TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiff Kim Kanner’s Motion for Protective Order is DENIED.

Plaintiff Kim Kanner to give notice. 

REASONING

Plaintiff Kim Kanner (“Plaintiff”) moves the Court for a protective order directing that her deposition be taken by written examination, not oral. Plaintiff represents that she has physical limitations, specifically an eye disease, and needs reasonable accommodations for the deposition, and if an oral deposition is requested, Plaintiff requests that the deposition be taken by remote appearance. Defendant Richard Thurman (“Defendant”) opposes the motion on the ground that Plaintiff has no physical limitations, and Defendant has offered and will be providing accommodations. Plaintiff also takes issue with Defendant’s presence at Plaintiff’s deposition.

“Before, during, or after a deposition, any party, any deponent, or any other affected natural person or organization may promptly move for a protective order.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.420, subd. (a).) “The court for good cause shown may make any order that justice requires to protect any party, deponent, or other natural person or organization from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.420, subd. (b).) The protective order may provide that a deposition not be taken at all, be taken at a different time or place, or other certain limitations. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.420, subd. (b).) At the outset, the Court finds the meet-and-confer efforts to be sufficient for the purposes of these motions. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.420, subd. (a).)

Defendant has offered the following accommodations as to Plaintiff’s deposition: First, Defendant has purchased a 32-inch large computer screen and laptop specifically for use at Plaintiff’s deposition, and there is no intention that Plaintiff read hundreds of documents during the deposition. Second, Defendant has offered to depose Plaintiff near her home to accommodate for any driving issues, and Defendant has offered to pay for an Uber for Plaintiff’s travel to and from her deposition, but Plaintiff has not accepted. Third, Defendant offers to allow Plaintiff to take breaks and rest her eyes if needed. Fourth, the deposition will be taped, such that any impropriety can be discussed with the Court if necessary.

The Court finds that a protective order is not warranted here. The Court makes no finding as to Plaintiff’s physical limitations and credits Plaintiff’s representations given that Defendant has offered to accommodate these issues. Put simply, Defendant is entitled to take Plaintiff’s deposition, and Defendant is entitled to be present at that deposition, particularly given that any attempts to harass Plaintiff will be recorded. It is axiomatic that preventing Defendant’s presence during Plaintiff’s deposition “would significantly and unreasonably impair trial counsel’s ability to effectively represent his client,” as “it is critical for counsel to be able to confer with his client at his side concerning responses being received during the course of a deposition,” and “[t]o preclude this type of attorney-client conferring and to alternatively require the attorney to leave the deposition room to confer with his client outside or make contact by phone would disrupt the discovery processes and would constitute a wide departure from the existing rights of discovery.” (Willoughby v. Superior Court (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 890, 892.)

Thus, Plaintiff Kim Kanner’s Motion for Protective Order is DENIED. However, Defendant shall provide the accommodations listed above, and the parties shall meet and confer about a proper location for Plaintiff’s deposition. Further, the parties are advised to refrain from surreptitious recording; all recording of the deposition must be disclosed to the opposing party in advance of the deposition, and failure to do so may result in sanctions.

Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.420, subdivision (h), provides that the Court “shall impose a monetary sanction . . . against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion for a protective order, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” Defendant requests monetary sanctions on the ground that Plaintiff’s motion is frivolous. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s motion was made with substantial justification, as Plaintiff has provided sworn statements that she suffers from vision impairment; thus, Defendant’s request for monetary sanctions is denied.