Judge Lisa K. Sepe-Wiesenfeld, Case Number: 24SMCV01731, Date: 2025-03-27 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lisa K. Sepe-Wiesenfeld, Case: 24SMCV01731, Date: 2025-03-27 Tentative Ruling

Defendants Anne B. Mirahmadi; Mostafa Mirahmadi; Patrick Mirahmadi; Anne B. Mirahmadi, as Trustee of Anne B. Mirahmadi Family Trust aka Anne B. Mirahmadi Trust; Patrick Mirahmadi, as Trustee of Anne B. Mirahmadi Family Trust; and Loma Vista Trousdale LLC (“Defendants”) move the Court for an order striking the malicious prosecution cause of action against them in Plaintiff Patricia Sakai (“Plaintiff”)’s complaint on the ground that the claim arises from protected activity, as the claim arises out of Defendants’ filing of an unlawful detainer action against Plaintiff, and Plaintiff is not likely to succeed on the merits of her claim because she cannot show that she achieved a favorable termination in her favor, as the action was dismissed because Plaintiff vacated the property, an absence of probable cause, and that Defendants litigated the underlying action with actual malice.

A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.

Accordingly, section 425.16 posits a two-step process for determining whether an action is a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP). First, the Court decides whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one arising from protected activity. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) “A defendant meets this burden by demonstrating that the act underlying the plaintiff’s cause fits one of the categories spelled out in [section 425.16,] subdivision (e).” (Braun v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1043.) Those categories include “(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e).) If defendant makes a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one arising from protected activity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish a likelihood of prevailing on the complaint. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)

To invoke Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, a defendant need only demonstrate that a suit arises from the defendant’s exercise of free speech or petition rights. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b); City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 78.) This is determined by “the gravamen or principal thrust of the action.” (See In re Episcopal Church Cases (2009) 45 Cal.4th 467, 477.) “In the anti-SLAPP context, the critical point is whether the plaintiff’s cause of action itself was based on an act in furtherance of the defendant’s right of petition or free speech.” (City of Cotati v. Cashman, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 78.) “In making its determination, the court shall consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(2).)

“A special motion to strike is particularly appropriate when the action sought to be stricken is one for malicious prosecution.” (Barak v. The Quisenberry Law Firm (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 654, 659.) “By definition, a malicious prosecution suit alleges that the defendant committed a tort by filing a lawsuit.” (Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 735.) Here, Plaintiff’s claim for malicious prosecution against Defendants is based on litigation of Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. 23SMCV02224 (Mirahmadi v. Sakai). This conduct falls within the purview of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (e). Therefore, the Court finds Defendants have satisfied the first prong of the anti-SLAPP statute as to Plaintiff’s claim for malicious prosecution, as Plaintiff’s claim arises from protected activity.

If the defendant makes a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one arising from protected activity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish a likelihood of prevailing on the complaint. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) “In order to establish a probability of prevailing on the claim, a plaintiff responding to an anti-SLAPP motion must state and substantiate a legally sufficient claim.” (Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester (2002) 28 Cal.4th 811, 821, superseded by statute on other grounds as noted in Hutton v. Hafif (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 527, 547, citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted.) To do so, “the plaintiff must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.” (Ibid., quotation marks omitted.) In considering whether a plaintiff’s claim has merit, “the trial court considers the pleadings and evidentiary submissions of both the plaintiff and the defendant,” and while “the court does not weigh the credibility or comparative probative strength of competing evidence, it should grant the motion if, as a matter of law, the defendant’s evidence supporting the motion defeats the plaintiff’s attempt to establish evidentiary support for the claim.” (Ibid., emphasis in original.)

