TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant Lyft, Inc.’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings is GRANTED.

The proceedings are hereby STAYED pending the outcome of arbitration.

Defendant Lyft, Inc. to give notice.

REASONING

Defendant Lyft, Inc. (“Defendant”) moves the Court for an order compelling Plaintiff David Brantley (“Plaintiff”) to submit to arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause included in Defendant’s Terms of Service, which Plaintiff affirmatively accepted on four occasions. The motion is unopposed.

“[I]n considering a . . . petition to compel arbitration, a trial court must make the preliminary determinations whether there is an agreement to arbitrate and whether the petitioner is a party to that agreement (or can otherwise enforce the agreement).” (M & M Foods, Inc. v. Pac. Am. Fish Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 554, 559; see also Giuliano v. Inland Empire Personnel, Inc. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1284 [“petitioner bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by the preponderance of the evidence”].) In deciding a petition to compel arbitration, trial courts must first decide whether an enforceable arbitration agreement exists between the parties, and then determine whether plaintiff’s claims are covered by the agreement. (Omar v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 955, 961.) The burden then shifts to the opposing party to prove, by a preponderance of evidence, a defense to enforcement of the agreement. (Rosenthal v. Great Western Financial Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2 provides, in relevant part:

On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto refuses to arbitrate such controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that:

(a) The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or

(b) Grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement.

(c) A party to the arbitration is also a party to a pending court action or special proceeding with a third party . . . .

“The right to arbitration depends upon contract; a petition to compel arbitration is simply a suit in equity seeking specific performance of that contract.” (Eng’rs & Architects Ass’n v. Cmty. Dev. Dep’t (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 644, 653.) General principles of contract law determine whether the parties have entered a binding agreement to arbitrate. (Chan v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 632, 640-641 [“The existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate involves general contract principles”].)

In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges he was physically assaulted and battered by Defendant’s agent or representative following a verbal dispute. (Compl. ¶ 5.) Defendant moves to compel arbitration pursuant to Defendant’s Terms of Service, which Plaintiff accepted on four different occasions. (Mot., McCachern Decl. ¶ 12.) The arbitration agreement reads in pertinent part:

(a) Agreement to Binding Arbitration Between You and Lyft. YOU AND LYFT MUTUALLY AGREE TO WAIVE OUR RESPECTIVE RIGHTS TO RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES IN A COURT OF LAW BY A JUDGE OR JURY AND AGREE TO RESOLVE ANY DISPUTE BY ARBITRATION, as set forth below. This agreement to arbitrate (“Arbitration Agreement”) is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act and survives after the Agreement terminates or your relationship with Lyft ends. ANY ARBITRATION UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL TAKE PLACE ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS; CLASS ARBITRATIONS AND CLASS ACTIONS ARE NOT PERMITTED. Except as expressly provided below, this Arbitration Agreement applies to all Claims (defined below) between you and Lyft, including our affiliates, subsidiaries, parents, successors and assigns, and each of our respective officers, directors, employees, agents, or shareholders.

Except as expressly provided below, ALL DISPUTES AND CLAIMS BETWEEN US (EACH A “CLAIM” AND COLLECTIVELY, “CLAIMS”) SHALL BE EXCLUSIVELY RESOLVED BY BINDING ARBITRATION SOLELY BETWEEN YOU AND LYFT. These Claims include, but are not limited to, any dispute, claim or controversy, whether based on past, present, or future events, arising out of or relating to: this Agreement and prior versions thereof (including the breach, termination, enforcement, interpretation or validity thereof), the Lyft Platform, . . . any other goods or services made available through the Lyft Platform.

(Mot., McCachern Decl. ¶ 12, Exs. 2-5, 17(a).)

The Court finds that Defendant has demonstrated the existence of an arbitration agreement which may be invoked by Defendant against Plaintiff, and the dispute is covered by the agreement to arbitrate, as the provision requires submission of claims arising out of relating to the agreement, the Lyft platform, or any other goods or services made available through the Lyft platform. (Mot., McCachern Decl. ¶ 12, Exs. 2-5, 17(a).) While the Court does not find rulings from other trial courts within Los Angeles Superior Court or outside this jurisdiction to be persuasive, it is well established that Plaintiff accepted Defendant’s Terms of Service, including the arbitration clause, on March 26, 2017, when he created his account with Defendant, then again on November 27, 2019, March 20, 2021, and March 5, 2023, when Defendant updated its Terms of Services and required Plaintiff to affirmatively accept the revised terms. (Mot., McCachern Decl. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff has not opposed the motion with any arguments invalidating the application of the arbitration provision. Accordingly, Defendant Lyft, Inc.’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings is GRANTED. The proceedings are hereby STAYED pending the outcome of arbitration.