Judge: Lee W. Tsao, Case: 24NWCV01452, Date: 2025-06-10 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24NWCV01452 Hearing Date: June 10, 2025 Dept: C
HIGUERA v. JAGUAR LAND ROVER NORTH
AMERICA, LLC
CASE
NO.: 24NWCV01452
HEARING: 06/10/2025
#13
TENTATIVE ORDER
I.
Plaintiffs’
Motion to Compel Further Responses to Plaintiffs’ Request for Production of
Documents, Set One, is GRANTED as
set forth below pursuant to CCP §2031.310.
II.
Defendant
is ORDERED to provide verified responses and documents for the following
requests in Plaintiff’s RPD: 1-15,
18, 20, 22, 23-29, and 30-31. Defendant is to produce the documents no later
than 45 days from the issuance of this Order. This date may be extended
pursuant to agreement of the parties.
Moving Party
to give Notice.
Background
This is a
lemon law action. On or about November 3, 2022, Plaintiffs Yvette Higuera and
Carlos Higuera (collectively “Plaintiffs”) purchased a Land Rover Range Rover
(Subject Vehicle). During the Subject Vehicle’s warranty period, Plaintiffs
allegedly presented the Subject Vehicle to Defendant’s authorized repair
facility on multiple occasions for various engine, electrical, and structural
defects.
On May 8,
2024, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint against Defendant Jaguar Land Rover
North America, LLC (Defendant), alleging violations of the Song-Beverly Act.
On June 14,
2024, Plaintiffs propounded their initial set of written discovery, including
the Requests for Production of Documents (RPD), Set One, that is currently at
issue. (Kohanoff Decl., ¶ 16.) On or about July 16, 2024, Defendant responded
to Plaintiff’s request with objections and allegedly did not produce any of the
requested documents. (Id., ¶ 17.) Defendant disputes this, indicating that it
served documents on July 18, 2024. (Cho Decl., ¶ 3, Exhibit A.)
On August 28,
2024, Plaintiff filed the present motion to compel further responses. On May
28, 2025, Defendant filed its Opposition. On May 29, 2025, Plaintiffs filed
their Reply.
Analysis
Plaintiffs
filed the instant motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) sections
2031.310 and 2031.320 on the grounds that Defendant waived its objections and
failed to provide adequate responses to Plaintiffs’ RPD.
Legal
Standard
A party may move to compel further written response
to a request for production if the responding party’s statement of compliance is incomplete, a
representation of inability to comply is inadequate, or an objection is without
merit. (CCP § 2031.310, subd. (a).) To prevail, the party moving for the order
must first offer specific facts demonstrating “good cause justifying the
discovery sought by the demand.” (CCP, § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1).) This burden “is met simply by a
fact-specific showing of relevance.” (TBG
Ins. Servs. Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.) If
“good cause” is shown by the moving party, the burden shifts to the responding
party to justify any objections made to document disclosure. (Kirkland v. Superior Court (2002) 95
Cal.App.4th 92, 98.)
Meet and
Confer
Motions to compel further responses to written
discovery must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration setting forth
facts showing a “reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of
each issue presented by the motion.” (CCP,
§ 2031.310, subd. (b)(2); CCP § 2016.040.)
Plaintiff’s counsel, Joshua Kohanoff (Kohanoff),
submitted a supporting declaration in which he details his efforts to meet and
confer with Defendant’s counsel. On or about July 23, 2024, Kohanoff emailed
Defendant’s counsel a meet and confer letter in which he detailed the
deficiencies in Defendants’ responses to various discovery requests, including
the RPD. (Kohanoff Decl., ¶¶20-21, Exhibit 5.) On or about July 31, 2024,
Kohanoff sent another meet and confer letter to Defendant’s counsel explaining
why Defendants’ responses and objections were improper and reiterating
Plaintiffs’ willingness to stipulate to a protective order. (Id., ¶ 23, Exhibit
6.) Defendant’s counsel did not respond to either of those meet and confer
letters. (Id., ¶ 25.)
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have
substantially fulfilled the statutory meet and confer requirement.
