Judge Lisa K. Sepe-Wiesenfeld, Case Number: 21SMCV01042, Date: 2025-05-21 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lisa K. Sepe-Wiesenfeld, Case: 21SMCV01042, Date: 2025-05-21 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiffs Arno Melikyan and Bahman Bitaraf dba Regency Consulting may amend their complaint only as authorized by the Court’s order and may not amend the complaint to add a new party or cause of action without having obtained permission to do so. (Harris v. Wachovia Mortgage, FSB (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1023.)

Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“Defendant”) first takes issue with Plaintiffs Arno Melikyan and Bahman Bitaraf dba Regency Consulting (“Plaintiffs”) asserting the first five causes of action against Defendant Thomas Watts and Does 1 to 100, and the last two causes of action against Defendant and Does 1 to 100, while stating that Plaintiffs purport to name Defendant as Doe 1, but Doe 1 was previously dismissed with prejudice.

The case docket shows that Defendant was not named in the initial complaint, and on August 2, 2023, Plaintiffs dismissed Does 1 to 100 with prejudice. Plaintiffs then filed their First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on July 9, 2024, naming Defendant as a party to the first, sixth, and seventh causes of action. Defendant appears to conclude that it is a party to all causes of action because it could have been considered a Doe, i.e., Plaintiffs state in the FAC that Doe 1 was identified as Defendant, and Doe 1 is named in all causes of action. “Demurrers for uncertainty are disfavored, and are granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond.” (A.J. Fistes Corp. v. GDL Best Contractors, Inc. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 677, 695, quotation marks and brackets omitted.) However, this is the rare situation in which the complaint is so uncertain that neither Defendant nor the Court can determine what causes of action are alleged against Defendant. The Court can assume that Defendant is not a party to the second through fifth causes of action, as there are no allegations against Defendant in those claims, but Plaintiffs declined to oppose this demurrer and motion to strike, such that the Court cannot determine that these claims are not alleged against Defendant.

For this reason, Defendant’s demurrer is SUSTAINED with thirty (30) days leave to amend as to the second, third, fourth, and fifth causes of action. Plaintiff shall file an amended pleading alleging specific facts against Defendant in these causes of action should it wish for the claims to be alleged against Defendant.

To state a cause of action for breach of contract, Plaintiffs must be able to establish “(1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff.” (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.)

In the first cause of action, Plaintiffs allege that “Plaintiff,” who is not identified “entered into a separate agreement with Defendant STATE FARM for an auto insurance policy to insure the SUBJECT VEHICLE,” which Defendant breached by failing to provide proper coverage under the insurance policy. (FAC ¶¶ 3643.) Plaintiffs have not alleged the terms of the agreement or the parties to the agreement, and they have not provided a copy of the agreement. If a breach of contract claim “is based on alleged breach of a written contract,” which appears to be the case here, “the terms must be set out verbatim in the body of the complaint or a copy of the written agreement must be attached and incorporated by reference.” (Harris v. Rudin, Richman & Appel (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 299, 307.) In some circumstances, a plaintiff may also “plead the legal effect of the contract rather than its precise language” (Construction Protective Services, Inc. v. TIG Specialty Ins. Co. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189, 198-199), but Plaintiffs have not done so here. Accordingly, Defendant’s demurrer to the first cause of action is SUSTAINED with thirty (30) days leave to amend.

“A breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing involves something beyond breach of the contractual duty itself and it has been held that bad faith implies unfair dealing rather than mistaken judgment.” (Careau & Co. v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1371, 1394.) “If the allegations do not go beyond the statement of a mere contract breach and, relying on the same alleged acts, simply seek the same damages or other relief already claimed in a companion contract cause of action, they may be disregarded as superfluous as no additional claim is actually stated . . . [T]he only justification for asserting a separate cause of action for breach of the implied covenant is to obtain a tort recovery.” (Id. at pp. 1394-1395.) To recover in tort for breach of the implied covenant, the defendant must “have acted unreasonably or without proper cause.” (Id. at p. 1395, citations and italics omitted.)

First, as stated above, Plaintiffs have not alleged a viable contract claim because they have failed to allege the existence of a contract between the parties. Second, the claims for tortious breach of insurance contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing appear to be duplicative of each other, as Plaintiffs allege that Defendant breached its obligation to pay under the subject policy. Moreover, the conduct underlying the claim appears to be no more than breach of contract, i.e., a contract existed for Defendant to pay insurance coverage funds, and it failed to do so. Thus, the Court lacks a basis to conclude that these claims are proper under these facts, and Defendant’s demurrer to the sixth and seventh causes of action is SUSTAINED with thirty (30) days leave to amend.