TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant Negar Modgeddi’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

The answer filed by Nader Modgeddi on August 29, 2023, is STRICKEN from the case docket.

Plaintiff Caribeth, LLC to give notice. 

REASONING

Defendant Negar Modgeddi (“Defendant”) moves for summary judgment as to Plaintiff Caribeth, LLC (“Plaintiff”)’s complaint on the ground that the 3-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit supporting the complaint overstates the amount of rent due and does not comply with tenant protection resolutions, and Plaintiff accepted rent payments while pursuing this action.

At the outset, the Court notes that the motion is said to be filed by Defendant Negar Modgeddi and a third party, “Defendant” Nader Modgeddi, who filed an answer in this action on August 29, 2023, despite never having been named as a defendant. There some legal authority allowing a party to designate himself as a defendant in an action pursuant to CCP 415.46. However, the Residential Lease Agreement underlying this action shows that only Defendant Negar Modgeddi is a tenant under the agreement (Opp’n, Ketcham Decl. ¶ 3; Compl. ¶ 6e, Ex. 1, at p. 1), and Plaintiff provides evidence that Defendant did not request that Defendant Nader Modgeddi reside in the unit as required under the agreement (Opp’n, Ketcham Decl. ¶ 11; Compl. ¶ 6e, Ex. 1, at ¶ 2). Further, Nedar accepted service on behalf of  Negar in May, 2023, but failed to file a prejudgment claim until August 29, 2023, after Defendant Negar's Demurrer was overruled. Defendant Nader had over 3 months within which to file an answer.  Thus, this motion is considered only as to Defendant Negar Modgeddi, and the answer filed by Nader Modgeddi on August 29, 2023, is hereby STRICKEN from the case docket.

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) 

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Med. Ctr. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467 (Avivi).)

“Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “[T]he court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection) . . . in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 467; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)

Defendant moves for summary judgment on the ground that Plaintiff’s notice is defective in that it includes portions of rent which is legally stayed under Los Angeles Municipal Code section 49.99.2. Los Angeles Municipal Code section 49.99.2 provides that “[u]ntil January 31, 2023, no Owner shall endeavor to evict or evict a residential tenant for non-payment of rent if the tenant is unable to pay rent due to circumstances related to the COVID-19 pandemic,” and such “circumstances include loss of income due to a COVID-19 related workplace closure, child care expenditures due to school closures, health-care expenses related to being ill with COVID-19 or caring for a member of the tenant’s household or family who is ill with COVID-19, or reasonable expenditures that stem from government-ordered emergency measures.” Defendant’s motion only states that Los Angeles Municipal Code section 49.99.2 applies to this action. Defendant provides no evidence that she is unable to pay rent due to circumstances related to the COVID-19 pandemic, nor does she state that she provided Plaintiff with any notice that she was unable to pay rent due to circumstances related to the COVID-19 pandemic, and Plaintiff provides a sworn statement that Defendant never communicated an inability to pay rent due to circumstances related to the COVID-19 pandemic (Opp’n, Ketcham Decl. ¶ 10). Thus, the Court lacks a basis to conclude that this action is barred by Los Angeles Municipal Code section 49.99.2.

Defendant also argues that Plaintiff has accepted rent currently due and owing until the present date while this action was pending, thereby curing any alleged default that would entitle Plaintiff to forfeiture of the real property in controversy. Defendant provides unauthenticated checking deposit receipts of deposits of $2,100 for the months of April, May, June, July, and August 2023 as Exhibit B to the motion without a sworn statement that payments were accepted by Plaintiff or that these receipts represent proof of those payments. Insofar as these exhibits were intended to provide proof of Plaintiff accepting rental payments, the receipts do not show that Plaintiff accepted rental payments, as the receipts are merely receipts of $2,100 deposits into an account without any individual’s name on them. In opposition, Plaintiff provides the declaration of John Ketcham, Plaintiff’s manager, who states that Plaintiff has not accepted payments for the period of time covered by the 3-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit. (Opp’n, Ketcham Decl. ¶ 9.) Thus, the Court lacks a basis to grant summary judgment in Defendant’s favor on this basis.

Accordingly, Defendant Negar Modgeddi’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.