Plaintiff’s Burden to Show Good Cause
Plaintiffs argue that the requested documents are
relevant to Plaintiffs’ Song-Beverly Act (SBA) claims and the issue of whether
Defendant compiled with its affirmative duty under SBA to replace a vehicle or
make restitution to a buyer. Plaintiffs explain that their RPD sought documents
relating to “(1) Plaintiffs’ own vehicle (Request Nos. 1-14); (2) Defendant’s
warranty and repurchase policies, procedures, and practices (Request Nos.
14-29); and (3) Defendant’s knowledge of the same or similar defects in other
vehicles of the same year, make, and model (Request Nos. 30. 31).” (Motion to
Compel (MTC), 9:10-15; Kohanoff Decl., ¶ 16, Exhibit 3.)
Plaintiffs categorize Requests 1-14 as “Requests
Relating to the Subject Vehicle.” (Kohanoff Decl., Exhibit 3, 2:18.) Plaintiffs
argue that Requests 1-14 are relevant to their SBA claims because these
requests seek documents and information concerning the Subject Vehicle itself.
Plaintiffs adequately argue specific facts showing that the Subject Vehicle and
its alleged defects are the subject matter of the suit. Requests 1, 3-12, and
14 are all relevant to the subject matter of the suit because they all seek
documents related to the Subject Vehicle, its alleged defects and/or
communications between the parties. Although Request 2—which requests documents
related to Defendant’s affirmative defenses—does not specify that it is related
to the Subject Vehicle, Defendant’s affirmative defenses are relevant to the
subject matter of the suit. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have
demonstrated good cause justifying the discovery of the documents requested in
Requests 1-14.
Plaintiffs categorize Requests 15-22 as “Defendant’s
Warranty Policy and Procedure for Handling Song-Beverly Cases.” (Kohanoff
Decl., Exhibit 3, 4:20.) Plaintiffs argue that Requests 15-22 are relevant to
the issue of whether Defendant willfully violated the SBA. (Id, 26-31.)
Plaintiffs adequately allege specific facts about Defendant’s knowledge of the
types of defects plaguing the Subject Vehicle and others like it, as well as
facts about Defendant’s refusal to repurchase the Subject Vehicle. (MTC, 3:9-28
- 4:1.) Because Requests 15, 18, 20, and 22 are all related to Defendant’s
policies and procedures for handling SBA claims, Plaintiffs have established
the relevance of Requests 15, 18, 20, and 22.
However, Plaintiffs have not alleged specific facts showing the
relevance of Requests 16, 17, 19, and 21. In support of these requests,
Plaintiff merely refers to the reasons offered in support of RFP No. 15. Requests 16 and 17 relate to Defendant’s call
center policies regarding responses to complaints about defects. Although
Plaintiffs allege that they called Defendant regarding the defects affecting
the Subject Vehicle (MTC, 3:25-26), this fact alone does not establish the
relevance of Defendant’s call center policies. Request 19 asks for documents
related to flow charts used for the purpose of escalating customer complaints.
Request 21 asks for documents related to training materials on Defendant’s policy
for calculating repurchases. Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts that
establish the relevance of Requests 19 and 21.
Plaintiffs categorize Requests 23-29 as “Defendant’s
Warranty Policy and Procedure for Handling.” (Kohanoff Decl., Exhibit 3, 5:24.)
Plaintiffs argue that Requests 23-29 are relevant because they concern
Defendant’s policies and procedures for handling warranty issues. Plaintiffs
adequately allege facts that Defendant violated the SBA by failing to conform
the Subject Vehicle to the terms of the warranty within a reasonable number of
repair opportunities. Because Requests 23-29 are all related to Defendant’s
warranty policy and procedures provided to its authorized repair facilities,
Plaintiffs have established the relevance of requests 23-29.
Plaintiffs categorize Requests 30-31 as “Similar
Customer Complaints.” (Kohanoff Decl., Exhibit 3, 7:1.) Plaintiffs argue
Requests 30-31 are relevant because they evidence similar defects experienced
by other consumers, as well as Defendant’s knowledge of those defects and
Defendant’s inability to repair them. Plaintiffs adequately allege facts that
Defendant knew about the “types of defects plaguing Plaintiff’s vehicle through
its internal investigation and analysis of customer complaints, warranty data,
field service reports, and product evaluation.” (Kohanoff Decl., ¶ 12.) Because
Requests 30-31 relate to Defendant’s knowledge of defects that Plaintiffs and
other consumers experienced, Plaintiffs have established the relevance of
Requests 30-31. However, the request
shall be limited to records created within the past five years.
