Judge: Linda S. Marks, Case: 2022-1240298, Date: 2022-10-17 Tentative Ruling

Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint filed by Mia G. Carbajal on 6/9/22

The Complaint sufficiently pleads facts supporting Plaintiff Chad Christopher Sheldon’s (“Plaintiff”) punitive/exemplary damages cause of action.

“[A] conscious disregard of the safety of others” may constitute the requisite malice within the meaning of section 3294 of the Civil Code necessary to support a punitive damages claim. (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 895–896; Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, 88–89.) “In order to justify an award of punitive damages on this basis, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct, and that he wilfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.” (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 895–896.)

“One who willfully consumes alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing that he thereafter must operate a motor vehicle, thereby combining sharply impaired physical and mental faculties with a vehicle capable of great force and speed, reasonably may be held to exhibit a conscious disregard of the safety of others.” (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 896–897.) “The effect may be lethal whether or not the driver had a prior history of drunk driving incidents.” (Ibid.) “It is crystal clear to us that courts in the formulation of rules on damage assessment and in weighing the deterrent function must recognize the severe threat to the public safety which is posed by the intoxicated driver.” (Id., at 899.) “Drunken drivers are extremely dangerous people.” (Ibid.)

Here, Plaintiff alleges that at the time the accident occurred, Defendant was “driving under the influence” of drugs and “fleeing from the police officers.” As alleged, Defendant disregarded the police officers’ commands and, instead, “purposely, wilfully [sic] and knowingly fled from police officers.” Then, Defendant hit Plaintiff’s vehicle while Plaintiff was at a red light and thereafter “made no attempt to pull over to assess the damages in the collision.”

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant continued to disregard the safety of him and others after the collision when she left the accident site, further “evaded police officers[,] and continued to drive recklessly” by side-swiping a parked vehicle, colliding with a cement planter, striking a pedestrian crossing sign, driving over the speed limit, driving in multiple lanes at a time, and accelerating between and almost colliding with two other vehicles. Eventually Plaintiff was stopped by police and arrested for driving under the influence in violation of Civil Code section 23152(f).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “engaged in the foregoing conduct with a willful and conscious disregard for the rights and safety of others.” Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “knew before getting behind the wheel of her vehicle that it was illegal to drive while under the influence of drugs and that it was entirely probable that she would lose control of the vehicle and cause a collusion with another motorist”

Defendant argues that such facts do not rise to the level of the requisite malice to support a claim of punitive damages based on the holdings in Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890 and Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82. Both Taylor and Dawes found that their respective complaints sufficiently stated a cause of action of punitive damages.

Importantly, however, this case is unlike Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890 and Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82 in that the police officers were allegedly in pursuit of Defendant prior to the accident with Plaintiff. Neither Taylor nor Dawes addresses a situation wherein the Plaintiff was injured during a police pursuit of an intoxicated driver where in the intoxicated driving was “fleeing” from police. Such facts evidence the requisite “conscious disregard of the safety of others” sufficient to constitute malice within the meaning of section 3294 of the Civil Code at the pleading stage. (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 895–896; Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, 88–89.)

Moreover, unlike the defendants in Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890 and Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant was under of influence of drugs – not alcohol.

Tentative Ruling: Defendant’s Motion to Strike is DENIED. Defendant shall file her answer within 30 days of the notice of ruling.

Prevailing party to give notice.