TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs Eduard Cacares and Jennri Melendez’ First Amended Complaint for Damages is GRANTED without leave to amend.

Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority shall prepare, serve, and submit a proposed judgment as per statute.

Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority to give notice. 

REASONING

Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (“Defendant”) moves to strike certain paragraphs in Plaintiffs Eduard Cacares and Jennri Melendez (“Plaintiffs”)’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”); specifically, Defendant takes issue with Plaintiffs’ references to Defendant’s purported negligent supervision and monitoring of their drivers. Defendant argues that these allegations are improper because Defendant is a public entity, and Government Code section 815, subdivision (a), prohibits common law liability against a public entity like Defendant. Plaintiffs argue that they are permitted to bring a claim against Defendant for negligent hiring and supervision. The Court previously rule as to Defendant’s motion on the same basis as to Plaintiffs’ initial complaint that Plaintiffs were required to describe a statutory basis for liability with specific facts to support imposing liability despite the governmental immunities provided by statute.

To state a claim for negligence, Plaintiffs must allege the elements of (1) “the existence of a legal duty of care,” (2) “breach of that duty,” and (3) “proximate cause resulting in an injury.” (McIntyre v. Colonies-Pacific, LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671.) Government Code section 815, subdivision (a), provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute: [a] public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.” It follows that there must be a specific statute imposing liability on Defendant based on the claims alleged by Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged a statutory basis for liability here. Plaintiffs again provide a list of Government Code provisions without describing how they would support liability here (FAC ¶ 11), and it is well established that a “plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show his cause of action lies outside the breadth of any applicable statutory immunity,” and “[h]e must plead with particularity every fact essential to the existence of statutory liability.” (Keyes v. Santa Clara Valley Water District (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 882, 886, quotation marks, brackets, and comma omitted.) Further, none of the cited statutory provisions appear to apply here, as the Court stated in its prior ruling.

Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a), states that “[e]veryone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or herself,” but there is no mention of government liability in the statute. Civil Code section 2338 provides that “[u]nless required by or under the authority of law to employ that particular agent, a principal is responsible to third persons for the negligence of his agent in the transaction of the business of the agency, including wrongful acts committed by such agent in and as a part of the transaction of such business, and for his willful omission to fulfill the obligations of the principal”; again, there is no mention of liability for public entities in the statute. Civil Code section 2343 states that “[o]ne who assumes to act as an agent is responsible to third persons as a principal for his acts in the course of his agency, in any of the following cases, and in no others: [¶] 1. When, with his consent, credit is given to him personally in a transaction; [¶] 2. When he enters into a written contract in the name of his principal, without believing, in good faith, that he has authority to do so; or, [¶] 3. When his acts are wrongful in their nature.” There are no allegations to this effect in the FAC.

Insofar as Plaintiffs are attempting to use these statutes to hold Defendant liable for its employees’ conduct or for negligent hiring, supervision, or training, there is no statutory basis or direct liability for negligent hiring, supervision, or training by a public entity. (See de Villers v. County of San Diego (2007) 156 Cal. App. 4th 238, 255-256 [“a direct claim against a governmental entity asserting *256 negligent hiring and supervision, when not grounded in the breach of a statutorily imposed duty owed by the entity to the injured party, may not be maintained”].) 

Government Code section 820, subdivision (a), merely imposes liability on a public employee to the same extent a private person would be liable, and Plaintiffs have failed to state any liability as to a specific employee of Defendant. Insofar as Plaintiff relies on Government Code section 815.2 as allowing liability, this statute provides only that “[a] public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal representative,” and, notably, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, a public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of an employee of the public entity where the employee is immune from liability.” Plaintiff states no liability of any specific employee. Vehicle Code sections 21703, 22350, and 23103 are simply driving rules, i.e., they do not impose any liability on a public entity like Defendant.

The Court previously set forth these issues in its prior ruling, and Plaintiffs have failed to amend the complaint in a manner that cures these deficiencies. Accordingly, Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs Eduard Cacares and Jennri Melendez’ First Amended Complaint for Damages is GRANTED.