TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs Eduard Cacares and Jennri Melendez’ Complaint for Damages is GRANTED with thirty (30) days leave to amend.

Plaintiffs Eduard Cacares and Jennri Melendez may amend their complaint only as authorized by the Court’s order and may not amend the complaint to add a new party or cause of action without having obtained permission to do so. (Harris v. Wachovia Mortgage, FSB (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1023.)

Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority to give notice. 

REASONING

Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (“Defendant”) moves to strike the words “negligently, carelessly, managed and maintained” at paragraph 9 in Plaintiffs Eduard Cacares and Jennri Melendez (“Plaintiffs”)’s complaint. Defendant’s citation to the line is inaccurate, as Plaintiffs allege Defendant “negligently, carelessly and unlawfully drove, managed, operated, and maintained the Vehicle” (Compl. ¶ 9), but the Court assumes Defendant seeks to cite the same statement in the complaint. Defendant argues that this portion of the complaint is irrelevant and improper, as Defendant is a public entity, and Government Code section 815, subdivision (a), prohibits common law liability against a public entity like Defendant. Plaintiffs argue that they are permitted to bring a claim against Defendant for negligent hiring and supervision.

The court may, upon motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b).) The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false, or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)

Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (See Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 [court shall not “sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment”]; Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1037 [“A demurrer should not be sustained without leave to amend if the complaint, liberally construed, can state a cause of action under any theory or if there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured by amendment.”]; Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768 [“When the defect which justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure, the court should allow leave to amend.”].) The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)

To state a claim for negligence, Plaintiffs must allege the elements of (1) “the existence of a legal duty of care,” (2) “breach of that duty,” and (3) “proximate cause resulting in an injury.” (McIntyre v. Colonies-Pacific, LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671.) Government Code section 815, subdivision (a), provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute: [a] public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.” It follows that there must be a specific statute imposing liability on Defendant based on the claims alleged by Plaintiffs.

Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a statutory basis for liability here. Plaintiff provides a list of Government Code provisions without describing how they would support liability here (Compl. ¶ 10), instead asking the Court and Defendant to determine the basis for such liability, which is improper, particularly because a “plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show his cause of action lies outside the breadth of any applicable statutory immunity,” and “[h]e must plead with particularity every fact essential to the existence of statutory liability.” (Keyes v. Santa Clara Valley Water District (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 882, 886, quotation marks, brackets, and comma omitted.) Further, none of the cited statutory provisions appear to apply here.

Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a), states that “[e]veryone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or herself,” but there is no mention of government liability in the statute. Civil Code section 2338 provides that “[u]nless required by or under the authority of law to employ that particular agent, a principal is responsible to third persons for the negligence of his agent in the transaction of the business of the agency, including wrongful acts committed by such agent in and as a part of the transaction of such business, and for his willful omission to fulfill the obligations of the principal”; again, there is no mention of liability for public entities in the statute. Civil Code section 2343 states that “[o]ne who assumes to act as an agent is responsible to third persons as a principal for his acts in the course of his agency, in any of the following cases, and in no others: [¶] 1. When, with his consent, credit is given to him personally in a transaction; [¶] 2. When he enters into a written contract in the name of his principal, without believing, in good faith, that he has authority to do so; or, [¶] 3. When his acts are wrongful in their nature.”

Insofar as Plaintiffs are attempting to use these statutes to hold Defendant liable for its employees’ conduct or for negligent hiring, supervision, or training, there is no statutory basis or direct liability for negligent hiring, supervision, or training by a public entity. (See de Villers v. County of San Diego (2007) 156 Cal. App. 4th 238, 255-256 [“a direct claim against a governmental entity asserting *256 negligent hiring and supervision, when not grounded in the breach of a statutorily imposed duty owed by the entity to the injured party, may not be maintained”].) 

Government Code section 820, subdivision (a), merely imposes liability on a public employee to the same extent a private person would be liable, and Plaintiffs have failed to state any liability as to a specific employee of Defendant. Insofar as Plaintiff relies on Government Code section 815.2 as allowing liability, this statute provides only that “[a] public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal representative,” and, notably, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, a public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of an employee of the public entity where the employee is immune from liability.” Plaintiff states no liability of any specific employee. Vehicle Code sections 21703, 22350, and 23103 are simply driving rules, i.e., they do not impose any liability on a public entity like Defendant.

Accordingly, Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs Eduard Cacares and Jennri Melendez’ Complaint for Damages is GRANTED with thirty (30) days leave to amend. Upon amending the complaint, Plaintiffs shall describe a statutory basis for liability with specific facts to support imposing liability despite the governmental immunities provided by statute.