TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc.’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Stay Action is GRANTED.

The proceedings are hereby STAYED pending the outcome of arbitration.

Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc. to give notice.

REASONING

Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc. (“Defendant”) moves the Court for an order compelling Plaintiff Karamali Pashmforoosh (“Plaintiff”) to submit to arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause included in Defendant’s Terms of Use, which Plaintiff accepted on six occasions. Plaintiff argues that the agreement was between Defendant and Plaintiff’s daughter, Sara Pashmforoosh, not Plaintiff himself, such that there is no agreement to arbitrate between Plaintiff and Defendant that is enforceable against Plaintiff.

“[I]n considering a . . . petition to compel arbitration, a trial court must make the preliminary determinations whether there is an agreement to arbitrate and whether the petitioner is a party to that agreement (or can otherwise enforce the agreement).” (M & M Foods, Inc. v. Pac. Am. Fish Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 554, 559; see also Giuliano v. Inland Empire Personnel, Inc. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1284 [“petitioner bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by the preponderance of the evidence”].) In deciding a petition to compel arbitration, trial courts must first decide whether an enforceable arbitration agreement exists between the parties, and then determine whether plaintiff’s claims are covered by the agreement. (Omar v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 955, 961.) The burden then shifts to the opposing party to prove, by a preponderance of evidence, a defense to enforcement of the agreement. (Rosenthal v. Great Western Financial Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2 provides, in relevant part:

On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto refuses to arbitrate such controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that:

(a) The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or

(b) Grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement.

(c) A party to the arbitration is also a party to a pending court action or special proceeding with a third party . . . .

“The right to arbitration depends upon contract; a petition to compel arbitration is simply a suit in equity seeking specific performance of that contract.” (Eng’rs & Architects Ass’n v. Cmty. Dev. Dep’t (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 644, 653.) General principles of contract law determine whether the parties have entered a binding agreement to arbitrate. (Chan v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 632, 640-641 [“The existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate involves general contract principles”].)

In the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges he was injured while riding in a vehicle driven by Defendant Hayk Avetsiyan, an individual working for Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc. (“Defendant”) as a rideshire driver at the time of the incident when Defendant Joseph Moshe Sassoon collided with the vehicle in which Plaintiff was a passenger. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 9.) Defendant moves to compel arbitration pursuant to Defendant’s Terms of Use, which includes an arbitration agreement stating, in pertinent part, as follows:

(a) Agreement to Binding Arbitration Between You and Uber.

. . . [Y]ou and Uber agree that any dispute, claim or controversy in any way arising out of or relating to (i) these Terms and prior versions of these Terms, or the existence, breach, termination, enforcement, interpretation, scope, waiver, or validity thereof, (ii) your access to or use of the Services at any time, (iii) incidents or accidents resulting in personal injury that you allege occurred in connection with your use of the Services, whether the dispute, claim or controversy occurred or accrued before or after the date you agreed to the Terms, or (iv) your relationship with Uber, will be settled by binding arbitration between you and Uber, and not in a court of law. This Agreement survives after your relationship with Uber ends.

(Mot., Yu Decl. ¶ 15, Ex. H.) Defendant states that Plaintiff consented to these terms on January 18, 2021, December 16, 2021, and January 17, 2023 when he confirmed acceptance of these terms. (Mot., Yu Decl. ¶ 11.) Defendant states that Plaintiff’s account was under the name Sara Pashmforoosh. (Mot., Yu Decl. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff argues that he does not hold a user account with Defendant, and because the agreement and acceptance of arbitration was between Plaintiff’s daughter and Defendant, not Plaintiff, he cannot be forced to arbitrate his claims against Defendant.

While Defendant argues that Plaintiff operated an account under the name Sara Pashmforoosh, the evidence shows only that Sara Pashmforoosh, Plaintiff’s daughter, ordered Plaintiff a ride through her Uber account. (Opp’n, Karamali Decl. ¶ 2.) It follows that Plaintiff himself did not agree to arbitration as a signatory. However, nonsignatories can be required to arbitrate their claims in certain circumstances. “The California cases binding nonsignatories to arbitrate their claims fall into two categories. In some cases, a nonsignatory was required to arbitrate a claim because a benefit was conferred on the nonsignatory as a result of the contract, making the nonsignatory a third party beneficiary of the arbitration agreement.” (County of Contra Costa v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (1996) 47 Cal. App. 4th 237, 242.)

The Court finds it proper to require Plaintiff to be bound to the arbitration agreement as a third-party beneficiary of the agreement between Defendant and Plaintiff’s daughter, Sara Pashmforoosh, who ordered the drive for Plaintiff. Defendant provides evidence that an individual cannot use the Uber app, and in turn order a ride, without registering for an account and agreeing to certain times. (Mot., Yu Decl. ¶ 5.) Here, Plaintiff’s daughter registered for an account and agreed to Defendant’s Terms of Use so she could order rides through Defendant’s platform, including the ride in which Plaintiff was allegedly injured. It follows that a benefit was conferred on Plaintiff as a nonsignatory to the Terms of Use and the arbitration agreement because Plaintiff could not have been in an Uber ride without his daughter entering into the agreement with Defendant.

Additionally, under the principle of equitable estoppel, “a nonsignatory is estopped from avoiding arbitration if [he] knowingly seeks the benefits of the contract containing the arbitration clause” and receives “a direct benefit under the contract containing an arbitration clause.” (Crowley Maritime Corp. v. Boston Old Colony Insurance Co. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1061, 1070, quotation marks and italics omitted.) Again, Plaintiff received a direct benefit of the agreement between his daughter and Defendant because he could not have been party to a ride with Uber without his daughter entering into the arbitration agreement with Defendant, and he knowingly sought the benefit of his daughter having entered into the agreement with Defendant.

Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff is bound to the arbitration agreement as a third-party beneficiary of the agreement between Defendant and Plaintiff’s daughter, Sara Pashmforoosh, and under the principle of equitable estoppel. Accordingly, Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc.’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Stay Action is GRANTED. The proceedings are hereby STAYED pending outcome of the arbitration.