Judge: Lee W. Tsao, Case: 23NWCV02830, Date: 2024-06-18 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23NWCV02830 Hearing Date: June 18, 2024 Dept: C
Jane Doe 7096 vs Los Angeles Unified School
District, et al.
Case No.: 23NWCV02830
Hearing Date: June 18, 2024 @ 10:30 AM
#7
Tentative Ruling
Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District’s
Demurrer is OVERRULED. Defendant to
answer within 20 days.
Plaintiff to give notice.
Background
In a Complaint filed on September 7, 2023, Plaintiff Jane
Doe 7096 (“Plaintiff”) alleges she was a student at Bell High School in 2005
when her former teacher, Defendant Gerardo Herrera (“Herrera”), began grooming
and molesting her. Defendant Los Angeles
Unified School District (“LAUSD”) turned “a blind eye to red flags” in
Herrera’s behavior, thus fostering an environment that disregarded students’
safety. (Complaint, ¶¶ 1-2, 14.)
LAUSD argues that AB218, effective January 1, 2020, creates
a new liability which violates the California Constitution’s prohibition on
unlawful gifts of public funds.
Additionally, LAUSD demurs to the First and Second causes of action on
the following grounds: (1) the First Cause of Action fails to state fact
sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Defendant District and is
uncertain; and (2) the Second Cause of Action for Negligent Supervision and
Retention fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action
against District and is uncertain.
Legal Standard
A
demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of
action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)
When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in
context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power
(2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects
must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial
notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th
968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or
other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear
on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.” (SKF Farms v.
Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) “The only issue
involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands,
unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.” (Hahn,
supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 747.)
Discussion
Constitutionality of AB218
The Court first addresses the argument that AB218
violates the California Constitution prohibition against unlawful gifts of
public funds.
Defendant argues that the retroactive application
of AB 218 violates Article XVI, Section 6 of the California Constitution.
Under the Government Claims Act, no
person may sue a public entity or public employee for money or damages unless a
timely written claim has been presented to and denied by the public
entity. (County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2005) 127
Cal.App.4th 1263, 1267.) Absent an applicable exception, failure to
timely present a claim for money or damages to a public entity bars a plaintiff
from filing suit against that entity bars a plaintiff from filing a lawsuit
against that entity. (State of California v. Superior Court (2004)
32 Cal.4th 1234, 1239.)
Currently,
claims brought under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 for damages
resulting from childhood sexual abuse are exempt from the claims presentation
requirement. (See Gov. Code, § 905, subd. (m).) Before the passage
of AB 218, Government Code section 905, subdivision (m) limited the exception
to the claim presentation requirement to childhood sexual abuse claims arising
out of conduct occurring on or after January 1, 2009. When AB 218 became
law in October 2019, it amended section 340.1 to revive expired claims and
enlarged the time to file suit. AB 218 also (1) amended Government Code
section 905, subdivision (m) by deleting the language limiting the claim
presentation exception to claims arising out of conduct occurring on or after
January 1, 2009, and (2) added Government Code section 905, subdivision (p),
which made this change retroactive.
Defendant
challenges AB 218 as unconstitutional in that it violates California
Constitution, Article XVI, section 6, which prohibits gifts of public funds
(also referred to by the parties as the “Gift Clause”). The Gift Clause
states, in relevant part, that the Legislature shall have no “power to make any
gift or authorize the making of any gift, of any public money or thing of value
to any individual, municipal or other corporation whatever.” (Cal.
Const., art. XVI, § 7.) “[T[he term ‘gift’ includes ‘all appropriations
of public money for which there is no authority or enforceable claim, even if
there is a moral or equitable obligation.’” (Jordan v. California
Dept. of Motor Vehicles (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 431, 450 [citing Conlin
v. Board of Supervisors (1893) 99 Cal.17, 21-22 (Conlin)].)
Defendant
argues that AB 218 is a gift of public funds that violates the Gift Clause by
excusing compliance with the Government Claims Act. Importantly, Defendant does
not dispute that the Legislature’s authority to enlarge or amend a statute of
limitations to revive claims; instead, it argues that timely claim presentation
is a substantive element of any cause of action against a public entity and is
not merely a procedural requirement. In some of the cases Defendant sites, Chapman
v. State (1894) 104 Cal. 690, 693, the Supreme Court stated that “the
legislature has no power to create a liability against the state for any . . .
past act of negligence.” Subsequently, in Heron v. Riley (1930)
209 Cal. 507, 517, the Supreme Court stated that the imposition of liability
for a past act of negligence “would, in effect, be the making of a gift.”
Defendant
argues that its demurrer should be sustained because Plaintiff was allegedly
groomed and molested beginning in 2005 but did not submit a claim within a year
of the abuse. Defendant argues that after Plaintiff failed to submit a
claim, Defendant became immune from liability, and AB 218, which retroactively
strips this immunity away, should be invalidated.
