Judge: Lindsey E. Martinez, Case: 2021-01235226, Date: 2022-08-08 Tentative Ruling
1. Demurrer to Amended Complaint
2. Motion to Strike Complaint
Motion No. 1: Defendant Jelber Aguilar’s Demurrer to the Third Cause of Action of the Complaint is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.
In the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs added some additional language and two exhibits, the photo of the property damage and the 911 transcript. In Paragraph 4, Plaintiffs alleged that after Defendant “fled the scene of the collision, Plaintiffs then pursued Defendant’s vehicle at a high speed in a dangerous chase for approximately three minutes . . . As a result of this traumatic encounter, Plaintiffs’ encountered severe emotional distress so substantial in nature that no reasonable person in society should expect to bear it.”
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: “A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists when there is ‘(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct.’ A defendant's conduct is ‘outrageous’ when it is so ‘extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.’ And the defendant's conduct must be ‘intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result.’ ” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050–1051.) (Emphasis added.)
“’Behavior may be considered outrageous if a defendant (1) abuses a relation or position which gives him power to damage the plaintiff's interest; (2) knows the plaintiff is susceptible to injuries through mental distress; or (3) acts intentionally or unreasonably with the recognition that the acts are likely to result in illness through mental distress.’. . . ‘Moreover, ‘[t]he extreme and outrageous character of the conduct may arise from an abuse by the actor of a position, or a relation with the other, which gives him actual or apparent authority over the other, or power to affect his interests.... [¶] The extreme and outrageous character of the conduct may arise from the actor's knowledge that the other is peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress, by reason of some physical or mental condition or peculiarity. The conduct may become heartless, flagrant, and outrageous when the actor proceeds in the face of such knowledge, where it would not be so if he did not know.’” (Hailey v. California Physicians' Service (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 452, 474.) (Emphasis original.)
The Complaint alleged that Defendant with knowledge of Plaintiff’s serious injuries fled the scene. Plaintiffs and Defendants did not have a pre-existing relationship created the circumstance for outrageous conduct. Even though Defendant allegedly willfully left the scene of the accident, his conduct was not so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community under the circumstances. Defendant’s conduct after the accident (leaving) was passive and not directed at the Plaintiff. Plaintiff in fact gave chase. No allegations have been added that alter the Court’s prior ruling to the effect that allegations of “fleeing the scene” in the absence of a special relationship are not of the kind that support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Leave to Amend: “Plaintiff must show in what manner he can amend his complaint and how that amendment will change the legal effect of his pleading.” (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) Plaintiff has not demonstrated how the defects in the Third Cause of Action and the request for punitive damages could be corrected.
Motion No. 2: Defendant Jelber Aguilar’s Motion to Strike is GRANTED as to punitive damages.
Second Cause of Action for General Negligence: “’Following an order sustaining a demurrer or a motion for judgment on the pleadings with leave to amend, the plaintiff may amend his or her complaint only as authorized by the court's order.’” (Zakk v. Diesel (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 431, 456.)
Defendant moved to strike the Second Cause of Action for General Negligence. The revised cause of action added “intentionally” and “wilfully.” In addition, Plaintiff added Defendants’ negligence caused “significant injuries.”
On 4/22/22, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Errata. (ROA 45) Plaintiff corrected the language of the Second Cause of Action and returned to the original language. The error was corrected.
Punitive Damages: In order to survive a motion to strike punitive damages, the Plaintiff must plead ultimate facts to show it is entitled to such relief. (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166.)
Conclusory characterization of defendant’s conduct as intentional, willful, and fraudulent is a patently insufficient statement of “oppression, fraud, or malice” within the meaning of §3294. (Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.) Regardless of relaxed pleading criteria, “allegations that the Defendant’s conduct was wrongful, willful, wanton, reckless or unlawful do not support a claim for exemplary damages; such allegations do not charge malice.” (G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court (1974) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 29.)
In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth. . . . In ruling on a motion to strike, courts do not read allegations in isolation.” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)
“’Conscious disregard’ means ‘that the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct, and that he willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.’. . Put another way, the defendant must “have actual knowledge of the risk of harm it is creating and, in the face of that knowledge, fail to take steps it knows will reduce or eliminate the risk of harm.’” (Butte Fire Cases (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1159.) (Emphasis original.)
The First Amended Complaint did not allege additional allegations that cured the pleading defect. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant willfully fled the scene of the accident with knowledge of Plaintiffs’ injuries. There is no allegation that Defendants were in need of immediate medical treatment. In fact, Plaintiffs were able to give chase after the accident. Plaintiffs did not allege that Defendant were guilty of causing additional injuries by the subsequent hit and run.