack, or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially
noticeable. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 430.30, 430.70; Blank v. Kirwan (1985)
39 Cal 3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116
Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the
evidence or other extrinsic matters. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court
(1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905.) The only issue involved in a demurrer
hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous
matters, states a cause of action. (Id. at 905; Hahn v. Mirda
(2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) At the pleading stage, a plaintiff need only
allege ultimate facts sufficient to apprise the defendant of the factual basis
for the claim against him. (Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28 Cal. App. 3d
714, 721.)
For
purposes of testing the causes of action, the court “gives the complaint a
reasonable interpretation, and treats the demurrer as admitting all material
facts properly pleaded.” (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist.¿(1992) 2
Cal.4th 962, 966–67.) The court does not, however, assume the truth of
contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law. (Id.)
When
considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context,
with a view to substantial justice between the parties. (CCP §¿452.) Although
courts construe pleadings liberally, sufficient facts must be alleged to
support the allegations plead to survive a demurrer. (Rakestraw v.
California Physicians' Serv. (2000) 81 Cal. App. 4th 39, 43.)
Discussion
To maintain an action for negligence, plaintiff must be
able to show that: defendant owed a legal duty of care; defendant breached that
duty; and defendant's breach was proximate or legal cause of plaintiff's
injury. (Brunelle v. Signore (1989) 215 Cal. App. 3d 122). In an
appropriate case, a defendant's lack of negligence may be determined as matter
of law. (Biles v. Richter (Ct. App. 1988) 206 Cal. App. 3d 325. Whether a legal
duty exists in a given case is primarily a question of law. (Goodman v. Kennedy
(1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 342).
The demurrer by Defendants Briana Gonzalez and Joseph Hoban
raises the following issues:
Whether Defendant Briana Gonzalez Owed a Duty
to Plaintiffs
The Complaint alleges Defendant Gonzalez hired Decedent to
perform chores and tasks on the property, instructed to remain on the premises
to help during a house party, and then instructed him to drive to nearest
grocery store to purchase several items while visibly and noticeably
intoxicated. (Complaint, pg. 5.)
Plaintiffs argue this is sufficient to allege that Defendant Gonzalez
employed Decedent, giving rise to her duty to protect him.
Whether a special relationship exists in a particular case
as a basis for a duty to protect or assist another is a question of law based
upon public policy considerations. (Musgrove v. Silver (2022) 82 Cal.
App. 5th 694). A person generally has no duty to come to the aid of another by
assisting or protecting them unless there is some relationship between them
which gives rise to a duty to act. (Id (emphasis added)).
One such special relationship is the employment
relationship. (Restatement of Torts § 314-15.) “The essential characteristic of
employment relationship is the right to control and direct the activities of
the person rendering service, or the manner and method in which the work is
performed.” (Serv. Employees Internat. Union v. County of Los Angeles
(1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 761, 769.)
Defendants argue that an employer/employee relationship did
not exist; rather, Defendant Gonzalez was merely asking a friend to grab things
at the store. Defendants argue they were not engaged in any distinct occupation
or business. They were throwing a simple
house party.
However, taking the allegations in the Complaint as true, Decedent drove to the store under the direction and
supervision of Defendant Gonzalez. Based
upon the allegations in the Complaint, Defendant Gonzalez owed a duty to Decedent
because Decedent was acting within the scope of his employment when the
accident occurred.
Whether
Social Host Immunity Bars Claims Against Defendants
According to Defendants, even if Plaintiffs sufficiently
allege an employment relationship between Defendant Gonzalez and Decedent,
Defendants enjoy broad immunity against civil liability as social hosts who
furnished alcoholic beverages to their guests.
Civil Code § 1714, subd. (c), provides in relevant part, “no
social host who furnishes alcoholic beverages to any person may be held legally
accountable for damages suffered by that person, or for injury to the person or
property of, or death of, any third person, resulting from the consumption of
those beverages.”
