Judge: Lisa K. Sepe-Wiesenfeld, Case: 23SMCV04834, Date: 2025-01-17 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23SMCV04834 Hearing Date: January 17, 2025 Dept: N
TENTATIVE RULING
Defendant CSAA Insurance Exchange’s Motion for Summary Judgment and/or Summary Adjudication of Issues is GRANTED.
Defendant CSAA Insurance Exchange shall prepare, serve, and submit a proposed judgment as per statute.
Defendant CSAA Insurance Exchange to give notice.
REASONING
Request for Judicial Notice
Defendant CSAA Insurance Exchange (“Defendant”) requests judicial notice of the complaint filed in Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. 23SMCV02488 (Horwich v. Askari) and Plaintiff Adam Askari (“Plaintiff”)’s answer in that action. Defendant’s request is GRANTED pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d).
Plaintiff requests judicial notice of the fact that no city citations have been issued to Plaintiff for noise ordinance violations and public records showing enforcement actions taken to shut down illegal tennis coaching activities at the Horwich property. Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice is not properly made, as the request includes no evidence attached, and the Court will not determine on its own which pieces of evidence may support each request. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice is DENIED.
Analysis
Defendant moves the Court for summary judgment in its favor on the ground that it owed no obligation to defend Plaintiff in Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. 23SMCV02488 (Horwich v. Askari) (“the underlying action”), so no breach of contract or breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing occurred. Defendant also seeks summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s claims for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, bad faith denial of insurance coverage, and punitive damages on the grounds that no evidence exists that Defendant acted unreasonably in making its coverage determinations or that Defendant was motivated by malice, fraud, or oppression.
At the outset, the Court notes that Defendant’s separate statement of undisputed facts is of little assistance to the Court, as many of the purported facts are that documents are true and correct copies of those documents, such that the information contained within the documents is not included within the separate statement. The Court exercises its discretion to consider Defendant’s motion nonetheless given the documents are described in the memorandum of points and authorities, but it takes care to note that parties are required to put all facts supporting the motion in the separate statement itself rather than simply referring to documents for the Court’s review or placing the information within the memorandum of points and authorities.
Legal Standard
The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)
“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Med. Ctr. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467 (Avivi).)
“Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “[T]he court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection) . . . in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 467; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)
Analysis
Plaintiff and Defendant were parties to Homeowners Policy No. CAH3217790305, which includes personal liability coverage as follows:
SECTION II – LIABILITY COVERAGES
COVERAGE E – Personal Liability
If a claim is made or a suit is brought against any “insured” for “damages” because of “personal injury” or “property damage” caused by an “occurrence” to which this coverage applies, we will:
1. Pay up to our limit of liability for the “damages” for which the “insured” is legally liable; and
2. Provide a defense at our expense by counsel of our choice, even if the allegations are groundless, false or fraudulent. We may make any investigation and settle any claim or suit that we decide is appropriate. Our obligation to defend any claim or suit ends when the amount we pay for “damages” resulting from the “occurrence” equals our limit of liability
(Def.’s UMF No. 1.) The policy covers claims caused by an “occurrence,” which is defined by the policy as follows:
11. “Occurrence” means an accident, including exposure to conditions which results during the policy period in:
a. “Personal injury”; or
b. “Property damage”.
(Def.’s UMF No. 1.) The policy also defines “personal injury” and “property damage” as follows:
12. “Personal injury” means:
a. Bodily injury, sickness or disease, including care, loss of services and death resulting therefrom;
b. False arrest, detention or imprisonment or malicious prosecution;
c. The publication or utterance of a libel or slander or of other defamatory or disparaging material, or a publication or utterance in violation of an individual’s right of privacy; except publications or utterances in the course of or related to advertising, broadcasting or telecasting activities conducted by or on behalf of the named “insured”;
d. Wrongful entry or eviction or other invasion of the right of private occupancy.
13. “Property damage” means physical injury to or destruction of tangible property, including loss of use of this property.
(Def.’s UMF No. 1.)
