Judge: Lee W. Tsao, Case: 23NWCV01970, Date: 2024-09-24 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23NWCV01970 Hearing Date: September 24, 2024 Dept: C
CORNELIA MUNTEAN vs 24 HOUR FITNESS,et al.
Case No.: 23NWCV01970
Hearring Date: September 24, 2024 @ 9:30 a.m.
#6
Tentative Ruling
Defendant 24 Hour Fitness USA, LLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
Plaintiff to give notice.
Background
This is a personal injury action. On June 26, 2023, Plaintiff Cornelia Muntean (“Plaintiff”) sued Defendant 24 Hour Fitness USA, LLC (“Defendant”) and Anthony Nocon, asserting causes of action for: (1) Negligence and (2) Premises Liability. On October 11, 2023, Plaintiff dismissed Defendant Anthony Nocon from the Complaint without prejudice. This suit arises from an April 10, 2023, incident where Plaintiff broke her femur after she slipped and fell in the pool area at a 24-Hour Fitness facility in Santa Fe Springs, California. (Complaint ¶ 11.)
Defendant moves for summary judgment on the grounds that the Complaint brought by Plaintiff is barred by the express liability release in her Membership Agreement.
Legal Standard
The purpose of a motion for summary judgment “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.”¿(Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843 (Aguilar); Code Civ. Proc., § 437c (c).)¿ A plaintiff reaches its burden on summary judgment by showing prima facie evidence for each element of its cause of action.¿ Code Civ. Proc, § 437c (p); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519 (Scalf).¿ The burden will then shift to the defendant to show the existence of a triable issue of material fact for at least one element of the cause of action at issue.¿(Ibid.)¿
Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment or summary adjudication and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.”¿(Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)¿However, if all inferences reasonably deducible from the submitted evidence are uncontradicted by other inferences and there is no triable issue as to any material fact, the moving party is entitled to summary adjudication as a matter of law.¿(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c (c); Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)¿
Discussion
The elements of negligence and premises liability cause of action are the same: duty, breach, causation, and damages.¿ (Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998.)¿ Those who own, possess, or control property generally have a duty to exercise ordinary care in managing the property in order to avoid exposing others to an unreasonable risk of harm.¿ (Annocki v. Peterson Enterprises, LLC (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 32, 37.)¿
An exculpatory contract releasing a party from liability for future ordinary negligence is valid unless it is prohibited by statute or impairs the public interest. (Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California (1963) 60 Cal.2d 92, 96.) Releases in the context of recreational sports or exercise facilities generally do not impair the public interest. (Capril v. L.A. Fitness International, LLC (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1084.) A valid release precludes liability for risks of injury within the scope of the release. (Paralift, Inc. v. Superior Court (1993) 23 Cal.App.4th 748, 757.) A release of liability for future gross negligence, in contrast, generally is unenforceable as a matter of public policy. (City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 747, 750-751.) Ordinary negligence consists of a failure to exercise reasonable care to protect others from harm, while gross negligence consists of “a ‘ “ ‘want of even scant care’ ” ’ or ‘ “ ‘an extreme departure from the ordinary standard of conduct.’ ” ’ (Id. at p. 754.)
In support of the motion, Defendant presents evidence which includes the following:
Plaintiff confirmed that she read and signed the Club Membership Agreement and confirmed the signature on the Club Membership Agreement was hers. (SS # 3, Ex. D, p. 16:17-25.)
Plaintiff testified she read Section 10 of Plaintiff’s Club Membership Agreement which contained the following provisions: “Release of Liability and Assumption of Risk Using the 24 Hour Fitness USA, LLC. (24 Hour) facilities, services, or activities involves the risk of injury to you or your guest, whether you or someone else causes it. Specific risks vary from one activity to another and the risks range from minor injuries to major injuries, such as catastrophic injuries including death. In consideration of your acceptance of the benefits under this agreement, you understand and voluntarily accept this risk and agree that 24 Hour, its officers, directors, employees, volunteers, agents and independent contractors will not be liable for any injury, including, without limitation, personal, bodily, or mental injury, economic loss or any damage to you, your spouse, guests, unborn child, or relatives resulting from the negligence of 24 Hour or anyone on 24 Hour's behalf or anyone else whether related to exercise or not and whether using 24 Hour’s services on its premises or not.” (Bold and underline emphasis in original.) (SS # 4, Ex. D., p 17:19-25.)
