Judge: Lee W. Tsao, Case: 23NWCV03813, Date: 2024-08-07 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23NWCV03813    Hearing Date: August 7, 2024    Dept: C

CHAVEZ v. ADECCO USA, INC., ET AL.

CASE NO.:  23NWCV03813

HEARING:  8/3/24 @ 9:30 A.M.

#5

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant Adecco USA, Inc.’s motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED.  Proceedings are STAYED pending arbitration. 

Moving Party to give NOTICE.

This is an employment discrimination and wrongful termination action. Defendant Adecco USA, Inc., a staffing company, moves to compel arbitration based on a contract Plaintiff signed. (Decl. Prentiss, ¶ 5.) Defendant also requests a stay of the action pending arbitration.

Existence of an Arbitration Agreement 

The initial burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement is on Defendant. (See Bannister v. Marinidence Opco, LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 541, 541-543 [“The party seeking arbitration can meet its initial burden by attaching to the petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the¿respondent's signature.”].) Alternatively, the moving party can meet its initial burden by setting forth the agreement’s provisions in the motion. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330; see also Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 219.)

¿“If the moving party meets its initial prima facie burden and the opposing party disputes the agreement, then in the second step, the opposing party bears the burden of producing evidence to challenge the authenticity of the agreement.” (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic¿(2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165.)

Here, Defendant attached a copy of the agreement Plaintiff signed. (Decl. Prentiss, ¶ 11. Ex, C.) Thus, Defendant has met its burden.

Unconscionability

Plaintiff argues that the Agreement is procedurally and substantively unconscionable.

A showing of unconscionability requires procedural and substantive unconscionability. (Armendariz v. Foundation Health (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 102.) Procedural unconscionability asks whether there is oppression from unequal bargaining power or surprise from buried terms. (Id., at 114.) Substantive unconscionability asks whether there are overly harsh, one-sided terms. (Ibid.) There is a sliding scale; if an agreement is particularly substantively unconscionable, the petitioner need not show a large amount of procedural unconscionability, and vice versa. (Ibid.)

i.             Procedural Unconscionability

Plaintiff has not shown procedural unconscionability. Plaintiff bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, any fact necessary to show the Agreement was invalid. (See Banner Entertainment Inc., supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at 356-357.) Plaintiff asserts that the arbitration provision is procedurally unconscionable because Defendant did not provide a copy of the arbitration rules to which the employee would be bound. But as a sole basis, not providing a copy of the rules does not support a finding of procedural unconscionability. (Carbajal v. CWPSC, Inc. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 227, 246.)

Therefore, Plaintiff has not shown that the agreement is invalid based on procedural unconscionability.

ii.            Substantive Unconscionability

Plaintiff has not shown substantive unconscionability. Plaintiff argues evidence of substantive unconscionability exists because the agreement requires him to waive the right to a jury trial; it requires Plaintiff to pay his own attorney fees if he prevails even though Plaintiff sues under Fair Employment and Housing Act; and claims asserted against a third-party beneficiary must be resolved according to the dispute resolution agreement. Plaintiff further argues that the agreement does not identify specific entities or individuals as third-party beneficiaries.

Contracting parties can voluntarily agree to waive their constitutional right to have their dispute resolved in a judicial forum by a jury. (Murrey v. Super. Ct. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1223, 1236.) Thus, the jury trial waiver is not substantively unconscionable.

Upon the Court’s review, the agreement is silent on attorney fees. Thus, contrary to what Plaintiff claims, it does not require Plaintiff to pay his own attorney fees if he prevails.

Contrary to what Plaintiff claims, Defendant identifies the company’s clients and their officers, directors, employees, agents, parents, subsidiaries, and/or affiliated entities as third-party beneficiaries. (Decl. Prentiss, ¶ 11, Ex. C.) Further, requiring arbitration of the claims against the company’s clients and their officers, directors, employees, agents, parents, subsidiaries, and/or affiliated entities is not unfairly one-sided because it does not allocate the risks in an unreasonable manner. (Zullo v. Super. Ct. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 477, 484.)

Therefore, Plaintiff has not shown that the agreement is invalid based on substantive unconscionability.

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED.  Proceedings are STAYED pending arbitration.