The
Legislature passed AB 218 in 2019, which amended Code of Civil Procedure
section 340.1 by authorizing a three-year extension for reviving claims of
childhood sexual abuse in spite of how long ago the abuse occurred. (See Code
Civ. Proc., § 340.1 (q).) AB 218 also amended Government Code section 905
to retroactively remove the limitation that the waiver from the claim
presentation requirement applied to conduct “occurring on or after January 1,
2009” and adding subsection (p) to the Gov. Code § 905, stating that “changes
made to this section by the act that added this subdivision are retroactive and
apply to any action commenced on or after the date of enactment of that act,
and to any action filed before the date of enactment and still pending on that
date, including any action or causes of action that would have been barred by
the laws in effect before the date of enactment.” (Gov. Code, § 905(p).)
Courts
have found that the Legislature has the authority to enlarge the statute of
limitations. (Quarry v. Doe I (2012) 53 Cal.4th 945, 955 (“Quarry”).)
“Code of Civil Procedure Section 340.1 is, for the most part, a statute of
limitations.” (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 536.)
The revival of lapsed claims is a retroactive application of the law under an
enlarged statute of limitations. (Quarry, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 956.)
See Liebig v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 828, 830 (“[T]he
Legislature has the power to retroactively extend a civil statute of
limitations to revive a cause of action time-barred under the former
limitations period.”); Roman Catholic Bishop of Oakland v. Superior Court
(2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1155, 1161 (“It is equally well settled that legislation
reviving the statute of limitations on civil law claims does not violate
constitutional principles.”).) Furthermore, the statute extended the time to
bring childhood sexual assault actions that had “not been litigated to finality
and that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2020, because the
applicable statute of limitations, claim presentation deadline, or any other
time limit had expired[.]” (CCP, § 340.1(r).) However, the claim presentation
deadline is not a statute of limitations. (Rubenstein v. Doe 1, 3
Cal.5th 903, 907.)
In
Shirk, the California Supreme Court held that the plaintiff’s claims
were barred due to her failure to present a timely claim under the Government
Claims Act. (Shirk v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 201,
212-214. However, the case was heard before the enactment of AB 218, and
“Subdivision (m) was added to section 905 in 2008, in direct response to
Shirk.” (Coats, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 422.)
The
Legislature is prohibited from making any gift of public money or thing of
value to any person. (Chapman v. State (1894) 104 Cal. 690, 693.)
Pursuant to Cal. Cost. Art. XVI, § 6, the term “gift” “‘includes all
appropriations of public money for which there is no authority or enforceable
claim,’ even if there is a moral or equitable obligation.” (Jordan v.
California Dept. of Motor Vehicles (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 431, 450, quoting
Conlin v. Board of Supervisors (1893) 99 Cal. 17, 21-22 (Conlin).
“[T]he primary question is whether the funds are to be used for a public or a
private purpose. If the money is for a public purpose, the appropriation is not
a gift even though private persons are benefited by the expenditure.” (County
of Los Angeles v. La Fuente (1942) 20 Cal.2d 870, 876-877.) “The
determination of what constitutes a public purpose is primarily a matter for
legislative discretion [Citations], which is not disturbed by the courts so
long as it has a reasonable basis.” (Alameda County v. Janssen (1940) 16
Cal.2d 276, 281 (“Janssen”).) “[T]he courts may infer the public purpose from
other legislation or the manner in which the legislation is enacted.” (Scott
v. State Bd. of Equalization (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1597, 1604.)
The
Court does not find that the Legislature lacks the authority to revive lapsed
claims against the state for past acts of negligence that would have been
barred before the enactment of AB 218. Based on a further review of the
legislative history and case law, the Legislature possesses the authority to
revive lapsed claims against the state. Further, the Court is not persuaded
that the revival of lapsed claims constitutes a “gift” in violation of the
State Constitution. Defendant fails to cite authority that reviving lapsed
claims against the state would be a prohibition against the gift of public
funds. In Heron, the court explained that judgments obtained
against the state did not constitute a gift of public money as prohibited in
the constitution and the judgments are obtained after compliance with the
requirements of due process. (Heron v. Riley, (1930) 209 Cal. 509, 517.)
It is evident that a victim of childhood abuse must first obtain a judgment to
recover money against the state, which is not a gift of public funds. Thus,
COUSD fails to show that Plaintiff’s claims are unenforceable since AB 218
revived Plaintiff’s claims.
The
legislature enacted AB 218 since the “systematic incidence of childhood sexual
assault in numerous institutions in this country and the cover-ups that
accompanied them arguably make both a revival period and an extended statute of
limitations warranted.” (RJN, Ex. 1, p. 6.) Moreover, the public purpose of
section 340.1 is to extend the statute of limitations and revive claims for
victims of childhood abuse to allow them to obtain compensation from both
private and public entities. (A.M. v. Ventura Unified School Dist. (2016) 3
Cal.App.5th 1252, 1264.) The purpose of the law for victims “to deserve an
opportunity to expose their perpetrators and those who covered up the abuse. AB
218 simply provides a forum for victims to come forward. Victims will still be
responsible for proving they were sexually assaulted and someone covered it
up.” (Ibid. at p. 9.) Furthermore, Government Code section 905,
subdivision (m) states that its purpose was ‘to ensure that victims severely
damaged by childhood sexual abuse are able to seek compensation from those
responsible, whether those responsible are private or public entities....’