Therefore, Plaintiffs have shown good cause
justifying the discovery of Requests 1-15, 18, 20, 22, 23-29, and 30-31.
Accordingly, the burden shifts to Defendant to justify any objections made to
their disclosure.
Defendant’s Objections
Although Defendant asserts a variety
of objections in the body of its original response to Plaintiff’s discovery
requests, Defendant’s opposition only addresses its objections based on
overbreadth, relevance, and privacy. The Court limits its discussion to those
objections specifically argued by Defendant in its opposition papers.
Defendant contends that Plaintiffs’
requests are overbroad because they seek information unrelated to whether
Defendant repaired the Subject Vehicle within a reasonable number of
opportunities. In support of this argument, Defendant applies Calcor Space Facility v. Superior Court (1997),
53 Cal.App.4th 216. The court in Calcor
found that the propounding party’s requests for production were overbroad
because they essentially requested everything in the responding party’s
possession that had anything to do with gun mounts. (Calcor, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at p. 219-220.) Defendant
argues that Plaintiffs’ requests here are no different. Specifically, Defendant
argues that Plaintiffs’ requests for documents about Defendant’s warranty and
repurchase policies, procedures, and practices, as well as Defendant’s
knowledge of the same or similar defects in other vehicles of the same year,
make, and model suffer from the same overbreadth as the requests in Calcor.
Defendant’s argument is flawed. Plaintiffs do not request everything in
Defendant’s possession that has anything to do with the Subject Vehicle.
Plaintiff’s requests are specifically tailored to discover evidence of
Defendant’s policies to maintain compliance with SBA and Defendant’s knowledge
of the same or similar defects that other vehicles of the same make and model
experienced– this is a much narrower scope than what the propounding party in Calcor sought. Therefore, the Court
rejects Defendant’s overbreadth objection.
Regarding relevance, Defendant
provides little to no analysis of why it deems any of the requests irrelevant.
Instead of discussing why the requests are irrelevant, Defendant merely
attacks the authorities that Plaintiffs cite to in support their own arguments about
relevance. Defendant briefly argues that Plaintiffs’ requests for production of
Defendant’s policies and procedures regarding complaints and repurchase
requests are irrelevant because Defendant’s Customer Relationship Center and
its Consumer Affairs departments were never involved in the instant case. This
argument is flawed because Plaintiffs did not request documents related to the
Customer Relationship Center or the Consumer Affairs department. Although
Plaintiffs’ requests might encompass documents from those departments, the fact
that those departments were not involved in the case is immaterial. Plaintiff’s
requests for production of Defendant’s policies and procedures regarding
complaints and repurchase requests are relevant to Defendant’s SBA compliance.
Defendant does not adequately dispute this relevance. Therefore, the Court
rejects Defendant’s relevance objection.
Finally, Defendant also argues that its objections
as to privacy and proprietary information are justified. To illustrate its
point, Defendant explains that Request 30, which requests all documents of
other customer complaints that are substantially similar to Plaintiff’s
complaint, is overly intrusive because those documents contain the personal
information of people who have nothing to do with the present lawsuit. This
argument is also flawed because the sensitive information that Defendant seeks
to protect can be redacted. It is standard practice to redact sensitive
information such as social security numbers, birthdays, addresses, bank account
numbers, etc. Thus, the Court rejects Defendant’s privacy objection.
Based on the foregoing, the Court
finds that Defendant has failed to adequately justify any of its asserted
objections.
Conclusion
Accordingly,
Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Further Responses to Plaintiffs’ Request for
Production of Documents, Set One, is GRANTED
as set forth above pursuant to CCP §2031.310.
Defendant is ORDERED to provide verified responses
and documents for the following requests in Plaintiff’s RPD: 1-15, 18, 20, 22, 23-29, and
30-31. Defendant is to produce the documents no later than 45 days from the
issuance of this Order. This date may be extended pursuant to agreement
of the parties.