Business and Professions Code § 25602, subd. (b), provides,
“No person who sells, furnishes, gives, or causes to be sold, furnished, or
given away, any alcoholic beverage pursuant to subdivision (a) of this section
shall be civilly liable to any injured person or the estate of such person for
injuries inflicted on that person as a result of intoxication by the consumer
of such alcoholic beverage.”
Defendants cite no authority, and the Court is aware of
none, for the proposition that the social host immunity conferred by statute
supersedes the duty owed by an employer to an employee acting within the scope
of employment. Defendants’ reliance upon
Musgrove v. Silver (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 694 is misplaced. In Musgrove, a company owner furnished
alcohol to an executive assistant during a vacation, and the executive
assistant drowned after using alcohol and drugs. The appellate court found that social host
immunity applied to shield the owner from liability for furnishing alcohol. (Id.,
at 711.) However, the appellate court also found that the executive
assistant was not “at work” or undertaking any work-related activities when she
died. (Id., at 712.) Here, as
discussed above, the Complaint sufficiently alleges that Decedent drove to the
store under the direction and supervision of Defendant Gonzalez, and Decedent
was acting within the scope of his employment when the accident occurred. Therefore, social host immunity does not
preclude a finding that Defendant Gonzalez owed a duty to Decedent as his
employer.
Whether Defendants Owed a Duty to Plaintiff David
John Kearney
The Complaint states that Plaintiff Kearney was the partner
and friend of Decedent and was in the car at the time of the accident. Because Plaintiff Tonia Perez is the
successor-in-interest to Decedent’s estate, it follows that Plaintiff Kearney
was not the legal spouse of Decedent and he lacks standing to sue for wrongful
death. (CCP § 377.60.) Therefore, the Complaint must properly allege a duty by
Defendants to protect Plaintiff Kearney.
Plaintiff Kearney does not contend he was in an employment
relationship with Defendant Gonzalez. The
Complaint does not allege any facts tending to show that Defendants knew
Plaintiff Kearney was going to ride in the car with Decedent, or that they knew
he was at risk of foreseeable harm. Thus,
the Court finds that the Complaint fails to allege that Defendants owed a duty
directly to Plaintiff Kearney. In any
event, social host immunity would bar claims by Plaintiff Kearney against
Defendants based upon the mere furnishing of alcoholic beverages. Because Defendants do not demur to the Second
Cause of Action, the Court does not address arguments relating to vicarious
liability.
Whether Defendant Joseph Hoban Owed a Duty to
Plaintiffs
The Complaint alleges that Defendant Hoban is “the insurer
of the Subject Property,” and he “allowed” the party to occur and the Decedent
to drive while intoxicated. However, the Complaint does not allege any facts showing
Defendant Hoban knew Decedent was
intoxicated, or what Defendant Hoban’s role was at the party. The Complaint does not allege Defendant Hoban
attended the party or otherwise exercised any control over the Subject Property
during the party. Plaintiffs’ reliance
upon Delgado v. Trax Bar Grill (2005) 36 Cal.4th 224 is misplaced. In Delgado,
the Court found that the homeowner had actual notice of an imminent threat,
the threat was foreseeable, and there was a special relationship between the
homeowner and the Plaintiff. As discussed
above, the Complaint does not allege that Defendant Hoban had any actual
knowledge of the party occurring or knew of Decedent’s condition before driving. The Court finds that the Complaint does not
sufficiently allege that Defendant Hoban owed a duty to Plaintiffs. In any event, social host immunity would bar
claims against Defendant Hoban based upon the mere furnishing of alcoholic
beverages.
Whether Plaintiff Jimmy Rey Patrick has
Standing to Sue
Defendants argue that Plaintiff Patrick has failed to
establish any connection to the incident because only the Decedent and
Plaintiff Kearney were involved in the accident. According to Defendants, Plaintiff Tonia
Perez is the successor-in-interest to Decedent’s estate and there are no
allegations as to how or why Plaintiff Patrick is involved or could claim
Defendants are liable to him.
However, the Complaint alleges that Plaintiff Patrick is
the parent of Decedent, and he is claiming damages for wrongful death.
(Complaint, ¶ 12(b).) Therefore, Plaintiff Patrick has properly alleged
standing. (CCP § 377.60.)