Judge: Lee W. Tsao, Case: 23NWCV03837, Date: 2024-09-18 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23NWCV03837    Hearing Date: September 18, 2024    Dept: C

VASQUEZ vs. CALIFORNIA METRO PATROL, LLC, et al.

CASE NO.:  23NWCV03837

HEARING:  9/18/24 @ 10:30 A.M.

#3

TENTATIVE RULING

I.             Defendant California Metro Patrol, LLC; Jonathan Chicas; Richard Rodriguez, and Miguel Solorzano’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s complaint for damages is OVERRULED in part and SUSTAINED in part with 20 days leave to amend. 

II.            Defendants’ motion to strike punitive damages is GRANTED with 20 days leave to amend. 

Moving Party to give NOTICE.

DEMURRER

Background

Plaintiff Leticia Vasquez (“Plaintiff”) is an elected member of the Governing Board of the Central Basin Municipal Water District, a California local public entity. In that capacity, she regularly attends monthly Central Basin board and committee meetings.  On November 27, 2023, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant California Metro Patrol, a security guard company, and three of its security guard employees, Defendants Jonathan Chicas (“Chicas”), Richard Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”), and M. Solorzano (“Solorzano”). 

Plaintiff alleges that on March 27, 2023, Plaintiff attended a Central Basin board meeting at the Doubletree Hotel in Whittier, California. (Complaint, ¶11.) The meeting was open to the public. (Ibid.) Also present at the meeting were Defendants Chicas and Rodriguez, both of whom were armed. (Ibid.) At the meeting, Plaintiff witnessed Joey Martinez, “one of the local activists”, address the board. (Id., ¶12.) Before he could finish, however, Board President Arturo Chacon ordered the security guards to stop Martinez from speaking. (Id., ¶13.) Defendant Rodriguez approached Martinez, grabbed the microphone, and told him to stop talking. (Ibid.) When Martinez continued to speak, Defendant Chicas grabbed Martinez by his left arm and escorted Martinez out of the meeting room. (Ibid.) As this was happening, Plaintiff was standing behind Defendant Chicas waiting for her turn to speak at the podium. (Ibid.)

After Martinez left the meeting, Plaintiff approached the podium to make a public comment. (Id., ¶15.) Board President Arturo Chacon, Central Basin General Manager Alex Rojas, and Central Basin General Counsel Robert Baker shouted at Plaintiff that she could not speak, and Defendant Rodriguez grabbed the microphone to prevent her from doing so. (Ibid.) “Because [Plaintiff] reasonably feared and believed that she would be injured and physically grabbed and thrown out of the room in the same manner as the defendants had just thrown Mr. Martinez out of the room, [Plaintiff] decided not to risk injury and her personal safety and she backed away and returned to her seat at the dias.” (Ibid.) “This outrageous conduct by defendants Chicas and Rodriguez instilled fear, anxiety, severe emotional distress, humiliation, consternation and embarrassment in [Plaintiff] and she reasonably believed and felt that at some point the California Metro Patrol armed guards, Chicas and Rodriguez, would physically grab her, beat her up, drag her out of the meeting room and/or shoot her if she tried to publicly speak out and exercise her first amendment rights.” (Id., ¶16.)

Later, when Plaintiff began to speak at the meeting, Board President Chacon shouted she was out of order. (Id., ¶18.) The meeting was abruptly adjourned. (Ibid.) Then, Defendants Chicas and Rodriguez suddenly surrounded Plaintiff and demanded that she leave the building. (Id., ¶19.) After several minutes of a “standoff” with Defendants Chicas and Rodriguez, they left the room. (Id., ¶22.)

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants Chicas, Rodriguez, and M. Solorzano (“Solorzano”) refused to allow Plaintiff to enter the La Habra Heights Water District building on four occasions so she could attend Central Basin committee meetings held at the location. (Id., ¶25.) After one of the committee meetings, Defendants Chicas and Rodriguez told Plaintiff to move her car. (Id., ¶27.) As a result of Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff has suffered “severe emotional distress, to be frightened, harassed, embarrassed, unnecessarily humiliated, threatened, intimidated and coerced, anguish, horror, nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry, shock, shame and the loss of her right to free speech and assembly, the loss or her right to serve as an elected official and member of the Central Basin Governing Board.” (Id., ¶28.)

Based thereon, the Complaint alleges the following causes of action: 1) assault, 2) intentional infliction of emotional distress, 3) negligent infliction of emotional distress, 4) Bane Act violations, and 5) false imprisonment

Defendants demur to all five causes of action on the grounds that they fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. 

Meet and Confer

The parties adequately met-and-conferred. (Decl. Doty, ¶¶ 3-4; Code. Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a).)

Legal Standard

A demurrer is an objection to a pleading, the grounds for which are apparent from either the face of the complaint or a matter of which the court may take judicial notice.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a); see also Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)  The purpose of a demurrer is to challenge the sufficiency of a pleading by raising questions of law. (Postley v. Harvey (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 280, 286.) 

First Cause of Action: Assault

The essential elements of a cause of action for assault are the following: (1) defendant acted with intent to cause harmful or offensive contact, or threatened to touch plaintiff in a harmful or offensive manner; (2) plaintiff reasonably believed [he or] she was about to be touched in a harmful or offensive manner or it reasonably appeared to plaintiff that defendant was about to carry out the threat; (3) plaintiff did not consent to defendant’s conduct; (4) plaintiff was harmed; and (5) defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s harm.” (So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652, 668-669.) 

Here, Plaintiff alleges that at the March 27, 2023 board meeting, Defendant Rodriguez grabbed the microphone to prevent her from speaking. (Complaint, ¶15.) Although she feared that she would be grabbed and thrown out of the meeting, Plaintiff alleges no facts tending to show that Defendant Rodriguez attempted to grab her or intended to do so. 

