TENTATIVE RULING

Specially Appearing Defendant Ocean Avenue LLC’s Motion to Quash Service of Doe Amendment Naming Ocean Avenue LLC as Doe 1 is GRANTED.

Specially Appearing Defendant Ocean Avenue LLC shall prepare, serve, and submit a proposed judgment as per statute.

Specially Appearing Defendant Ocean Avenue LLC to give notice. 

REASONING

Request for Judicial Notice

Specially Appearing Defendant Ocean Avenue LLC (“Defendant”) requests judicial notice of three court records in this action, the grant deed recorded for the property where the subject incident occurred, and the location of the real property per the Assessor’s Map. Defendant’s request is GRANTED pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivisions (c), (d), and (h).

Analysis

Defendant moves the Court for an order quashing Plaintiff James W. Shropshire (“Plaintiff”)’s service of the summons and complaint upon it after making a Doe amendment naming Defendant in the place of Doe 1. Defendant argues that Plaintiff knew of Defendant’s identity for more than two years before making the Doe amendment, and he failed to serve the summons within the statutorily permitted time period. Plaintiff opposes the motion on the ground that he was ignorant of Defendant’s precise ownership role and legal responsibility at the time the complaint was filed.

Code of Civil Procedure section 474 provides, in relevant part, that “[w]hen the plaintiff is ignorant of the name of a defendant, [he] must state that fact in the complaint, . . . and when [the defendant’s] true name is discovered, the pleading or proceeding must be amended accordingly.” Defendant brings this motion to quash on the ground that Plaintiff may not avail himself of the Doe amendment procedure authorized by Code of Civil Procedure section 474 because he unreasonably delayed in filing the Doe amendment. The Court notes that a motion to quash is the proper procedure for challenging such an amendment, although it is not a motion to quash in the traditional sense. (See McClatchy v. Coblentz, Patch, Duffy & Bass, LLP (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 368, 375 [improper service of a defendant under Code of Civil Procedure may be attacked by a motion to quash].)

Woo v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal. App. 4th 169, 176, explains the general rule of naming a party in place of a Doe defendant as follows:

[A]n amended complaint that adds a new defendant does not relate back to the date of filing the original complaint and the statute of limitations is applied as of the date the amended complaint is filed, not the date the original complaint is filed. A recognized exception to the general rule is the substitution under [Code of Civil Procedure] section 474 of a new defendant for a fictitious Doe defendant named in the original complaint as to whom a cause of action was stated in the original complaint. If the requirements of section 474 are satisfied, the amended complaint substituting a new defendant for a fictitious Doe defendant filed after the statute of limitations has expired is deemed filed as of the date the original complaint was filed.

The Second District Court of Appeal case A.N. v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1058, is also instructive here. In that case, the plaintiff filed a complaint for damages in May 2005, and in August and September 2007, less than a month before trial, the plaintiff served five defendants with the summons and complaint, naming them in place of Doe defendants. (Id. at pp. 1060, 1063.) The defendants filed motions to quash, arguing the plaintiff “had known their identity for a significant period of time but had nonetheless unreasonably delayed in naming and serving them as Doe Defendants under section 474,” and “they had been prejudiced by the delay.” (Id. at p. 1063.) The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to quash on that ground, and the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling. (Id. at pp. 1060, 1063.) In so doing, the appellate court concluded (1) Code of Civil Procedure section 474 “includes an implicit requirement that a plaintiff may not unreasonably delay his or her filing of a Doe amendment after learning a defendant’s identity,” (2) “a defendant named in an action by a Doe amendment under section 474 may challenge the amendment by way of an evidence-based motion, which argues that the plaintiff unreasonably delayed his or her filing of the challenged amendment,” and (3) unreasonable delay “includes a prejudice element, which requires a showing by the defendant that he or she would suffer prejudice from plaintiff’s delay in filing the Doe amendment.” (Id. at pp. 1066-1067, quotation marks omitted.)

On October 21, 2021, shortly after the subject incident occurred on September 5 and 6, 2021, an attorney representing Plaintiff sent Defendant a demand letter for preservation of evidence and insurance information based on the incident alleged in the complaint. (Mot., Velilla Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. A.) The letter stated that “security personnel working at The Bungalow Santa Monica and/or Fairmont Miramar Hotel & Bungalows violently assaulted and battered [Plaintiff] while he was handcuffed and restrained by your personnel at the Bungalow,” and “[f]ailure to provide the requested information may result in a lawsuit filed against you.” (Ibid.) Defendant also provides evidence that it is the property owner of record of the subject property, with the deed having been recorded with the Los Angeles County Recorder’s Office. (Req. for Judicial Notice, Exs. B, C.) On August 30, 2023, Plaintiff filed his complaint and did not name Defendant. Defendant was named in a Doe amendment filing on June 21, 2024. (Req. for Judicial Notice, Ex. D.)

It is clear that Plaintiff was aware of Defendant’s identity at the time of filing the complaint and as early as October 21, 2021. This case is substantially similar to the facts of Optical Surplus, Inc. v. Superior Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 776, cited by Defendant, a case in which a demand letter had been sent by the plaintiff’s attorney before the filing of the original complaint. (Id. at pp. 780-781.) The plaintiff argued that liability had been denied, so the defendant had not been named. (Id. at pp. 781-782.) The appellate court found that ignorance is the key consideration, and the party was not ignorant, such that the Doe amendment should be quashed. (Id. at p. 784.)

Similarly here, Plaintiff “knew everything he needed to know about [Defendant] when he filed his original complaint.” (Optical Surplus, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 228 Cal.App.3d at p. 784.) Plaintiff argues that the true identity of the property owner was unclear, as several entities were affiliated with the property, and public information conflicted. (Opp’n, Gutierrez Decl. ¶ 9.) This argument is not well taken. While liability may not have been clear, Defendant’s identity was clear to Plaintiff. Plaintiff could have filed the complaint as to all entities he believed were affiliated with the property, but he chose not to do so. The demand letter made clear that Plaintiff believed Defendant may be liable, as Plaintiff made such an averment in the letter. He simply chose not to timely file an action against Defendant within the statute of limitations. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 335.1 [two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims].) Insofar as Plaintiff argues that Defendant has not shown prejudice, this is not a requirement for a motion to quash on this basis.

The Court finds that Plaintiff did not timely serve Defendant with the summons and complaint within the statute of limitations because Plaintiff was aware of Defendant’s identity as early as October 21, 2021, the date of the demand letter. Accordingly, Specially Appearing Defendant Ocean Avenue LLC’s Motion to Quash Service of Doe Amendment Naming Ocean Avenue LLC as Doe 1 is GRANTED. Specially Appearing Defendant Ocean Avenue LLC shall prepare, serve, and submit a proposed judgment as per statute.