Judge: Lisa K. Sepe-Wiesenfeld, Case: 23SMCV02524, Date: 2024-11-13 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23SMCV02524 Hearing Date: November 13, 2024 Dept: N
TENTATIVE RULING
Defendants Newhall Bliss, LLC. and Newhall Rosewell Bliss LLC.’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint is GRANTED without leave to amend as to Plaintiffs Joshuanna Lapp Lapplander and Chebella Lapplander’s claim for punitive damages and DENIED as to Plaintiffs’ request for attorney fees.
Defendants Newhall Bliss, LLC. and Newhall Rosewell Bliss LLC. shall file and serve an answer to Plaintiffs Joshuanna Lapp Lapplander and Chebella Lapplander’s First Amended Complaint within ten (10) days of entry of this order. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1320(j).)
Defendants Newhall Bliss, LLC. and Newhall Rosewell Bliss LLC. to give notice.
REASONING
The court may, upon motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b).) The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false, or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)
Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (See Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 [court shall not “sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment”]; Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1037 [“A demurrer should not be sustained without leave to amend if the complaint, liberally construed, can state a cause of action under any theory or if there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured by amendment.”]; Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768 [“When the defect which justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure, the court should allow leave to amend.”].) The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)
Analysis
Punitive damages may be recovered upon a proper showing of malice, fraud, or oppression. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) “Malice” is defined as conduct intended to cause injury to a person or despicable conduct carried on with a willful and conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others. (Turman v. Turning Point of Cent. Cal., Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) “Oppression” means despicable conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship, in conscious disregard of the person’s rights. (Ibid.) “Fraud” is an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known by defendant, with intent to deprive a person of property, rights or otherwise cause injury. (Ibid.) Conclusory allegations, devoid of any factual assertions, are insufficient to support a conclusion that parties acted with oppression, fraud, or malice. (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1042.)
Plaintiffs Joshuanna Lapp Lapplander and Chebella Lapplander (“Plaintiffs”) seek an award of punitive damages as part of their second cause of action for breach of warranty of habitability on the ground that the property was cited for habitability issues, such that Defendants Newhall Bliss, LLC. and Newhall Rosewell Bliss LLC. (“Defendants”)’s failure to remedy the issues at the property shows a disregard for Plaintiffs’ health, safety, and well-being. (See FAC ¶ 21.) The allegations, as stated, are conclusory, as it is not clear who was made aware of what issues at the property. Further, given that it appears Plaintiffs seek to hold Defendants liable for the acts of specific individuals, such as employees, who could have remedied the issue, corporate employers like Defendants may be liable for punitive damages only where the acts supporting the award were performed by or with knowledge of or with ratification by corporate officials. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (b).) Plaintiffs have alleged no facts that would allow the trier of fact to conclude that corporate officials were aware of the likelihood of injury to Plaintiffs due to failure to remedy the issues or that they ratified the wrongful conduct which ultimately caused harm to Plaintiffs. The Court previously advised Plaintiffs to allege specific facts in this regard to support an award for punitive damages, as conclusory statements would not suffice, but Plaintiffs failed to do so. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to strike is GRANTED without leave to amend as to Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages.
Defendants also apparently seek to strike Plaintiffs’ request for attorney fees in the FAC (see FAC, p. 9), but Defendants provide no argument to this effect. While this alone may be a basis to deny Defendants’ motion to strike, the Court notes that an award of attorney fees is proper when authorized by contract, statute, or law (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1032, subd. (b), 1033.5, subd. (a)(10)), and Plaintiffs have cited a statutory basis for such fees under Civil Code section 1942.4, subdivision (b)(2). Thus, Defendants’ motion to strike is DENIED as to Plaintiffs’ request for attorney fees.
Accordingly, Defendants Newhall Bliss, LLC. and Newhall Rosewell Bliss LLC.’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint is GRANTED without leave to amend as to Plaintiffs Joshuanna Lapp Lapplander and Chebella Lapplander’s claim for punitive damages and DENIED as to Plaintiffs’ request for attorney fees. Defendants Newhall Bliss, LLC. and Newhall Rosewell Bliss LLC. shall file and serve an answer to Plaintiffs Joshuanna Lapp Lapplander and Chebella Lapplander’s First Amended Complaint within ten (10) days of entry of this order. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1320(j).)