[Citation.] The author of the legislation explained this would be accomplished
‘by specifically exempting Section 340.1 civil actions for childhood sexual
abuse from government tort claim requirements, thereby treating Section 340.1
actions against public entities the same as those against private entities.’
[Citation.]
The
Court acknowledges the purpose behind the enactment of AB 218 is to allow
victims to come forward with claims of sexual abuse. However, the Court will
not disturb the Legislature’s determination of the public purpose of AB 218.
The public purpose of the statute is a matter for the Legislature to decide and
not the Court in this case. See Dittus v. Cranston (1959) 53 Cal.2d 284,
286 (“invalidity of legislation must be clear before it can be declared
unconstitutional”). Nonetheless, a reasonable basis exists for the
Legislature’s determination that a forum should exist for victims to prove they
were sexually assaulted and someone covered up the acts of negligence. Thus, AB
218 serves the public purpose for victims to make claims of sexual abuse
against their perpetrators. Defendant has failed to show the revival of lapsed
childhood claims for sexual assault against the state is unconstitutional and
in violation of Cal. Const. art. XVI, § 6. Accordingly, Defendant’s Demurrer is
denied as to the claims that AB 218 should not apply.
Having addressed the
arguments as to AB 218, the Court turns to the demurrer as it relates to the
causes of action.
First Cause of Action for Negligence
LAUSD argues that as a public entity it is only subject
to statutory liability, not common law ones, and to the extent Plaintiff relies
on a statutory duty, the First Cause of Action is not pleaded with the required
specificity.
Plaintiff relies on Government Code § 815.2,
subd. (a), which provides, “A public
entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an
employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or
omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action
against that employee or his personal representative.”
Here, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges a special relationship between
Plaintiff and LAUSD, which owed a duty to its pupils to supervise staff and
students to protect them from foreseeable harm. (C.A. v. William S. Hart
Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal. 4th 861.) “[A] school district and its employees have a special relationship with
the district's pupils, a relationship arising from the mandatory character of
school attendance and the comprehensive control over students exercised by
school personnel, “analogous in many ways to the relationship between parents
and their children.” (Id., at 869.) Here, the Complaint sufficiently
alleges that LAUSD had duty to its students, including Plaintiff, to properly supervise
and train its employees to avoid childhood sexual assault (Complaint, ¶¶ 53-63),
LAUSD breached that duty by allowing Herrera to sexually assault Plaintiff (Id.,
at ¶ 64), and the breach was the proximate cause of harm to Plaintiff (Id.,
at ¶¶ 65-66).
That the Complaint does not identify by name or position LAUSD’s
employees, administrators and/or agents who failed to properly hire, train, or
supervise Herrera is not fatal at this stage of the proceedings. (Id.,
at 872.) “To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient
to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form
part of the plaintiff's proof need not be alleged.” (Ibid.)
Accordingly, the demurrer as to the First Cause of Action is OVERRULED.
Second Cause
of Action for Negligent Supervision and Retention
LAUSD argues that Plaintiff fails to allege any facts showing it had
actual knowledge that Herrera posed a risk to students while acting within the
scope of his employment. However, actual
knowledge of a particular employee’s propensity to commit sexual abuse is not
required in a school setting. (Roe v. Hesperia Unified School Dist.
(2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 13, 26.) “[P]ublic policy considerations favor ‘imposing a duty on school
districts to take reasonable measures to identify and respond to potential
misconduct, even before a district knows a specific employee has previously
engaged in sexual misconduct’ because protecting ‘children from sexual abuse
[is] ‘[o]ne of society's highest priorities.’” (Ibid., (citing Doe v.
Lawndale Elementary School Dist. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 113, 135).)
Here,
the Court finds that Plaintiff has properly pled that LAUSD may be vicariously
liable by stating that “By the time Plaintiff was sexually
assaulted by Herrera repeatedly, LAUSD knew or should have known of the ongoing
grooming and abuse of Plaintiff, but due to their lack of training, employees
failed to recognize the signs and/or failed to stop the abuse.” (Complaint, ¶
75.) Plaintiff also alleges “Defendants failed to provide reasonable
supervision of Herrera; failed to use reasonable care in investigating Herrera;
and failed to provide adequate warning to Plaintiff and her family regarding
Herrera’s sexually abusive and exploitative propensities and unfitness.
Defendants further failed to take reasonable measures to prevent future sexual
assault despite clear warning and signs that such sexual assaults were taking
place.” (Complaint, ¶ 80.) Further, Plaintiff contends that Defendant
“Herrera’s frequent visits with Plaintiff in his classroom and after school
were clear red flags that inappropriate activities could be and were taking
place. Indeed, at least one other member of Bell’s faculty told Plaintiff that
he knew about the abuse yet did nothing to stop it, and merely directed
Plaintiff to the Dean’s office.” (Complaint, ¶ 24.)
Accordingly, the demurrer to the Second Cause of
Action is OVERRULED.