TENTATIVE RULING

Defendants Lisa Nicol, Crystal Property Management, Inc., Westside Property Management Inc., and Alexander Livingston Nicol III’s Motion for Attorney’s Fee and Costs in the Amount of $433,285.27 Pursuant to C.C.P. § 1942.4 is GRANTED in the reduced amount of $18,923.88. Such fees are payable by Plaintiff Carla Reid to Defendants Lisa Nicol, Crystal Property Management, Inc., Westside Property Management Inc., and Alexander Livingston Nicol III and defense counsel within sixty (60) days of entry of this order

Defendants Lisa Nicol, Crystal Property Management, Inc., Westside Property Management Inc., and Alexander Livingston Nicol III to give notice. 

REASONING

This matter was dismissed on March 18, 2024, when Plaintiff Carla Reid (“Plaintiff”) failed to appear on the date of the Final Status Conference, Hearing on Motion to Bifurcate, and Jury Trial, and Defendants Lisa Nicol, Crystal Property Management, Inc., Westside Property Management Inc., and Alexander Livingston Nicol III (“Defendants”) made an oral request to dismiss the action. The Court entered judgment in Defendants’ favor on the same date, and on March 21, 2024, Defendants served a Notice of Entry of Judgment on Plaintiff by mail and electronic mail. Defendants now move the Court for attorney fees and costs in the amount of $433,285.27 pursuant to Civil Code section 1942.4. Plaintiff has not filed an opposition to the motion.

While the lease for the property at issue provides for the prevailing party in an action brought by the tenant to recover attorney fees, the contract states that attorney fees shall not exceed $500.00 (Mot., Ex. A), and Defendants seek more than that amount. Nonetheless, Civil Code section 1942.4, subdivision (b)(2), provides that the prevailing party in an action relating to allegations that a landlord demanded rent where the dwelling lacked certain characteristics and endangered the public or occupants’ life. Civil Code section 1942.4 does not define “prevailing party” for purposes of an award for attorneys’ fees; thus, “the determination of which party, if either, prevailed” in the action “is a matter left to the discretion of the trial court.” (Galan v. Wolfriver Holding Corp. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1128.) The Court must “determine which party, if either, was the prevailing party ‘on a practical level.’” (Id. at p. 1129.) Here, Defendants obtained an involuntary dismissal and entry of judgment in their favor. The Court finds that Defendants are the prevailing party in this action, and they are entitled to attorney fees here. 

The fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily “begins with the ‘lodestar’ [method], i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.) “[A] computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.” (Margolin v. Reg’l Planning Comm’n (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004.)

Defendants request attorney fees and costs in the amount of $433,285.27, which is, to be frank, an extremely high number given that this case was not particularly complex, i.e., it is not clear why 778.4 hours were expended on this case when the top biller is an attorney with over 15 years of experience in civil litigation. Further, Garcia v. Santana (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 464 (Garcia), is instructive here. While Plaintiff has not filed an opposition to the motion, she has previously filed documents with the Court seeking fee waivers based on inability to pay and indigency, and Garcia appears to stand for the proposition that indigence can be considered in an attorney fees context where the statute calls for the imposition of “reasonable attorney’s fees” to the prevailing party, as is the case in Civil Code section 1942.4, subdivision (b)(2). Specifically, “[i]n determining the amount of fees to be awarded to the prevailing party where the statute, as here, requires that the fee be reasonable, the trial court must therefore consider the other circumstances in the case in performing the lodestar analysis. Those other circumstances will include, as appropriate, the financial circumstances of the losing party and the impact of the award on that party.” (Garcia, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 476-477.)

The Second District Court of Appeal has made clear that “an award of attorney fees should not subject the plaintiff to financial ruin” (Garcia, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 475), and there is reason to conclude that requiring Plaintiff to pay the full award here may, in fact, subject Plaintiff to shoulder an unreasonable financial burden. However, the Court must also acknowledge that parties must evaluate their cases effectively and avoid filing meritless or improper cases; that is, the requirement to pay an award of attorneys’ fees also serves to deter parties from subjecting opposing parties from incurring costs in defending an action which should not have been brought against them. These considerations require the Court to conclude that it is proper to require Plaintiff to pay an attorney fees award to Defendants, but the award shall be substantially reduced due to Plaintiff’s financial condition.

The Court exercises its discretion to reduce the award to represent 5% of the original fee sought, $378,477.50. Accordingly, Defendants Lisa Nicol, Crystal Property Management, Inc., Westside Property Management Inc., and Alexander Livingston Nicol III’s Motion for Attorney’s Fee and Costs in the Amount of $433,285.27 Pursuant to C.C.P. § 1942.4 is GRANTED in the reduced amount of $18,923.88. Such fees are payable by Plaintiff Carla Reid to Defendants Lisa Nicol, Crystal Property Management, Inc., Westside Property Management Inc., and Alexander Livingston Nicol III and defense counsel within sixty (60) days of entry of this order. Costs shall be awarded pursuant to statute.