Judge: Lee W. Tsao, Case: 23NWCV02460, Date: 2024-04-16 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23NWCV02460    Hearing Date: April 16, 2024    Dept: C

Viridiana Aranda vs Trojan Battery Company, et al.

Case No.: 23NWCV02460

Hearing Date: April 16, 2024 @ 9:30 AM

#5

Tentative Ruling

Defendant Roth Staffing Companies, LP’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and for Stay of Action is DENIED.

Plaintiff to give notice.

Defendant Trojan Battery Company has joined in the motion.

Background

This case involves claims of sexual harassment, sexual battery, and sexual assault by Plaintiff Viridiana Aranda (“Plaintiff”) against her former employers Trojan Battery Company, LLC (“TBC”), Roth Staffing Companies, LP (“Roth”) (collectively, “Defendants”), and Plaintiff’s former coworker Abraham Cazares (“Mr. Cazares”) after she endured alleged sexual advances, groping, and inappropriate conduct during her employment.

Request for Judicial Notice and Evidentiary Objections

Judicial Notice

Defendants request judicial notice of Plaintiff’s Compliant. Given that the Compliant is already a part of the judicial record in this action, the Court declines to take judicial notice at this time.

Evidentiary Objections

Defendant Trojan Battery Company, LLC submits evidentiary objections.

The Court rules as follows:

Objection Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 are OVERRULED.

Objection No. 5 is SUSTAINED.

Defendant Roth Staffing Company submits evidentiary objections.

The Court rules as follows:

Objection Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 are OVERRULED. 

Objection Nos. 1, 10, and 11 are SUSTAINED.

Legal Standard

Defendants move to compel arbitration pursuant to an Arbitration Agreement entered into between Roth and Plaintiff as part of Plaintiff’s onboarding process with Roth.  

California law reflects a strong public policy in favor of arbitration as a relatively quick and inexpensive method for resolving disputes. To further that policy, California Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2 requires a trial court to enforce a written arbitration agreement unless one of three limited exceptions applies. Those statutory exceptions arise where (1) a party waives the right to arbitration; (2) grounds exist for revoking the arbitration agreement; and (3) pending litigation with a third party creates the possibility of conflicting rulings on common factual or legal issues.” (Acquire II, Ltd. v. Colton Real Estate Group (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 959, 967 [citations omitted]; Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.2.) 

In deciding a petition to compel arbitration, trial courts must decide first whether an enforceable arbitration agreement exists between the parties, and then determine the second gateway issue whether the claims are covered within the scope of the agreement. (Omar v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 955, 961.) The party seeking arbitration has the “burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by a preponderance of the evidence, while a party opposing the petition bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense.” (Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 842.)¿The trial court “sits as the trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, and any oral testimony the court may receive at its discretion, to reach a final determination.” (Id.) General principles of contract law govern whether parties have entered a binding agreement to arbitrate. (Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236; see also Winter v. Window Fashions Professions, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 943, 947.)¿ 

Discussion

Existence of a Valid Arbitration Agreement

Here, Roth attaches a copy of the arbitration agreement.

As part of Plaintiff’s onboarding process with Roth, Plaintiff was provided with Roth Staffing’s Ambassador Handbook (i.e., employee handbook), which includes a three-page document entitled, “Mutual Arbitration Agreement.” (Garduno Decl., ¶¶ 4-5, Exh. A.)

The opening paragraph of the Mutual Arbitration Agreement states, in part:

“Except as otherwise provided in this Mutual Arbitration Agreement (“Agreement”) and to the fullest extent allowed by law, any controversy, claim or dispute between you and Roth Staffing Companies, L.P., which includes Ultimate Staffing Services, Ledgent Finance & Accounting, Adams & Martin Group, Ledgent Technology, About Talent, and/or any of their affiliates, divisions, owners, shareholders, directors, partners, members, officers, employees, volunteers or agents (collectively, the “Company”), relating to or arising out of your employment or the cessation of that employment will be submitted to final and binding arbitration before a neutral arbitrator in the county in which you work(ed) for determination pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, and administered by JAMS in accordance with JAMS’ Employment Arbitration Rules and Procedures (which can be accessed at www.jamsadr.com/rules-employmentarbitration), as the exclusive remedy for such controversy, claim or dispute.”

(Garduno Decl., Ex. A. at p. 33.)

