TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant The Regents of the University of California’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED with thirty (30) days leave to amend.

Plaintiff John Doe may amend his complaint only as authorized by the Court’s order and may not amend the complaint to add a new party or cause of action without having obtained permission to do so. (Harris v. Wachovia Mortgage, FSB (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1023.)

Defendant The Regents of the University of California to give notice. 

REASONING

Defendant The Regents of the University of California (“Defendant”) demurs to the third through eleventh causes of action alleged against it in Plaintiff John Doe (“Plaintiff”)’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on the ground that the claims are barred by the statute of limitations because Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege the existence of a “cover up” within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.16, subdivision (e)(4)(A), and the requisite specificity for “cover up” within the meaning of the statute includes specific allegations of past conduct attributed to specific individuals. The Court notes that it has not considered the statements within the declaration of Plaintiff’s counsel Virginia A. Clinkenbeard, submitted in opposition to the demurrer, as the statements were not relevant to the disposition of this motion.

Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 340.16, subdivision (e)(1), provides that “[n]otwithstanding any other law, any claim seeking to recover damages suffered as a result of a sexual assault that occurred on or after the plaintiff’s 18th birthday that would otherwise be barred before January 1, 2023, solely because the applicable statute of limitations has or had expired, is hereby revived, and a cause of action may proceed if already pending in court on January 1, 2023, or, if not filed by that date, may be commenced between January 1, 2023, and December 31, 2023,” as occurred here with the filing of this action on December 29, 2023. Code of Civil Procedure section 340.16, subdivision (e)(2), provides that “[t]his subdivision revives claims brought by a plaintiff who alleges all of the following: [¶] (A) The plaintiff was sexually assaulted. [¶] (B) One or more entities are legally responsible for damages arising out of the sexual assault. [¶] (C) The entity or entities, including, but not limited to, their officers, directors, representatives, employees, or agents, engaged in a cover up or attempted a cover up of a previous instance or allegations of sexual assault by an alleged perpetrator of such abuse.” The statute defines “cover up” to mean “a concerted effort to hide evidence relating to a sexual assault that incentivizes individuals to remain silent or prevents information relating to a sexual assault from becoming public or being disclosed to the plaintiff, including, but not limited to, the use of nondisclosure agreements or confidentiality agreements.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.16, subd. (e)(4)(A).)

Plaintiff alleges that the offending conduct occurred from 1972 to 1974 (FAC ¶ 14), such that any claim based on this conduct would be time barred but for Code of Civil Procedure section 340.16, subdivision (e)(1). Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendant liable on the ground that “UCLA and its agents and employees knowingly engaged in a cover up of the abuse” alleged. (FAC ¶ 14.) As to the purported cover up, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “actively covered up multiple sexual assaults over time from at least June 1968 to the present and prevented the information from becoming public,” which included “(1) Maintaining secret files on physician misconduct complaints; (2) Using confidentiality agreements to silence victims; (3) Failing to terminate employees who have committed abuse; and (4) Failing to report criminal conduct to law enforcement.” (FAC ¶¶ 69-70.) Plaintiff also refers to a cover up relating to a professor. (FAC ¶¶ 75-78.)

The FAC does not allege any specific facts about the purported cover up. He does not allege who covered up any assaults, when the cover up conduct occurred, or how specifically the conduct was covered up. Plaintiff refers to secret files, confidentiality agreements, failure to terminate, and failure to report, but he does not allege any specific conduct of this sort, only providing conclusory statements that this conduct occurred. Without these allegations, the Court and the trier of fact cannot conclude that the conduct constituted a concerted effort to incentivize Plaintiff or other individuals to remain silent or to prevent information relating to the sexual assault from becoming public or being disclosed to Plaintiff. The statute seeks to revive claims specifically where there was a cover up by an entity like Defendant, so it follows that Plaintiff is required to allege facts relating to that cover up. He has not done so here. Accordingly, Defendant The Regents of the University of California’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED with thirty (30) days leave to amend. Upon amending the complaint, Plaintiff must allege specific facts that would allow a conclusion that Defendant engaged in a “cover up” within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.16, subdivision (e)(4)(A).