Judge Lee W. Tsao, Case Number: 23NWCV02995, Date: 2024-05-09 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lee W. Tsao, Case: 23NWCV02995, Date: 2024-05-09 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23NWCV02995 Hearing Date: May 9, 2024 Dept: C

DOE v. BELLFLOWER UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

CASE NO.: 23NWCV02995

HEARING: 05/09/24

Defendant BELLFLOWER UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint is OVERRULED.

Opposing Party to give notice.

This sexual misconduct action was filed on September 19, 2023. Plaintiff JANE MH DOE (“Plaintiff”) alleges that “[d]uring Plaintiff’s 8^th grade year at BMS, Plaintiff had BARRETT as her assigned teacher for one of her classes. From the beginning of the school year in fall of 2002, BARRETT began to sexually groom Plaintiff while she was in his class at BMS. His conduct included, but was not limited to, the following: BARRETT rubbed his fingers through Plaintiff’s hair, repeatedly said to Plaintiff, ‘You’re so cute,’ repeatedly told Plaintiff that he wanted to take her picture, made a music CD containing love songs that were sexual in nature, and repeatedly asked Plaintiff to stay after school with him. Unfortunately, one day, Plaintiff was in BARRETT’s classroom alone and BARRETT took advantage. He put his arm around Plaintiff and groped her breast. Plaintiff tried to pull away; however, BARRETT continued, and groped her breast again. Plaintiff was shocked and horrified.” (Complaint ¶15.)

Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts the following causes of action:

(1) Sexual Battery;

(2) Sexual Assault;

(3) Gender Violence;

(4) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress;

(5) Negligence;

(6) Negligent Supervision;

(7) Negligent Hiring and Retention;

(8) Negligent Failure to Warn, Train, or Educate

Defendant BELLFLOWER UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT generally demurs to fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth causes of action.

Childhood Sexual Abuse Claims

Under CCP section 340.1, as amended by Assembly Bill No. 218 (“AB 218”), in an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault, the time for commencement of the action shall be within 22 years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within five years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual assault, whichever period expires later, for any of the following actions: (1) an action against any person for committing an act of childhood sexual assault; or (2) an action for liability against any person or entity who owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, if a wrongful or negligent act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual assault that resulted in the injury to the plaintiff. (CCP § 340.1, subd. (a)(1)-(2).)

AB 218 also amended the provision that lists exceptions to the Government Claims Act, Government Code section 905, by removing language in subdivision (m) that limited the exception to claims arising out of conduct that occurred on or after January 2009 and adding subdivision (p), which made this change retroactive. (See Coats v. New Haven Unified School District (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 415, 424 (“Coats”); Gov. Code § 905, subds. (m), (p).)

Article XVI, section 6 of the California Constitution (“the Anti-Gift Provision”) provides, in relevant part: “The Legislature shall have no power to give or to lend, or to authorize the giving or lending, of the credit of the State, or of any county, city and county, city, township or other political corporation or subdivision of the State now existing, or that may be hereafter established, in aid of or to any person, association, or corporation, whether municipal or otherwise, or to pledge the credit thereof, in any manner whatever, for the payment of the liabilities of any individual, association, municipal or other corporation whatever; nor shall it have power to make any gift or authorize the making of any gift, of any public money or thing of value to any individual, municipal or other corporation whatever… .” (Cal. Const., art. XVI, § 6.)

Defendant District argues that the portion of AB 218 that retroactively exempts childhood sexual abuse claims from the Government Claims Act is unconstitutional with respect to public entities and constitutes an impermissible gift of public funds. Compliance with the Government Claims Act is a substantive prerequisite to stating a claim for money damages against a public entity. (See State of California v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1240-41.)

Defendant District’s argument turns on the distinction between the nature of the statutes of limitation for childhood sexual abuse cases and the substantive requirements of the Government Claims Act for stating a claim against a government entity.

The Court finds that the effect of AB 218 in amending the Government Claims Act to add an exemption for claims of the type alleged herein does not constitute a “gift of public money or thing of value” within the meaning of the Anti-Gift Provision of the Constitution. As the California Supreme Court held in Heron v. Riley (1930) 209 Cal. 509, 517:

We are not strongly impressed with the contention of the respondent that the application of funds to pay judgments obtained against the state constitutes a gift of public money, within the prohibition of the Constitution. The state cannot be subjected to suits against itself express by its express consent; but it may surrender its sovereignty in that particular. The judgments which are to be paid bear no semblance to gifts. They must first be obtained in courts of competent jurisdiction, to which the parties have submitted their claims in the manner directed by law. In other words, they are judgments obtained after the requirements of due process of law have been complied with.”

Here, AB 218 did not create an obligation on the part of a governmental agency to pay a claim made by Plaintiff. In order for Plaintiff to recover money from Defendant District, Plaintiff must first obtain a judgment in this case. This would not be a gift of public funds.

Based on the foregoing, the Court is not persuaded by Defendant District’s argument that the retroactive elimination of the claim presentation requirement for childhood sexual abuse claims that arose before 2009 in AB 218 is unconstitutional under the Anti-Gift Provision.

The Demurrer is OVERRULED.