Judge Lisa K. Sepe-Wiesenfeld, Case Number: 19SMCV00043, Date: 2024-01-02 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lisa K. Sepe-Wiesenfeld, Case: 19SMCV00043, Date: 2024-01-02 Tentative Ruling

In her Fourth Amended Complaint (“4AC”), Plaintiff Rhonda Jessum (“Plaintiff”) alleges two claims for quiet title, one against “Public Defendants” and one against “Private Defendants,” a claim for declaratory relief against all Defendants, a slander of title claim against Defendant County of Los Angeles (“the County”), and an injunctive relief claim against the County, which was voluntarily dismissed on June 5, 2023. Plaintiff defines “Private Defendants” to be “[a]ll private party Defendants” (Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 48), and the Court understands this to mean all individual defendants and corporate defendants, excluding Defendants County of Los Angeles and Mountains Recreation and Conservation Authority (“MRCA”). Plaintiff defines “Public Defendants” as including the County and MRCA. (Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 28.)

Defendants Mark Konopaske and Ann Wisniewski demur to the second and third causes of action for quiet title and declaratory relief, respectively, alleged against them in Plaintiff’s 4AC. The County demurs to all causes of action, but only the first, third, and fourth causes of action for quiet title, declaratory relief, and slander of title, respectively, are alleged against the County. The County also moves to strike paragraphs 91 through 104 and 106, and Plaintiff’s prayer for injunctive relief. Defendants Interdyne, LLC, Josh Clark, Dara Ghasemizadeh, and MRCA have filed joinders to the motions.

In short, Plaintiff has brought this action to obtain a judgment that she owns a portion of Gorge Road which traverses her lot, as she contends it is a private road. (Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 105-106.) Plaintiff’s claims over the course of this action have been confusing, and the Court has allowed her many opportunities to clarify why she is entitled to relief. As described below, Plaintiff has failed to amend her pleading in a manner which states claims upon which relief may be granted, and the Court lacks a basis to conclude that further amendment is proper, as she has been given several chances to state a claim, but each iteration of her pleading fails to do so.

“[A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint.” (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (See Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 [in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents].) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true (Aubry v. Tri-City Hosp. Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967), but the Court does not “assume the truth of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law” (Moore v. Regents of University of California (1990) 51 Cal.3d 120, 125).

Further, the court may, upon motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b).) The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false, or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)

Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (See Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 [court shall not “sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment”]; Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1037 [“A demurrer should not be sustained without leave to amend if the complaint, liberally construed, can state a cause of action under any theory or if there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured by amendment.”]; Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768 [“When the defect which justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure, the court should allow leave to amend.”].) The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)

An action for quiet title seeks “to establish title against adverse claims to real or personal property or any interest therein.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 760.020, subd. (a).) In an action for quiet title, Plaintiff must plead (1) “[a] description of the property that is the subject of the action,” specifically the location of tangible personal property and the legal description and street address or common designation of real property, (2) “[t]he title of the plaintiff as to which a determination under this chapter is sought and the basis of the title,” (3) “[t]he adverse claims to the title of the plaintiff against which a determination is sought,” (4) “[t]he date as of which the determination is sought,” and (5) “[a] prayer for the determination of the title of the plaintiff against the adverse claims.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 761.020.)

First, Plaintiff fails to set forth an exact description of the property that is the subject of this action; she simply refers to “the subject property” and a segment of Gorge Road without describing the property with a legal description. (Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 24, 48.) Plaintiff identifies her property (Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 1), but she does not specifically describe the property for which she seeks to quiet title. It is unclear whether Plaintiff is seeking to quiet title for the entirety of Gorge Road or just a portion. (Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 11-12, 24.) Plaintiff also fails to state the interest claimed by any defendant. Plaintiff alleges that the road is considered to be public (Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 29, 51), but this does not state an interest claimed by Defendants. Plaintiff also alleges a mistake in the legal description, but she alleges her company bought the property in 2015, but she did not file this action until 2019, almost one year beyond the three-year statute of limitations set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (d). (See Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 19, 77.) For these reasons, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for quiet title against any defendant, and Defendants’ demurrers to the first and second causes of action are SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

“To qualify for declaratory relief, a party would have to demonstrate its action presented two essential elements: (1) a proper subject of declaratory relief, and (2) an actual controversy involving justiciable questions relating to the party’s rights or obligations.” (Jolley v. Chase Home Finance, LLC (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 872, 909, quotation marks and brackets omitted.)

For the same reasons stated as to Plaintiff’s quiet title claims, Plaintiff has failed to set forth an actual controversy involving justiciable questions relating to the party’s rights or obligations because the subject property is not clear, the interest claimed by the other parties is unclear, and Plaintiff’s basis for her purported interest is unclear. Further, insofar as Plaintiff seeks to reform a deed, this claim, too, is outside the statute of limitations.

Additionally, a cause of action for declaratory relief should not be used as a second cause of action for the determination of identical issues raised in another cause of action. (General of America Insurance Co. v. Lilly (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 465, 470.) “The availability of another form of relief that is adequate will usually justify refusal to grant declaratory relief” (California Insurance Guarantee Association v. Superior Court (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1617, 1624), and a duplicative cause of action is subject to demurrer (Palm Springs Villas II Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Parth (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 268, 290). Here, Plaintiff’s claim for declaratory relief is no different than the other claims she asserts in her pleading, and none of the claims assert a cause of action upon which relief may be granted. For these reasons, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for declaratory relief against any defendant, and Defendants’ demurrers to the third cause of action are SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

“Slander of title is effected by one who without privilege publishes untrue and disparaging statements with respect to the property of another under such circumstances as would lead a reasonable person to foresee that a prospective purchaser or lessee thereof might abandon his intentions. It is an invasion of the interest in the vendibility of property. . . . Damages usually consist of loss of a prospective purchaser.” (Phillips v. Glazer (1949) 94 Cal.App.2d 673, 677, citations omitted.) “To state a claim for slander of title, a plaintiff must allege (1) a publication, (2) which is without privilege or justification, (3) which is false, and (4) which causes direct and immediate pecuniary loss.” (Schep v. Capital One, N.A. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1331, 1336.)

In this claim, Plaintiff alleges that the County has harmed her by making statements that cast doubt as to her ownership of the property. (Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 84.) Plaintiff alleges that the County distributed a letter to neighbors, agencies, and County departments, and favored a former neighbor. (Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 86, 87.) Plaintiff otherwise fails to set forth specific details of how this publication occurred, that it was made with malice, that it was false, or that she has suffered pecuniary loss from the publication. Plaintiff also fails to set forth that she filed a written claim with the County before filing this action as required by Government Code sections 905 and 910, which require presentation of a claim for money or damages against the County to be timely presented to the County before filing a court action. “Where the claim filing requirements of the Tort Claims Act are applicable, timely compliance and rejection of the claim by the governmental agency must be pleaded in order to state a cause of action.” (State of California v. Superior Court (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 754, 757, quotation marks, brackets, and ellipses omitted.) For these reasons, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for slander of title against any defendant, and the County’s demurrer to the fourth cause of action is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

Defendants Mark Konopaske and Ann Wisniewski’s Demurrer to Fourth Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED without leave to amend. Defendant County of Los Angeles’ Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED without leave to amend. Defendant County of Los Angeles’ Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint is DENIED as MOOT. Plaintiff Rhonda Jessum’s Motion to Set Mandatory Settlement Conference is DENIED as MOOT. Defendants shall prepare, serve, and submit a proposed judgment as per statute.