TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District’s Motion to Consolidate Cases is DENIED.

Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District to give notice. 

REASONING

The trial court has discretion to consolidate actions involving common questions of law or fact. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1048, subd. (a).) The purpose of consolidation is “to promote trial convenience and economy by avoiding duplication of procedure, particularly in the proof of issues common to both actions.” (Estate of Baker (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 471, 485.) 

In deciding whether to consolidate actions, the Court generally considers the following factors: (1) timeliness of the motion, i.e., whether granting consolidation would delay the trial of any of the cases involved; (2) complexity, i.e., whether joining the actions involved would make the trial too confusing or complex for a jury; and (3) prejudice, i.e., whether consolidation would adversely affect the rights of any party. (See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1956) 47 Cal.2d 428, 430-431; Todd-Stenberg v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 976, 978-979.)

Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District (“LAUSD”) moves the Court for an order consolidating the present action with Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. 23STCV19780 (Los Angeles Unified School District v. Barry Smolin). The cases have been deemed related but are currently pending in different departments. LAUSD argues that the cases share common issues of law and fact, consolidation will promote efficiency, both cases involve the same parties and witnesses, and consolidation will save attorney time and costs and avoid unnecessary duplication of efforts. Plaintiff Jane Doe (“Plaintiff”) opposes the motion on the ground that consolidation will result in a delay of her day in court, and she will be prejudiced by potential confusion of the jury. Former Defendant Barry Smolin has also filed an opposition to the motion, but Smolin was dismissed from this action on July 26, 2023, so the Court has not considered his opposition, as he is no longer a party to this case.

In this action, Plaintiff alleges that LAUSD negligently hired, supervised, and retained an unfit employee, specifically Barry Smolin, failed to report suspected child abuse, and negligently supervised Plaintiff when she was a minor. LAUSD has not provided a copy of the complaint in Case No. 23STCV19780, but the Court takes judicial notice of the complaint in that case on its own motion pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d). In that action, LAUSD alleges claims for indemnity, contribution, apportionment of fault, and declaratory relief against Barry Smolin on the ground that LAUSD’s involvement in the present action was a direct result of Smolin’s conduct, and LAUSD has incurred significant expenses in its participation in the present case.

The Court finds that consolidation is not proper here. While the two cases arise from the same general conduct, i.e., Plaintiff allegedly suffering childhood sexual abuse at the hands of a teacher, the parties to the cases are now different, as Smolin is no longer a party to the present action after being dismissed, and the claims in Case No. 23STCV19780 will prejudice Plaintiff’s ability to present her case against LAUSD. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that LAUSD negligently permitted the alleged abuse to occur, while LAUSD seeks to shift that blame to Smolin, while Plaintiff no longer has pending claims against him. As to Plaintiff’s claims, the jury could reasonably shift its focus to Smolin’s liability for Plaintiff’s harm, which is no longer at issue in Plaintiff’s case, when the jury should be focused on LAUSD’s liability for Plaintiff’s harm. Further, consolidation of the cases would result in a delayed trial date for Plaintiff’s case so LAUSD may investigate its claims against Smolin. For these reasons, the Court finds that consolidation is not proper here. Accordingly, Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District’s Motion to Consolidate Cases is DENIED.