The demurrer to the first cause of action is SUSTAINED with 20 days leave to amend. 

Second Cause of Action: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Pleading intentional infliction of emotional distress requires the following: “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress; and (3) the defendant's extreme and outrageous conduct was the actual and proximate cause of the severe emotional distress.”  (Crouch v. Trinity Christian Center of Santa Ana, Inc. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 995, 1007.)

The conduct must be so extreme as to be beyond all bounds of decency tolerated by society. (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-1051.) Mere indignities, insults, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, and the like are not enough. (Id. at 1051.) Whether the alleged conduct is outrageous is usually a question of fact. (So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652, 672.) To avoid demurrer, Plaintiff must allege such acts with great specificity. (Yau v. Santa Margarita Ford, Inc. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 144, 160-161.)

Here, the Court determines that the Complaint, as it currently stands, fails to allege conduct so extreme as to be beyond all bounds of decency. 

The demurrer to the second cause of action is SUSTAINED with 20 days leave to amend. 

Third Cause of Action: Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

Defendants argue that Plaintiff does not allege facts that establish a duty on Defendants’ behalf or the severe emotional distress sufficient to plead negligent infliction of emotional distress.

The elements of negligent infliction of emotional distress are the following: (1) legal duty to use due care; (2) breach of duty; (3) damage or injury; and (4) cause of the resulting damages or injury. (Huggins v. Longs Drug Stores Calif., Inc. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 124, 129.) Serious emotional distress is an essential element of the cause of action of negligent infliction of emotional distress. (Bogard v. Employers Casualty Co. (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 602, 618.)

Here, Plaintiff pleads the following: “While serving as security guards at such public meetings and premises, the defendants had an obligation and duty to act reasonably and responsibly and not to threaten, harass, intimidate, scare, and otherwise frighten those in attendance at the meetings. This obligation and duty was specifically owed to those in attendance at the public meetings including the public officials and members of the public.” (Complaint, ¶41.)

The Court has determined that Rodruguez’s act of grabbing the microphone to prevent Plaintiff from speaking is insufficient to constitute an assault.  Similarly, such an act is insufficient to establish a breach of duty owed to Plaintiff.  Here, Rodriguez grabbed the microphone after the board president, general manager, and general counsel instructed Plaintiff not to speak. 

The demurrer to the third cause of action is SUSTAINED with 20 days leave to amend.   

Fourth Cause of Action: Bane Act Violations

To state a cause of action under section 52.1 there must first be violence or intimidation by threat of violence. (Cabesuela v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Calif., Inc. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 101, 111.) Second, the violence or threatened violence must be due to plaintiff's membership in one of the specified classifications set forth in Civil Code section 51.7 or a group similarly protected by constitution or statute from hate crimes. (Ibid.)

Here, for the reasons stated above, Plaintiff fails to adequately plead violence or intimidation by threat of violence.  Moreover, Plaintiff did not plead that she belongs to one of the specific groups.

The demurrer to the fourth cause of action is SUSTAINED with 20 days leave to amend. 

Fifth Cause of Action: False Imprisonment

The elements of a tortious claim of false imprisonment are the following: “(1) the nonconsensual, intentional confinement of a person, (2) without lawful privilege, and (3) for an appreciable period of time, however brief.” (Lyons v. Fire Insurance Exchange (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 880, 888.) 

Here, Plaintiff alleges, [a]s other people were gathering their belongings and preparing to leave the meeting room, the two armed guards, defendants Chicas and Rodriguez, suddenly surrounded Director Vasquez and demanded that she leave the building. Defendant Rodriguez stood directly in front of [Plaintiff] only an arm’s length away totally blocking her view of the public as she sat at the Directors’ table. Defendant Chicas stood within inches of her and directly behind her, hemming her between the director’s table and the chair in which she sat. Chicas was very close to her and may have even been touching her chair.” (Complaint, ¶19.)

Defendants argue that Plaintiff was free to leave but chose to remain in the meeting room specifically to fight with Defendants after the meeting was over.  Defendants raise factual issues which cannot be adjudicated at this stage of the proceedings.  The Court determines that the fifth cause of action is adequately pleaded. 

The demurrer to the fifth cause of action is OVERRULED.   

MOTION TO STRIKE

Motions to strike are used to reach defects or objections to pleadings which are not challengeable by demurrer (i.e., words, phrases, prayer for damages, etc.). (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 435, 436 & 437.) A motion to strike lies only where the pleading has irrelevant, false, or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)

Defendants move to strike punitive damages. Defendants argue that the complaint does not allege any facts showing that Defendants acted with oppression, fraud, or malice.

To state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a complaint must set forth the elements as stated in the general punitive damage statute, Civil Code section 3294. (College Hospital, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.) These statutory elements include allegations that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) “Malice” is defined in as conduct “intended by the defendant to cause injury to plaintiff, or despicable conduct that is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1); College Hospital, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 725.) “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.” (Civ. Code, § 3294 subd. (c)(2).) “Fraud” is “an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(3).)

Further, an employer shall not be liable based on an employee’s acts unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others; authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct; or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code., § 3294, subd. (b).) For a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and consciousness must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation. (Civ. Code., § 3294, subd. (b).)

Here, Plaintiff does not plead that California Metro Patrol had advanced knowledge of the unfitness of the employee; authorized or ratified the conduct; or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.

As to the individual defendants, the Court does not find that their conduct constitutes malice, fraud, or oppression. The individual defendants confronted Plaintiff in a public space, and although Plaintiff feared defendants would escalate the matter, they did not do so.   

Thus, the motion to strike punitive damages is GRANTED with 20 days leave to amend.