TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant/Judgment Debtor Steaphan Weir’s Motion to Vacate Judgment on Sister State Judgment is DENIED.

Defendant/Judgment Debtor Steaphan Weir to give notice. 

REASONING

Request for Judicial Notice

Defendant/Judgment Debtor Steaphan Weir (“Defendant”) requests judicial notice of 23 court records from the Circuit Court of Barbour County, West Virginia, Civil Action No. 14-C-32 (Lawrence v. General Stability, Inc.), and the full case docket from the same action. Defendant’s request is GRANTED pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d).

Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 1710.40, subdivisions (a) and (b), allows a judgment debtor to make a noticed motion to vacate the entry of judgment on a sister state judgment “on any ground which would be a defense to an action in this state on the sister state judgment” no less than 30 days after service of notice of entry of judgment. Defendant was served with the notice of entry of judgment on March 6, 2023, and moved to vacate the judgment on April 5, 2023, making the present motion timely.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal describes the basis for vacating the entry of judgment on a sister state judgment as follows:

Under the Sister State and Foreign Money–Judgments Act, a sister state judgment may be vacated on any ground which would be a defense to an action in this state on the sister state judgment. While the statute does not identify the available defenses, the Law Revision Commission’s comment to Code of Civil Procedure section 1710.40 explains that one common defense to enforcement of the judgment is that the judgment was rendered in excess of jurisdiction. Appellate courts have interpreted this language to include cases where the sister state court lacked fundamental jurisdiction—i.e., in personam or subject matter jurisdiction—as determined by the law of the sister state. The party moving to vacate the sister state judgment has the burden to show by the preponderance of the evidence why it is entitled to relief.

(Wells Fargo Bank, NA v. Baker (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1068, citations, quotation marks, and ellipses omitted.) Other “[c]ommon defenses to enforcement of a sister state judgment include the following: [1] the judgment is not final and unconditional; [2] the judgment was obtained by extrinsic fraud; [3] the judgment was rendered in excess of jurisdiction; [4] the judgment is not enforceable in the state of rendition; [5] the plaintiff is guilty of misconduct; [6] the judgment has already been paid; [and 7] suit on the judgment is barred by the statute of limitations in the state where enforcement is sought.” (Liquidator of Integrity Ins. Co. v. Hendrix (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 971, 976, ellipses omitted.) The Second District Court of Appeal has stated that while this list may not be exclusive, a judgment may not be challenged on the grounds set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 473, i.e., mistake, neglect, or surprise. (See ibid.) Further, “[a] State may not disregard the judgment of a sister State because it disagrees with the reasoning underlying the judgment or deems it to be wrong on the merits,” and “[a] California court, in ruling on a motion to vacate entry of a sister state judgment, may not retry the case.” (Blizzard Energy, Inc. v. Schaefers (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 295, 298.)

Defendant seeks to vacate the entry of judgment on the ground that the West Virginia court struck Defendant’s answer and entered a default judgment against him principally because he failed to appear in person at one hearing, the West Virginia court did not provide Defendant with a warning or notice that he was at risk for such a severe sanction, neither Plaintiff nor any other party sought such a sanction at the hearing, the West Virginia court did not consider any lesser sanctions before entering Defendant’s default, the West Virginia court disregarded Defendant’s communications prior to the hearing that a medical condition prevented him from flying to the hearing, and Defendant appeared by phone but was never connected to the hearing. Defendant also contends that the default judgment awarded compensatory and other damages on counts for fraud and conversion that Plaintiff did not bring against Defendant in violation of West Virginia law.

Put simply, Defendant’s motion is one seeking a second bite at the proverbial apple because he disagrees with the West Virginia court’s decision, and this is not a basis to vacate the entry of judgment here. Defendant argues that the West Virginia court acted in excess of its jurisdiction, but he makes no argument that the Court lacked personal jurisdiction over him or subject matter jurisdiction over the action; instead, Defendant argues that the West Virginia court exceeded its jurisdiction when granting relief contrary to its conferred authority, i.e., the West Virginia court wrongfully entered Defendant’s default. This Court is not so convinced.

Defendant argues that the West Virginia court failed to follow recognized procedures in imposing sanctions. In so arguing, Defendant appears to disagree with the West Virginia court’s choice to strike his answer, as there is no basis to conclude that the West Virginia court did not have the power to do so. If Defendant disagreed with the West Virginia court’s ability to enter his default without proper notice or opportunity to be heard, that was a matter that should have been presented to the West Virginia court. It is not this Court’s place to second guess the West Virginia court’s decision in that regard when Defendant failed to raise this contention before the West Virginia court.

Further, the record does not show that the West Virginia court acted in an improper manner when striking Defendant’s answer and entering his default. In short, the West Virginia court struck Defendant’s answer and entered Defendant’s default after Defendant had been advised of a February 5, 2016, hearing date on five separate occasions, and the hearing itself was the result of Defendant’s counsel’s withdrawal and Defendant’s failure to obtain counsel for a corporate entity after being ordered to do by the Court, instead choosing to improperly respond to discovery himself on behalf of a corporate entity, and Defendant had accordingly been ordered to appear personally at the February 5, 2016 hearing. (Opp’n, Cooper Decl. ¶¶ 20, 24, 26, Exs. 17, 21, 24, 25, 28.) The record shows that Defendant had previously failed to appear at a mediation before the February 5, 2016, hearing, and he only sought a continuance the day before the hearing by email in the late afternoon. (Mot., Weird Decl. ¶ 10, Exs. 2, 3; Opp’n, Cooper Decl. ¶¶ 9, 11.) After Defendant’s default was entered, he does not appear to have sought to have the entry of default set aside, he did not appear at a subsequent hearing on March 4, 2016, he did not object to the proposed judgment, he did not seek relief from the trial court as to the default judgment after it was entered, and he did not appeal the judgment in any regard, only taking issue with the judgment here.

Defendant also argues that the West Virginia court awarded damages for claims not asserted by Plaintiff. To the contrary, the damages for credit reputation, business reputation, annoyance, and inconvenience were specifically requested in all counts of the complaint (Opp’n, Cooper Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. 2), so the fact that such damages were related to claims for fraud and conversion is of no consequence because those damages were properly sought in other claims. In other words, Plaintiff was entitled to recover one set of damages, and Plaintiff was so awarded; if the fraud and conversion claims were not mentioned in the judgment, the default judgment amount would have been the same.

The Court finds that Defendant has not met his burden of showing by the preponderance of the evidence why he is entitled to relief. Accordingly, Defendant/Judgment Debtor Steaphan Weir’s Motion to Vacate Judgment on Sister State Judgment is DENIED.