The Court determines Defendant has made a prima facie showing that Plaintiff voluntary signed a Release of Liability and Assumption of Risk clause, which may relieve Defendant of its liability. The burden now shifts to Plaintiff to raise a triable issue of material fact.
Violations of Building and Health and Safety Codes
Plaintiff argues that various statutory provisions preclude operation of the waiver and release clause in the health club membership agreement. (Capri v. L.A. Fitness International, LLC, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th 1078.)
“All contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt any one from responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another, or violation of law, whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of the law.” (Civil Code § 1668, italics added.)
Plaintiff argues that Defendant committed the following violations of law which render the waiver and release clause invalid as against public policy: Defendant’s concrete pool deck was not compliant with 1998 California Building Code (“CBC”) Section 3113B.2. [PUMF 5-7.] Specifically, the pool area was not properly sloped, allowing for water pooling. [PUMF 5-7.] Moreover, Defendant was in violation of 1998 CBC Section 3113B.1 which requires that pool decks be slip-resistant and have a non-abrasive surface. [PUMF 8-10.] Finally, Defendant violated Health and Safety Code Sections by failing to require its employees to clean up water on the pool deck area by mopping to reduce the water accumulation thereon. [PUMF 8-10.]
The plaintiff in Capri, like Plaintiff in this case, sued a fitness club for injuries incurred when he slipped and fell on the club's pool deck. The fitness club relied upon the waiver and release clause in the membership agreement. The plaintiff argued that the waiver and release clause could not be enforced because the fitness club violated Health and Safety Code Sections 116040 and 116043. Section 116040 provides, “Every person operating or maintaining a public swimming pool must do so in a sanitary, healthful and safe manner.”¿ Section 116043 provides, “Every public swimming pool, including swimming pool structure, appurtenances, operation, source of water supply, amount and quality of water recirculated and in the pool, method of water purification, lifesaving apparatus, measures to insure safety of bathers, and measures to insure personal cleanliness of bathers shall be such that the public swimming pool is at all times sanitary, healthful and safe.” The appellate court found that the waiver and release clause, as applied to the negligence per se cause of action, was invalid because that cause of action alleged a violation of Health and Safety Code Sections 116040 and 116043. However, the wavier and release clause could be applied to the negligence cause of action which omitted a statutory violation.
Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint omits any mention of the Health and Safety Code or Building Code sections purportedly violated by Defendant. Thus, the waiver and release clause in this case is not invalid as against public policy.
Gross Negligence
In addition to the purported statutory violations discussed above, Plaintiff argues Defendant’s absence of pool safety and maintenance protocols and any supervisorial oversight at the time of Plaintiff’s incident further proves gross negligence. A release of liability for future gross negligence is generally unenforceable as a matter of public policy. (City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 747, 750-751.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to present any evidence in support of the assertion that “Defendant has no written policies, procedures, or protocols for regular maintenance of the pool area.” (PUMF No. 15.) The Court has reviewed the portions of the deposition testimony cited by Plaintiff and agrees with Defendant. In fact, Defendant’s PMQ, Anthony Nocon, testified that employees are instructed to inspect walkways in the pool area and to mop up pools of water. (Deposition of Anthony Nocon, 44:20-45:16.) Plaintiff’s remaining contentions do not raise a triable issue of material fact regarding whether Defendant’s conduct amounts to “an extreme departure” from the ordinary standard of care, or gross negligence.
Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
Objections
Defendant’s objections numbers 1-5 are OVERRULED.