Judge Lisa K. Sepe-Wiesenfeld, Case Number: 24SMCV02272, Date: 2025-01-07 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lisa K. Sepe-Wiesenfeld, Case: 24SMCV02272, Date: 2025-01-07 Tentative Ruling

“[A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint.” (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (See Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 [in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents].) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hosp. Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)

Further, the court may, upon motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b).) The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false, or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)

Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (See Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 [court shall not “sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment”]; Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1037 [“A demurrer should not be sustained without leave to amend if the complaint, liberally construed, can state a cause of action under any theory or if there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured by amendment.”]; Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768 [“When the defect which justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure, the court should allow leave to amend.”].) The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)

In this action, Plaintiff alleges that he was injured due to an unsafe condition on Interstate 10 westbound, which caused a vehicle to make an unsafe lane change due to poorly marked curb and inadequate barricades, causing the vehicle to collide with Plaintiff’s motorcycle. (Compl. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff has asserted a claim against Caltrans pursuant to Government Code section 815.2, which provides that “[a] public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal representative.”

Notably, Government Code section 815, subdivision (a), provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute: [a] public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.” It follows that there must be a specific statute imposing liability on Caltrans based on the claim alleged by Plaintiff. Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a statutory basis for liability here. Plaintiff has provided a list of statutes purportedly providing a basis for liability (Compl. ¶ 14), but none of the cited statutory provisions appear to apply here.

As stated above, Government Code section 815, subdivision (a), simply provides that “[a] public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.” Insofar as Plaintiff relies on Government Code section 815.2, this statute provides only that “[a] public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal representative,” and, notably, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, a public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of an employee of the public entity where the employee is immune from liability.” Plaintiff states no liability of any specific employee. Government Code section 820, subdivision (a), merely imposes liability on a public employee to the same extent a private person would be liable, and, again, Plaintiff has failed to state any liability as to a specific employee of Caltrans.

Government Code section 820.8 provides only that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, a public employee is not liable for an injury caused by the act or omission of another person,” and while “[n]othing in this section exonerates a public employee from liability for injury proximately caused by his own negligent or wrongful act or omission,” Plaintiff has not alleged any specific conduct by a Caltrans employee. Government Code section 835 provides that “a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either: [¶] (a) A negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or [¶] (b) The public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under Section 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.” Plaintiff alleges only that Caltrans was negligent in its design, but it is not clear how an employee created the dangerous condition because Plaintiff provides only a conclusory statement to this effect. (See Compl. ¶ 14.) Without allegations to describe why Caltrans may be liable despite the immunities described herein, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a statutory basis for liability against Caltrans. Notably, a “plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show his cause of action lies outside the breadth of any applicable statutory immunity,” and “[h]e must plead with particularity every fact essential to the existence of statutory liability.” (Keyes v. Santa Clara Valley Water District (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 882, 886, quotation marks, brackets, and comma omitted.) Without further facts, the Court lacks a basis to conclude that Caltrans may be liable here.

Accordingly, Defendant The People of the State of California, acting by and through the Department of Transportation’s Demurrer to Complaint is SUSTAINED with thirty (30) days leave to amend. Defendant The People of the State of California, acting by and through the Department of Transportation’s Motion to Strike is DENIED as MOOT. Plaintiff Charles Bryan may amend his complaint only as authorized by the Court’s order and may not amend the complaint to add a new party or cause of action without having obtained permission to do so. (Harris v. Wachovia Mortgage, FSB (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1023.) Upon amending the complaint, Plaintiff shall describe a statutory basis for liability with specific facts to support imposing liability despite the governmental immunities provided by statute.