TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiff Neda Heidari’s Motion to Compel Deposition Attendance and Production of Documents by Defendant General Motors, LLC’s Person Most Knowledgeable is GRANTED in part. Defendant General Motors LLC shall make its Person Most Knowledgeable available for deposition within thirty (30) days of entry of this order. Plaintiff Neda Heidari shall limit the deposition to only those topics stated in Category Nos. 1 to 5, 8, 9, 11, 17, 20, 25, 39, 43, 46, 47, and 49. In all other respects, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.

Plaintiff Neda Heidari’s Request for Monetary Sanctions is DENIED.

Plaintiff Neda Heidari to give notice.

REASONING

Plaintiff Neda Heidari (“Plaintiff”) moves the Court for an order compelling Defendant General Motors LLC (“Defendant”)’s Person Most Knowledgeable (“PMK”) to appear for deposition. Plaintiff represents that she served a notice of deposition, Defendant served an objection to the notice, and Defendant has failed to provide a date for the deposition. (Mot., Alemi Decl. ¶¶ 3-8.) Defendant objects on the ground that it has offered its PMK for deposition on the categories of the deposition notice that are pertinent to Plaintiff’s vehicle, but Plaintiff has demanded deposition testimony on categories concerning information that goes beyond the scope of this simple breach of warranty matter. 

“Any party may obtain discovery . . . by taking in California the oral deposition of any person, including any party to the action. The person deposed may be a natural person, an organization such as a public or private corporation, a partnership, an association, or a governmental agency.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.010.) An oral deposition of a party may be taken after service of a deposition notice. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2025.210, 2025.220.) “If, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action or an officer, director, managing agent, or employee of a party, or a person designated by an organization that is a party under Section 2025.230, without having served a valid objection under Section 2025.410, fails to appear for examination, or to proceed with it, or to produce for inspection any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice, the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling the deponent’s attendance and testimony, and the production for inspection of any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd. (a).) The motion “shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the production for inspection of any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice” and “shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040, or, when the deponent fails to attend the deposition and produce the documents, electronically stored information, or things described in the deposition notice, by a declaration stating that the petitioner has contacted the deponent to inquire about the nonappearance.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subds. (b)(1), (b)(2).) Where the deposition subpoena requires a witness to appear for the taking of a deposition, the Court may make an order directing compliance with the subpoena. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1, subd. (a).)

“A plaintiff pursuing an action under the Song-Beverly Act has the burden to prove the following elements: (1) the product had a defect or nonconformity covered by the express warranty; (2) the product was presented to an authorized representative of the manufacturer for repair; and (3) the manufacturer or its representative did not repair the defect or nonconformity after a reasonable number of repair attempts.” (Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 798-799.) It follows that Plaintiff’s action is limited to the purported defects in her vehicle alone, as she has not brought an action alleging that all 2022 Cadillac Escalades contain the same defects as her vehicle. Moreover, Civil Code section 1794, subdivisions (c) and (e)(1), bases civil penalties on the damages a consumer sustains by reason of a manufacturer’s failure to comply with a warranty or a provision of the Song-Beverly Act with respect to the consumer’s vehicle. Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (c), authorizes the award of a civil penalty where Defendant’s conduct was willful. Thus, Plaintiff need only show in this action that her vehicle should have been repurchased, but Defendant willingly failed to do so. Plaintiff is not entitled to seek broad discovery as to Defendant’s practices and communications as to defects in vehicles other than Plaintiff’s vehicle.

Put simply, Plaintiff seeks discovery in this action relating to Defendant’s procedures in general or defects from any General Motors vehicles, and there is no basis to order such extensive discovery. Notably, Defendant has agreed to produce its PMK for deposition as to the specific topics in the deposition notice which relate to Plaintiff’s vehicle. While Plaintiff argues that Defendant has not provided a time and place for the deposition as to those topics, it is clear that Defendant declined to do so because Plaintiff had not limited the deposition topics.

Accordingly, Plaintiff Neda Heidari’s Motion to Compel Deposition Attendance and Production of Documents by Defendant General Motors, LLC’s Person Most Knowledgeable is GRANTED in part. Defendant General Motors LLC shall make its Person Most Knowledgeable available for deposition within thirty (30) days of entry of this order. Plaintiff Neda Heidari shall limit the deposition to only those topics stated in Category Nos. 1 to 5, 8, 9, 11, 17, 20, 25, 39, 43, 46, 47, and 49. In all other respects, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.

Insofar as Plaintiff requested monetary sanctions in connection with the motion, that request is DENIED. Plaintiff has not identified a statutory basis for sanctions, the request for sanctions was not included in the notice of motion (see Mot., p. 8), and Plaintiff’s motion was only partially granted, specifically only as to what Defendant had already promised, such that there is no proper basis for an award for sanctions.