TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiff Star DeMarc’s Motion to Continue Defendant Dolphin Marina LTD’s Anti-SLAPP Motion and for Permission to Conduct Limited Discovery Pursuant to CCP 426.15(g) is DENIED.

Plaintiff Star DeMarc to give notice. 

REASONING

In the complaint, Plaintiff Star DeMarc (“Plaintiff”) alleges 22 causes of action claiming that she resided at 13900 Panay Way, Unit R-108, in Marina del Rey, and she made service requests to Defendants for maintenance to resolve problems with mold in the bathroom sink, water intrusion, roach infestation, and asbestos concerns, among others, but Defendants did not resolve the issues, and Defendants filed an unlawful detainer action against Plaintiff. After being served with the complaint, Defendants GK Management Co., Inc., Goldrich Kest, LLC, Goldrich & Kest Industries, LLC, Dolphin Marina Ltd., and Goldrich, Kest, Hirsch & Stern, LLC (“Defendants”) filed a special motion to strike certain portions of Plaintiff’s complaint on the ground that Plaintiff’s claims are based on Dolphin Marina Ltd.’s filing of an unlawful detainer lawsuit and the service of a three-day notice to pay rent or quit in advance of that lawsuit, both of which are protected petitioning activity under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, and Plaintiff cannot establish a probability of success on the claims at issue.

Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 posits a two-step process for determining whether an action is a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP). First, the Court must determine whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one arising from protected activity. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) If the defendant makes a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one arising from protected activity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish a likelihood of prevailing on the complaint. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)

In response to Defendant’s special motion to strike, Plaintiffs filed the present motion to continue the hearing on Defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion, currently set for hearing on May 10, 2024, so counsel may have more time to prepare a meaningful opposition, and for leave to conduct discovery to obtain evidence of uninhabitable conditions such as water leaks, mold, or asbestos contamination. (Mot., Winters Decl. ¶ 7.) 

First, as to Plaintiff’s request to continue the anti-SLAPP motion hearing to July 2, 2024, or later, Plaintiff’s request is DENIED. First, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (f), provides that an anti-SLAPP motion hearing “shall be scheduled by the clerk of the court for a hearing not more than 30 days after the service of the motion unless the docket conditions of the court require a later hearing.” The motion is currently set for the first date the docket conditions allow, and Plaintiff has failed to set forth good cause to continue the hearing beyond May 10, 2024, as he states only that he has to deal with other legal matters while declining to elaborate on how those matters may preclude preparing a meaningful opposition to the motion beyond stating that he is currently preparing a motion for preliminary injunction and appointment of a receiver which is set for hearing on March 7, 2024. (Mot., Winters Decl. ¶¶ 4, 5.) Plaintiff’s counsel has sufficient time before May 10, 2024, to prepare an opposition to this motion.

Second, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (g), provides that “[a]ll discovery proceedings in [an] action shall be stayed upon the filing of a notice of motion made pursuant to” Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. Such stay “shall remain in effect until notice of entry of the order ruling on the motion,” but the Court, “on noticed motion and for good cause shown, may order that specified discovery be conducted notwithstanding this subdivision.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (g).) “If the plaintiff makes a timely and proper showing in response to the motion to strike, that a defendant or witness possesses evidence needed by plaintiff to establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff must be given the reasonable opportunity to obtain that evidence through discovery before the motion to strike is adjudicated.” (Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 855, 868.) For that reason, the Court “must liberally exercise its discretion by authorizing reasonable and specified discovery timely petitioned for by a plaintiff . . . when evidence to establish a prima facie case is reasonably shown to be held, or known, by defendant or its agents and employees.” (Ibid.)

Plaintiff’s claims at issue in the anti-SLAPP motion are limited solely to those claims arising out of Defendant Dolphin Marina Ltd.’s filing of an unlawful detainer lawsuit and the service of a three-day notice to pay rent or quit in advance of that lawsuit. There are no claims at issue which relate to habitability of the premises, i.e., the evidence of uninhabitable conditions such as water leaks, mold, or asbestos contamination, would not be relevant to the disposition of the motion. Evidence relating to habitability issues at the property has no bearing on whether the litigation privilege applies to Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff’s claims that she met the financial hardship criteria for a rental deferral, whether Defendant Dolphin Marina Ltd. had a legitimate basis for initiating an unlawful detainer action against Plaintiff, whether the Tenant Protection Act applies to the property, or whether Plaintiff abandoned and vacated the premises, all of which are raised in Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion. Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion does not take issue with all of Plaintiff’s claims, as it seeks to strike only some claims or portions of claims based on the filing of an unlawful detainer lawsuit and the service of a three-day notice to pay rent or quit in advance of that lawsuit. Thus, there is no basis to conclude that the evidence sought is relevant to the Court’s ruling on the anti-SLAPP motion.

Plaintiff appears to be seeking unfettered access to any discovery which may be relevant to any of her claims, regardless of whether those claims are at issue in the anti-SLAPP motion, which is not permitted under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (g). Plaintiff was required to limit her discovery requests such that she would obtain only what is necessary to oppose Defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion, but she has not done so. Accordingly, Plaintiff Star DeMarc’s Motion to Continue Defendant Dolphin Marina LTD’s Anti-SLAPP Motion and for Permission to Conduct Limited Discovery Pursuant to CCP 426.15(g) is DENIED.