As for the first element, “[i]n order for a plaintiff to state a cause of action for malicious prosecution, [she] must plead and prove that the prior judicial proceeding of which [she] complains terminated in [her] favor.” (Asia Investment Co. v. Borowski (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 832, 837.) “A termination is . . . ‘favorable’ if its nature is such as to indicate the innocence of the accused”; “[i]f, on the other hand, the dismissal is on technical grounds, for procedural reasons, or for any other reason not inconsistent with [her] guilt, it does not constitute a favorable termination.” (Id. at pp. 837-838.) Plaintiff argues that the action was terminated in her favor because neither Defendant Patrik Mirahmadi nor the Anne B. Mirahmadi Family Trust had standing to sue on behalf of the landlord. Notably, it is not this Court’s role to determine whether Defendants had standing to file the unlawful detainer action; the Court need only determine whether the action was terminated in Plaintiff’s favor. The Court cannot so find when the action was voluntarily dismissed by Defendants. Plaintiff contends that a demurrer to the complaint had been sustained with leave to amend, and the dismissal followed thereafter, but finding that the dismissal was entered due to Plaintiff’s arguments about standing asks the Court to speculate about Defendants’ rationale for voluntarily dismissing the case. The dismissal includes no statement or finding that Defendants lacked standing, that Plaintiff’s arguments were well taken by Defendants, or, again, that Plaintiff was innocent of the alleged conduct. Further, even if Defendants did lack standing, although the Court makes no such finding here, this does not show that Plaintiff was “innocent” of the conduct alleged in the unlawful detainer action. Thus, the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiff can establish that the underlying action was terminated in her favor as required for a malicious prosecution claim.

As for the second element, “[a] litigant will lack probable cause for his action either if he relies upon facts which he has no reasonable cause to believe to be true, or if he seeks recovery upon a legal theory which is untenable under the facts known to him.” (Soukup, supra, 39 Cal.4th at 292.) Plaintiff argues there was no probable cause to file the unlawful detainer action because Defendants lacked standing to do so, but this contradicts her allegation in the complaint that Defendants lacked probable cause because Plaintiff had previously agreed to vacate and return possession of the property. (Compl. ¶ 267.) As to any agreement to vacate, this does not show that Plaintiff did, in fact, vacate before the action was filed, nor does it show that Plaintiff paid the unpaid rent sought in the complaint. As to standing, Plaintiff argues that the lease identified Anne B Mirahmadi Trust as the landlord, such that neither Defendant Patrik Mirahmadi nor the Anne B. Mirahmadi Family Trust had standing to sue, but the Court cannot conclude there is no reasonable cause of believe either of these parties lacked standing when the name identified as the landlord was substantially similar to the Anne B. Mirahmadi Family Trust. The Court need only conclude here that Defendants brought a claim based on facts they believed were true and which was tenable under those facts, which was the case in the unlawful detainer action, such that the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiff can establish a lack of probable cause as required for a malicious prosecution claim.

Further, to demonstrate the third element, that Defendants litigated the underlying action with malice, Plaintiff must establish “actual ill will or some improper ulterior motive.” (Soukup, supra, 39 Cal.4th at 292, italics omitted.) Notably, “[m]alice may also be inferred from the facts establishing lack of probable cause.” (Ibid.) Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Defendants litigated the action against Plaintiff with malice. Plaintiff argues that she had previously agreed to vacate, and she had detailed issues with harassment and failure to make repairs, but this does not establish malice through reference to evidence or even that the complaint lacked probable cause because, again, Plaintiff does not show that she vacated the property before the action was filed, nor does she show that she paid the unpaid rent sought in the complaint. Defendants brought an unlawful detainer action based on their understanding of what was owed to them, and there is no evidence that Defendants had some ill will toward Plaintiff or an ulterior motive for filing the action against her. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not established the third element of her malicious prosecution claim against Defendants, such that the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate a likelihood of prevailing on her claim for malicious prosecution against Defendants. Accordingly, Defendants Anne B. Mirahmadi; Mostafa Mirahmadi; Patrick Mirahmadi; Anne B. Mirahmadi, as Trustee of Anne B. Mirahmadi Family Trust aka Anne B. Mirahmadi Trust; Patrick Mirahmadi, as Trustee of Anne B. Mirahmadi Family Trust; and Loma Vista Trousdale LLC’s Special Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s Complaint Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 is GRANTED as to the tenth cause of action for malicious prosecution.

Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (c), provides that “a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney’s fees and costs.” Under section 425.16, an award of fees and costs is mandatory. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131.) In that Defendants are the prevailing parties, they are entitled to their reasonable attorney fees and costs, the amount of which shall be determined upon Defendants filing a noticed motion for attorney fees and memorandum of costs.