Judge: Lee W. Tsao, Case: BC667792, Date: 2023-05-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: BC667792    Hearing Date: July 20, 2023    Dept: C

YI v. JSGS PARTNERS LLC

CASE NO.: BC667792

HEARING: 07/20/23

#8

Defendant DONG HYUN BAIK’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. The alternative Motion for Summary Adjudication is DENIED.  

Opposing party to give notice

The Complaint, filed by Plaintiff RAYMOND YI (“Decedent”) alleges that on September 13, 2015, Plaintiff was injured on Defendant JSGS’s property due to its negligence. The Complaint asserts a single cause of action for Premises Liability. Defendants KIM and BAIK were subsequently added as DOE 1 and DOE 1. 

Raymond Yi passed away in 2022. SUNG KUK YI (“Plaintiff”), Plaintiff’s father, has substituted in as party plaintiff for Decedent.

Defendant JSGS Partners, LLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment was granted on September 11, 2020. Defendant CHOI’s motion for summary judgment was granted on February 9, 2021.

Defendant DONG HYUN BAIK (“Baik”) is the sole remaining defendant in this action. Baik now moves for summary judgment or alternatively summary adjudication of the following issues: (1) Plaintiff cannot establish that Baik owed any duty of care to Plaintiff to prevent the Subject Incident because Baik had no control over the Subject Premises; (2) Baik did not have actual knowledge of any problem, defect, or malfunction with the subject garage door; (3) Plaintiff can produce no admissible evidence to establish that the subject garage door presented any dangerous condition at the time the subject Lease Agreement was executed; and (4) Defendant did not have actual or constructive notice of any alleged dangerous condition of the subject garage door prior the Subject Incident.

“The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages.” (Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998.)

“A commercial landowner cannot totally abrogate its landowner responsibilities merely by signing a lease. As the owner of property, a lessor out of possession must exercise due care and must act reasonably toward the tenant as well as to unknown third persons. At the time the lease is executed and upon renewal a landlord has a right to reenter the property, has control of the property, and must inspect the premises to make the premises reasonably safe from dangerous conditions. Even if the commercial landlord executes a contract which requires the tenant to maintain the property in a certain condition, the landlord is obligated at the time the lease is executed to take reasonable precautions to avoid unnecessary danger…. The burden of reducing or avoiding the risk and the likelihood of injury will affect the determination of what constitutes a reasonable inspection. The landlord’s obligation is only to do what is reasonable under the circumstances. The landlord need not take extraordinary measures or make unreasonable expenditures of time and money in trying to discover hazards unless the circumstances so warrant. When there is a potential serious danger, which is foreseeable, a landlord should anticipate the danger and conduct a reasonable inspection before passing possession to the tenant. However, if no such inspection is warranted, the landlord has no such obligation.” (Mora v. Baker Commodities, Inc. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 771, 781.)

Baik submits the Declaration of Dong Hyun Baik in support of the instant Motion. Baik’s Declaration states, in relevant par:

·        “The initial lease was entered into between John Choi (‘CHOI’), the landlord of the subject property and myself… on June 18, 2011.” (Baik Decl., ¶1.)

·        “I then, immediately, that same day, ‘subleased’ the subject Premises (‘Agreement’) to Chong Kim aka Jeff Kim (‘KIM’). The sublease was an oral agreement me and KIM.” (Baik Decl., ¶2.)

·        “The Agreement between myself and KIM, required KIM to maintain and repair the portion of the premises, including but not limited to the Door which purportedly caused injury to Plaintiff.” (Baik Decl., ¶7.)

·        “Mr. John Choi, the property, declared that he had inspected the garage doors of the Premises again in June 2011, at approximately the time that I entered into the Lease, the same moment in which the premises was then ‘subleased’ to KIM. Again, Mr. Choi found no problems or damage to the garage doors at that time.” (Baik Decl., ¶10.)

In Opposition, Plaintiff disputes the existence of any valid oral lease between Baik and Jeff Kim, citing the statute of frauds. (See, e.g., PRSS No. 2.)

Cal. Civ. Code §1624 states: “(a) the following contracts are invalid, unless they, or some note or memorandum thereof, are in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or by the party’s agent…. (3) An agreement for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale of real property, or of an interest therein; such an agreement if made by an agent of the party sought to be charged, is invalid, unless the authority of the agent is in writing, subscribed by the party sought to be charged.” (Id.)

Because the oral lease between Baik and Kim is for an interest in real property for longer than one year, the statute of frauds applies barring an exception.

In Reply, Baik argues that Plaintiff (“Decedent’s predecessor”) lacks standing to dispute the validity of the oral lease because Decedent was not a party to the alleged oral agreement. This argument lacks merit.

Plaintiff is not asserting the statute of frauds defense in order to object to the validity of the lease. Rather, Plaintiff cites the statute of frauds to dispute the existence of any alleged sublease between Baik and Kim. Aside from Baik’s self-serving declaration submitted in support of his Motion, there is no evidence before the Court establishing that Baik subleased the Property back to Jeff Kim immediately after he entered into a written lease with John Choi. The written lease entered into on June 18, 2011 between Baik and Choi provides that Baik was obligated to “keep in good order, condition and repair the Premises and every part thereof….” (MF No. 1.) Notwithstanding Baik’s declaration that he orally subleased the Property to Jeff Kim immediately after entering into the written lease, Baik and Choi executed a written Addendum to their written lease on July 1, 2011. (Opp. Ex. 2.)

Baik has not met his burden of proof to show that he delegated responsibility over maintenance and repair of the garage door to Kim, the purported sub-lessee. Baik’s self-serving declaration contradicts his deposition testimony and other written evidence in existence.

Moreover, Baik submits no evidence to show that he performed an inspection of the garage doors. Baik admits that Choi performed the inspection before Baik executed the written lease. Baik does not declare that he ever performed a reasonable inspection to ensure that the premises was safe from dangerous conditions.

Summary judgment/adjudication is DENIED.