TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant City National Bank’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees is GRANTED in the reduced amount of $27,200.

Defendant City National Bank to give notice. 

REASONING

On November 28, 2023, this Court granted Defendant City National Bank (“Defendant”)’s special motion to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. Defendant now moves for an award of attorney fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (c), which provides that “a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover that defendant’s attorney’s fees and costs.” Defendant moves for an order awarding it $105,170.05 in fees, which consists of 174.3 hours of work performed (1) reviewing and analyzing Plaintiff Philip Elghanian (“Plaintiff”)’s claims; (2) researching and analyzing the applicable case law to support Defendant’s special motion to strike; (3) meeting and conferring with Plaintiff’s counsel regarding Defendant’s special motion to strike; (4) drafting and preparing Defendant’s special motion to strike and supporting papers; (5) analyzing Plaintiff’s opposition and cited case law; (6) drafting and preparing Defendant’s reply papers for the special motion to strike; (7) preparing for and attending the hearing on Defendant’s special motion to strike; (8) prevailing on Defendant’s special motion to strike; and (9) preparing this motion and supporting papers. Plaintiff opposes the motion on the ground that Defendant fails to sufficiently substantiate its request for $105,170.05 in fees, and the hours worked are excessive. Notably, in the supplemental declaration, it appears that Defendant now seeks $140,666.80 in fees, which represents 233 hours spent on the anti-SLAPP motion, present motion for attorney fees, memorandum of costs, and supporting documents.

The fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily “begins with the ‘lodestar’ [method], i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.) “[A] computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.” (Margolin v. Reg’l Planning Comm’n (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004.)

Plaintiff initially argued that the Court has the discretion to and should deny Defendant’s motion for attorney fees in its entirety. When this motion first came on for hearing, the Court noted that the case cited by Plaintiff makes no statement that a court has the discretion to deny a fees motion outright after a successful anti-SLAPP motion. Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1329 did not concern a denial of an attorney fees motion; rather, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision to reduce the amount requested by counsel. Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1137 cites Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 635, which did not concern an anti-SLAPP motion, and Ketchum v. Moses itself made reference to the statement in Serrano v. Unruh allowing for denial of an attorney fees motion while not itself denying a motion for attorney fees as to an anti-SLAPP motion. The Court is not inclined to depart from the mandatory rule of recovery of attorney fees after prevailing on an anti-SLAPP motion in the absence of case law specifically allowing for the Court to do so.

However, on the date of the initial hearing, the Court found that Defendant had not sufficiently set forth the basis for its fees request because, while “California courts do not require detailed time records, and trial courts have discretion to award fees based on declarations of counsel describing the work they have done and the court’s own view of the number of hours reasonably spent” (Syers Properties III, Inc. v. Rankin (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 691, 698), it is axiomatic that the hours worked must be reasonable, and the Court cannot conclude that 174.3 hours of work is reasonable for a single motion. The Court ordered Defendant to file a supplemental declaration describing the work performed with billing sheets and sufficient detail to allow the Court to determine whether the work was reasonable and necessary to the litigation of the anti-SLAPP motion.

Put simply, the Court cannot conclude that $140,666.80 in fees, consisting of 233 hours spent working on the anti-SLAPP motion, present motion for attorney fees, memorandum of costs, and supporting documents, at an average rate of $603.38 per hour, is reasonable. While partner work is necessary for some tasks, the time spent by a partner should have been minimal if the number of hours spent by an associate is as extensive as the work performed here. Alternatively, if a party seeks to have a partner perform most of the work, the work should be performed in less hours to justify a higher billing rate. The Court has reviewed the billing sheets and rules as follows: This case was not particularly complex, nor were the anti-SLAPP motion or present motion for attorney fees. Thus, $500 is a reasonable average rate for the work performed for a total of 76 hours performed, at the rate of $500 per hour, which consists of 10 hours analyzing the complaint and supporting documents, 20 hours researching for the anti-SLAPP motion, 20 hours drafting the anti-SLAPP motion, two hours analyzing the opposition, 13 hours preparing a reply brief, two hours preparing for the hearing, and one hour attending the hearing. As to the attorney fees motion, the Court finds it reasonable to award for 8 hours performed, at the rate of $500 per hour, which consists of one hour reviewing billing records, one hour drafting the memorandum of costs, two hours preparing the attorney fees motion, one hour analyzing the opposition, two hours preparing the reply for the attorney fees motion, and one hour attending the hearing. Thus, Defendant City National Bank’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees is GRANTED in the reduced amount of $ 38, which represents 76 hours of work at an average rate of $500.