Plaintiff tendered the underlying action to Defendant, and Defendant denied coverage because the alleged conduct at issue, specifically the use of a leaf blower, playing loud music, and spying or harassment, was not caused by an accidental occurrence but by Plaintiff’s volitional conduct, and there was no accidental component in the causal chain as required for coverage. (Def.’s UMF No. 4.)
On August 23, 2023, Plaintiff’s counsel wrote to Defendant’s coverage counsel to rebut the denial of coverage and alleging bad faith. (Def.’s UMF No. 5.) In that letter, Plaintiff deemed Defendant’s denial both wrongful because (1) the underlying action took the form of an unverified complaint, and the denial was thus based on unverified allegations, (2) the underlying action alleged loss of property value, personal injury and emotional distress within the CSAA Policy’s personal liability coverage, and (3) the underlying action alleged damages which Defendant is required to cover. (Ibid.) The only additional factual evidence presented with this letter was a copy of Plaintiff’s answer to the complaint in the underlying action, which simply denied all allegations in the complaint. (Def.’s UMF Nos. 5, 6.)
On August 29, 2023, Defendant’s coverage counsel responded on behalf of Defendant and pointed out that Plaintiff “did not provide CSAA with any facts or evidence that changed the allegation of the [underlying action] or created a potential for coverage under the policy.” (Def.’s UMF No. 7.) The letter stated, “As previously asked of Dr. Askari, if you have any facts/evidence or legal authority that you believe should cause CSAA to reconsider its coverage position in this matter, please communicate it to me promptly for review and consideration.” (Ibid.) Plaintiff has not provided any new facts or information relevant to coverage. (Def.’s UMF No. 8.)
This evidence allows Defendant to meet its burden of establishing that no triable issue of material fact exists as to Plaintiff’s claims for declaratory relief, breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and bad faith denial of insurance coverage. The burden, therefore, shifts to Plaintiff to create a triable issue of material fact as to these issues.
Plaintiff does not dispute most of Defendant’s evidence; the only additional fact provided is that he offered to provide evidence clarifying the allegations in the underlying complaint, but Defendant failed to engage in meaningful investigation. (Pl.’s UMF No. 8.) Notably, Plaintiff has provided no evidence to this effect. Plaintiff also argues that Defendant misapplied the terms of the policy in denying coverage because it did not conduct a reasonable investigation, relying only on the allegations of the underlying complaint, which were vague and unverified. Plaintiff points to the fact that he was never cited for noise violations, and the underlying action was filed in retaliation to Plaintiff’s lawsuit based on the neighbors’ purported illegal operation of a business out of their home. Put simply, Plaintiff was required to provide some evidence that the conduct at issue was accidental, as the terms of the policy make clear that Defendant would only provide a defense for personal injury or property damage caused as the result of an accident. There is no reading of the underlying complaint, the answer, or any evidence provided by Plaintiff that would allow the trier of fact to conclude that the conduct alleged was accidental. Plaintiff appears to contend that he was entitled to a defense because his conduct was justified, or because the neighbors engaged in improper conduct, or because he did not intend to cause a nuisance or other harm to the neighbors, but this is not the standard for whether Defendant was required to tender a defense. Plaintiff must create a triable issue of material fact that a defense was warranted under the terms of the policy, i.e., that his conduct could be considered accidental, and he has provided no such evidence.
For that reason, Defendant CSAA Insurance Exchange’s Motion for Summary Judgment and/or Summary Adjudication of Issues is GRANTED. Defendant CSAA Insurance Exchange shall prepare, serve, and submit a proposed judgment as per statute.
Evidentiary Objections
Plaintiff objects to certain paragraphs of the declaration of Kenneth West. Plaintiff’s objections are not properly formatted, as he fails to quote the statements at issue. In any event, Plaintiff’s objections are OVERRULED.
Defendant objects to certain statements within the declaration of Adam Askari and to certain exhibits in support of Plaintiff’s opposition. Defendant’s objections are OVERRULED.