TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant 817 Whittier, LLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

Defendant 817 Whittier, LLC shall prepare, serve, and submit a proposed judgment as per statute.

Defendant 817 Whittier, LLC to give notice. 

REASONING

Defendant 817 Whitter, LLC (“Defendant”) moves the Court for an order granting summary judgment in its favor as to Plaintiffs Saule Bektayeva and Darina Denisova (“Plaintiffs”)’s claims for contract rescission, declaratory relief, unjust enrichment, and wrongful retention of security deposit. Plaintiffs have not filed an opposition to Defendant’s motion. While the moving party generally bears the initial burden of proof on its motion, and lack of opposition will not automatically entitle the moving party to prevail on its motion, a party’s failure to file an opposition can be considered a concession that the motion is meritorious. (See Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.)

Legal Standard

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) 

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Med. Ctr. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467 (Avivi).)

“Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “[T]he court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection) . . . in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 467; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)

Plaintiffs’ Claims

Plaintiffs assert four claims based on the contention that a residential lease agreement between Plaintiff Bektayeva and Defendant is subject to rescission “due to impracticality of performance, force majeure, and frustration of purpose.” (Compl. ¶ 2.) Plaintiffs allege that “[t]he Coronavirus pandemic created unforeseeable events which rendered plaintiffs’ use of the Property impossible for the duration of the lease” because Plaintiffs and a third-party occupant “were prevented from securing their visas and traveling to the United States as they previously planned.” (Ibid.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendant is holding $380,000 of Plaintiffs’ funds, which represented rent and a security deposit. (Compl. ¶ 28.)

As to Plaintiffs’ contract rescission claim, a party to a contract may rescind it where the contract is unlawful, was the result of mistake, duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence, or will prejudice the public interest if permitted to stand, or if there was a failure of consideration. (Civ. Code, § 1689, subd. (b).) “To qualify for declaratory relief, a party would have to demonstrate its action presented two essential elements: (1) a proper subject of declaratory relief, and (2) an actual controversy involving justiciable questions relating to the party’s rights or obligations.” (Jolley v. Chase Home Finance, LLC (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 872, 909, quotation marks and brackets omitted.) “The elements for a claim of unjust enrichment are receipt of a benefit and unjust retention of the benefit at the expense of another. The theory of unjust enrichment requires one who acquires a benefit which may not justly be retained, to return either the thing or its equivalent to the aggrieved party so as not to be unjustly enriched.” (Lyles v. Sangadeo-Patel (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 759, 769, quotation marks and citations omitted.) Notably, “[u]njust enrichment is not a cause of action”; it is simply “a restitution claim.” (Hill v. Roll International Corp. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1295, 1307; see also Melchior v. New Line Productions, Inc. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 779, 793 [“there is no cause of action in California for unjust enrichment”].) As to Plaintiffs’ claim for wrongful retention of security deposit, Civil Code section 1950.5, subdivision (l), provides that “[t]he bad faith claim or retention by a landlord or the landlord’s successors in interest of the security or any portion thereof in violation of [Code of Civil Procedure section 1950.5], or the bad faith demand of replacement security in violation of subdivision (j) [of Code of Civil Procedure section 1950.5], may subject the landlord or the landlord’s successors in interest to statutory damages of up to twice the amount of the security, in addition to actual damages.”

Analysis

Defendant presents evidence that the subject lease agreement was signed on February 20, 2020, and provided for a three-month tenancy, commencing on June 15, 2020, with the lessors to provide a security deposit of $50,000. (Def.’s UMF No. 7.) The lease documents contained no contingencies to allow for termination by the tenant, and Defendant was unable to entertain any other offers to lease the property after February 2020. (Def.’s UMF No. 8.) Defendant was willing to honor the lease during a different three-month period, and it attempted to mitigate damages by using its best efforts to lease the premises during the June 15 to September 15, 2020, period, but it was unable to do so. (Def.’s UMF No. 10.) Defendant indicates that Plaintiffs did not show how they made efforts to come to Los Angeles, or how they were prevented from doing so, and private transportation was available. (Def.’s UMF Nos. 14-17.) Further, there was no specific force majeure clause in the lease upon which Plaintiffs could rely. (Def.’s UMF No. 20.)

As to Plaintiffs’ allegation that they were prevented from performing under the contract due to force majeure, there is no evidence that the subject agreement contained a force majeure provision. Even if it had contained such a provision, and even if the COVID-19 pandemic qualified as a force majeure event, Plaintiffs must show that their performance was rendered extremely difficult, expensive, or would involve loss (West Pueblo Partners, LLC v. Stone Brewing Co., LLC (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1179, 1188), and there is no evidence so indicating, nor is there evidence as to Plaintiffs’ inability to arrive in Los Angeles, as they provide only allegations that this was impossible. Similarly, “[i]mpossibility is defined as not only strict impossibility but also impracticability because of extreme and unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury, or loss involved. The defense of impossibility may apply where, as here, a government order makes it unlawful for a party to perform its contractual obligations.” (SVAP III Poway Crossings, LLC v. Fitness International, LLC (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 882, quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted.)

In the complaint, Plaintiffs allege they are foreign nationals who were not permitted to enter the United States during the pendency of the COVID-19 pandemic, and visas could not be issued. (Compl. ¶ 18.) Plaintiffs also allege that the Russian Federation closed its borders and prevented its citizens to travel outside its borders. (Compl. ¶ 19.) However, Plaintiffs’ contractual obligation was not to reside in the property; it was to pay Defendant rent, and “[n]othing about the pandemic or resulting closure orders” made Plaintiffs’ “performance of its obligation to [Defendant]—paying rent—impossible.” (SVAP III Poway Crossings, LLC v. Fitness International, LLC, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 893; see also Fitness International, LLC v. KB Salt Lake III, LLC (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1502 [party was not prevented from paying rent because of the COVID-19 pandemic where it conceded it had the funds to pay rent].) As to whether Plaintiffs’ performance was excused under the doctrine of frustration of purpose, this doctrine excuses contractual obligations “where performance remains entirely possible, but the whole value of the performance to one of the parties at least, and the basic reason recognized as such by both parties, for entering into the contract has been destroyed by a supervening and unforeseen event.” (Id. at p. 895, quotation marks, brackets, and italics omitted.) Here, Defendant offered Plaintiffs the opportunity to lease the premises at a later date, such that Plaintiffs were not prevented from obtaining the value of the agreement, albeit at a different date, i.e., Plaintiffs were not entirely prevented from ever occupying the premises.

Defendant’s evidence allows it to establish there is no triable issue of material fact as to Plaintiffs’ claims for contract rescission, declaratory relief, unjust enrichment, and wrongful retention of security deposit because Plaintiffs’ performance of its obligation under the contract, specifically paying Defendant rent, was not excused “due to impracticality of performance, force majeure, and frustration of purpose” (Compl. ¶ 2) as Plaintiffs allege, which is the basis of each of their claims seeking a return of the rental funds they paid to Defendant. Plaintiffs failed to oppose the motion, thereby failing to show that any triable issue of material fact exists as to their claims. Accordingly, Defendant 817 Whittier, LLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Defendant 817 Whittier, LLC shall prepare, serve, and submit a proposed judgment as per statute.