The Mutual Arbitration Agreement also specifies that it “covers, but is not limited to claims of unpaid wages, breach of contract, torts, violation of public policy, discrimination, harassment, or any other employment-related claims under laws including but not limited to … the California Fair Employment and Housing Act[.]” (Garduno Decl., Ex. A. at p. 33.)

The concluding portion of the Mutual Arbitration Agreement, which precedes the signature line, states in boldface text: “I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT I HAVE READ, UNDERSTAND, AND AGREE TO THE FOREGOING. I AGREE TO USE AN ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE TO DEMONSTATE MY ACCEPTANCE OF THIS MUTUAL ARBITRATION AGREEMENT. I UNDERSTAND THAT AN ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE IS AS LEGALLY BINDING AS AN INK SIGNATURE.” (Ibid. [emphasis in original].)

Plaintiff inserted her electronic initials onto every page of the Mutual Arbitration Agreement and inserted her printed name and electronic signature on the signature page. (Garduno Decl., ¶¶ 4-5, Exh. A.) The agreement was fully executed on January 10, 2022. (Ibid.)

Accordingly, the Court finds that there is a valid arbitration agreement.

Defenses 

While Plaintiff does not dispute the existence or authenticity of the arbitration agreement, she argues that arbitration is precluded by the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (the “EFAA”).  Signed into law on March 3, 2022, the EFAA amends the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq., and renders unenforceable (at option of person alleging assault or harassment) pre-dispute arbitration agreements relating to claims of sexual assault or sexual harassment:¿ 

Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, at the election of the person alleging conduct constituting a sexual harassment dispute or sexual assault dispute, or the named representative of a class or in a collective action alleging such conduct, no predispute arbitration agreement or predispute joint-action waiver shall be valid or enforceable with respect to a case which is filed under Federal, Tribal, or State law and relates to the sexual assault dispute or the sexual harassment dispute.¿(9 U.S.C. § 402, subd. (a).) 

The effective date of the EFAA is March 3, 2022.  “This Act, and the amendments made by this Act, shall apply with respect to any dispute or claim that arises or accrues on or after the date of enactment of this Act.” (PL 117-90, March 3, 2022, 136 Stat 26, emphasis added.)¿ 

Here, the events constituting Plaintiff’s sexual battery and sexual assault claims occurred on March 9, 2022 (FAC ¶¶ 32-33.), six days after the EFAA was enacted. 

Roth argues that the EFAA should not apply because Plaintiff’s original complaint establishes that Plaintiff possessed enough information to believe she had been subjected to unlawful conduct by mid-February of 2022.  Defendants point to language in the original complaint which alleges “Around Mid-February, Ms. Aranda felt [Defendant Cazares’s] pervasive behavior had gone on too far.” (Complaint ¶ 25.) This language, as Defendants point out, is omitted from the FAC.  However, the acts which occurred before mid-February as alleged in the original complaint did not amount to touching.  Like the FAC, the original complaint also alleged that a sexual battery and sexual assault occurred on March 9, 2022.  The gravamen of Plaintiff’s causes of action, in both the original complaint and the FAC, involve allegations of sexual battery and sexual assault that occurred on March 9, 2022.  The fact that some unlawful conduct is alleged to have occurred before the EFAA’s enactment does not preclude its application.  Under these circumstances, the Court determines that arbitration is prohibited under the EFAA. 

Roth also argues that to the extent the arbitration agreement does not apply under federal law, it should be enforceable under California law. However, the EFAA makes clear that no “predispute arbitration agreement or predispute joint-action waiver shall be valid or enforceable with respect to a case which is filed under Federal, Tribal, or State law.” (9 U.S. Code § 402(a).) Accordingly, the EFAA supersedes California law. 

TBC argues that to the extent the Court determines the EFAA applies, Plaintiff must be compelled to Arbitrate all claims not subject to the EFA. This would include all causes of action besides the seventh and eight causes of action for sexual assault and sexual battery.  Clearly, the causes of action in the FAC relate to common factual allegations and outline a course of conduct of sexual harassment.  While the alleged conduct may give rise to separate causes of action, the conduct is founded on allegations of sexual harassment as defined by the Act. Therefore, the Court rejects TBC’s attempt to exclude the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, ninth, and tenth causes of action from the protections of the Act.

Accordingly, the motion to compel arbitration and for stay of action is DENIED.