Judge: Lee W. Tsao, Case: 23NWCV04171, Date: 2024-06-18 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23NWCV04171 Hearing Date: June 18, 2024 Dept: C
Steven Remery vs Teresa Sabel Prado, et al.
Case No.: 23NWCV04171
Hearing Date: June 18, 2024 @ 10:30 a.m.
#9
Tentative Ruling
Defendant Teresa Sabel Prado’s Demurrer as to
the Fourth Cause of Action is SUSTAINED with 20 days leave to amend.
Defendant Teresa Sabel Prado’s Motion to Strike
is GRANTED with 20 days leave to amend.
Defendant to give notice.
Background
In a Complaint filed on December 22, 2023, Plaintiff STEVEN
REMERY alleges that “[o]n or about September 4, 2022, Plaintiff was a lawful passenger
in Defendant JOHN DOE’s vehicle travelling eastbound on SR-91 near Lakewood Blvd.. Defendant TERESA SABEL PRADO operated her
vehicle eastbound on SR-91. Defendants operated their respective vehicles
without caution and in such an unsafe manner that they violently collided.
Defendant TERESA SABEL PRADO immediately fled the scene after the collision.
Defendant JOHN DOE began to chase Defendant TERESA SABEL PRADO’s fleeing
vehicle in a reckless and unsafe manner that he sped up and abruptly stopped,
thereby causing additional severe injuries and pain to Plaintiff.” (Complaint,
p. 5.) At the time of the collision, Defendant JOHN DOE was employed by, and
acting within the course of his employment with Defendant LYFT, INC. (Complaint,
p. 4.) Based thereon, Remery alleges negligence as to all defendants and, as to
Prado only, a violation of Vehicle Code § 20001, subd. (a), and Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress. Remery
seeks punitive damages.
Prado demurs to the cause of action for Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress on the grounds that 1) Remery fails to allege
a special relationship between Remery and Prado, and 2) Remery fails to allege facts
sufficient to state a cause of action. Prado
moves to strike language relating to punitive damages
from the Complaint.
Request for
Judicial Notice
Prado
requests Judicial Notice of the Complaint in this action. The Court may take
judicial notice of records within its case file. Accordingly, the Request for
Judicial Notice is GRANTED.
Legal Standard
A
demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of
action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747 (“Hanh”).)
When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in
context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power
(2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects
must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial
notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th
968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or
other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear
on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.” (SKF Farms v.
Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) “The only issue
involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands,
unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.” (Hahn,
supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 747.)
Discussion
The essential elements of a cause of action for IIED are:
(1) Extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant
with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of
causing, emotional distress; (2) The plaintiff’s suffering severe or
extreme emotional distress; and (3) Actual and proximate causation of the
emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct. (Hughes v. Pair
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035,1050-1051; CACI No. 1600.)
Defendant contends that Plaintiff must plead there was a
special relationship between Prado and Remery to properly assert a claim for
IIED against Prado.
In opposition, Remery argues, and the Court agrees, that a
special relationship is not required for an IIED claim. (Angie M. v.
Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217 (a special relationship with
defendant or a defendant’s knowledge of plaintiff’s special susceptibility to emotional
distress are factors that may be considered in determining whether conduct is
“outrageous,” but they are not required elements of the tort).) Therefore, the
demurrer is not sustained on this basis.
However, the Court determines that the Complaint fails to
allege extreme and outrageous conduct by Prado with the intention of causing,
or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress. The Complaint alleges that the vehicles
“violently collided”, but it does not allege the extent to which John Doe’s
vehicle was damaged or any other fact tending to show that Prado knew or should
have known that an occupant in John Doe’s vehicle was injured as a result of
the collision.
Accordingly, the Demurrer as to
the Fourth Cause of Action is SUSTAINED.
Motion to Strike
Upon motion, or at any time in its own discretion, a court
may grant a motion to strike any of the following material: (1) irrelevant,
false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) all or any part of
any pleading not drawn in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule,
or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc. §436.) These provisions also
authorize “the striking of a pleading due to improprieties in its form or in
the procedures pursuant to which it was filed.” (Ferraro v. Camarlinghi,
(2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 509, 528, emphasis in original.)
Here, Prado moves to strike language relating to punitive
damages from the Complaint.
Punitive damages are recoverable when it is proven by clear
and convincing evidence that the defendant is guilty of oppression, fraud, or
malice. (CCP § 3294(a).) Malice is defined as “conduct which is intended by the
defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is
carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the
rights or safety of others.” (CCP § 3294(c)(1).)
For the reasons discussed above, the Court determines that
the Complaint does not sufficiently allege that Prado acted with oppression,
fraud, or malice.
Accordingly, the motion to
strike is GRANTED with 20 days leave to amend.