Judge: Lee W. Tsao, Case: 23NWCV02443, Date: 2024-10-16 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23NWCV02443    Hearing Date: October 16, 2024    Dept: C

CASTANEDA v. TURN 2 AG, LLC, ET AL.

CASE NO.:  23NWCV02443

HEARING:  10/16/24 @ 9:30 A.M.

#5

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiff Edith Gonzalez Castaneda’s motion for attorney fees and costs against Defendant Hudson Insurance Company is GRANTED in part. Plaintiff is entitled to $13,125.00 in attorney fees and $1,077.40 in costs.

Moving Party to give NOTICE.

This is a Song-Beverly action. The parties settled before they filed any motions, exchanged written discovery, inspected vehicles, or deposed anyone. (Decl. Phan, ¶ 9.) Plaintiff Edith Gonzalez Castaneda moves for $18,350.00 in attorney fees and $1,077.40 in costs.

Prevailing Party

Under Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d), “[i]f the buyer prevails in an action under [the Song-Beverly Act], the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.”

Here, under the terms of the settlement agreement, the parties agreed that Plaintiff is the prevailing party and Defendants will not dispute Plaintiff’s underlying entitlement to attorney’s fees and costs.

Reasonableness of Attorney’s Fees

A buyer prevailing under the Song-Beverly Act may recover “reasonable” attorney fees and costs as determined by the Court. (Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (d).) As to Song–Beverly warranty claims, prevailing buyers have the burden to show that the fees incurred were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation and were reasonable amounts.  (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 998.)  The question whether attorneys’ fees were reasonably incurred may depend on circumstances including, “factors such as the complexity of the case and procedural demands, the skill exhibited, and the results achieved.”  (Goglin v. BMW of North America, LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 462, 470.)

Lodestar is the objective starting point to determine if attorney’s fees are reasonable. (Nichols v. City of Taft (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1242.) Lodestar is calculated by using the reasonable rate for comparable services in the local community, multiplied by the reasonable number of hours spent on the case. (Ibid.) Lodestar requires the court to determine the reasonable number of hours expended for the work performed. (Concepcion v. Amscan Holdings, Inc. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1309, 1320.) The lodestar approach has been applied to determining attorney’s fees under Song-Beverly. (Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 817.)

In evaluating whether the attorney fee request is reasonable, the trial court should consider whether the case was overstaffed, how much time the attorneys spent on claims, and whether the hours were reasonably expended. (Morris v. Hyundai Motor Am. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 38.) Reasonable compensation does not include compensation for padding in the form of inefficient or duplicative efforts. (Ibid.) A reduced award might be fully justified by a general observation that an attorney submitted a padded bill. (Ibid.)

Here, Plaintiff seeks to recover attorney fees and costs for the following: (1) attorney Christopher P. Barry for 7.8 hours at $695 per hour; (2) attorney Gregory T. Babbitt for 4.6 hours at $610 per hour; (3) attorney Joseph S. Green for 4.4 hours at $550 per hour; (4) attorney Nathan N. Kiyam for 19.0 hours at $340 per hour; (5) attorney Ahmed Yousef for 1.7 hours at $280 per hour; (6) paralegal Brandon Rodriguez for 1.1 hours at $195 per hour; (7) paralegal Laura Turner for 1.8 hours at $195 per hour; and (8) paralegal Jeanette Abbenhaus for 1.3 hours at $155 per hour. (Decl. Barry, ¶¶ 7, 15; Decl. Kiyam, ¶ 3; Decl. Green, ¶ 4; Decl. Babbitt, ¶ 7; Decl. Turner, ¶ 4.)

Plaintiff argues that the fee request is reasonable because all the services performed were necessary to litigate the case and given the work that went into the case and outcome achieved, the time spent was reasonable and necessary. Plaintiff also argues that the hourly rates and billed hours are presumed to be reasonable. The rates are reasonable based on the experience and qualifications of the attorneys. Plaintiff further argues that California courts and arbitrators often approve Plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rates. In addition, Plaintiff’s firm charges competitive market rates based on a national survey of prevailing rates for consumer attorneys conducted in 2023.

In opposition, Defendant argues that there was overstaffing; some of the work was inefficient, redundant, and duplicative; Plaintiff’s counsel billed for vague and ambiguous entries; billings related to discovery should be stricken; billings related to intraoffice communications should be stricken. In addition, the Court should not award fees which are prospectively estimated. Further, Plaintiff’s counsel fails to establish that Plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rates are prevailing rates in Los Angeles.

In reply, Plaintiff asserts that the case was not overstaffed; Defendants have not established there is an inefficient, redundance, and duplicative billing; the time entries are not vague or ambiguous; billings related to discovery are proper; billings for communications about the case between paralegals and junior attorneys and the supervising attorneys is appropriate; Plaintiff’s rates are reasonable. Further, Plaintiff amends its request for the preparation of the reply.

Here, the Court finds that this case did not present particularly complex or unique issues, did not require any discovery motions, and did not go to trial.  The case settled in three months. (Decl. Phan, ¶ 8.) Further, because the attorneys have litigated Song-Beverly cases many times, the Court finds that there is a certain methodology in prosecuting these cases and a template the attorneys follow. (Decl. Green, ¶¶ 8,12.) Because of the simple and straightforward nature of the litigation, the little litigation it required, and the experience of the attorneys, the Court finds the attorney rates excessive in this action. The Court sets a blended rate of $350 per hour for all five attorneys who worked on the case. 

When attorney fees are recoverable by statute, the reasonable attorney fees incurred in preparing the motion are also recoverable. (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 1002.) Thus, the Court also includes the fees in incurred in preparing the instant motion.

Based upon an hourly rate of $350 per hour, and a total of 37.5 hours billed, the Court awards $13,125.00 in attorney fees, 

          Paralegals

Paralegal and other professional staff rates must be justified with evidence that they are consistent with market rates. (See, e.g., Shame on You Prods. v Banks (9th Cir. 2018) 893 F.3d 661, 670.)

Plaintiff has not submitted evidence that the paralegal’s rates are consistent with market rates. Thus, the Court strikes the paralegals’ entries.

Costs

The memorandum of costs must be served and filed within 15 days after the date of service of the notice of entry of judgment or of service of written notice of entry of judgment. (Cal. Rules of Ct, rule 3.1700(a).)

Here, Plaintiff included a memorandum of costs as part of its motion. Defendant do not oppose Plaintiff’s fee requests.

Thus, the Court awards the fee request.