Judge: Lisa R. Jaskol, Case: 19STCV28449, Date: 2023-11-09 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 19STCV28449 Hearing Date: February 13, 2024 Dept: 28
Having considered the moving, opposing and reply papers, the Court rules as follows.
BACKGROUND
On August 9, 2019, Plaintiff Deon Goggins (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants 4755 Alla LP (“Alla”), Marpac Company (“Marpac”), MF One, LP (“MF”), and Does 1-20 for negligence and premises liability.
On October 23, 2019, Alla, Marpac, and MF filed an answer.
On September 19, 2021, Alla, Marpac and MF filed a cross-complaint against Cross-Defendants RRAM Services, Vortex Industries, Inc. (“Vortex”), and Roes 1 through 50 for comparative negligence, express contractual indemnity, equitable indemnity, comparative equitable indemnity, contribution, apportionment of fault and declaratory relief. On August 6, 2021, Alla, Marpac and MF filed an amended cross-complaint. On October 22, 2021, RRAM Services filed an answer. On June 29, 2022, Vortex filed an answer.
On April 22, 2022, Plaintiff amended the complaint to include Defendants RRAM Services (Doe 1) and Vortex (Doe 2).
On April 26, 2022, Plaintiff amended the complaint to include Defendant Shrader & Martinez Construction USA, LLC (Doe 3).
On June 2, 2022, Defendant Shrader & Martinez Construction USA, LLC (erroneously sued as RRAM Services) (“Shrader”) filed an answer to Plaintiff’s complaint.
On June 29, 2022, Vortex filed (1) an answer to the complaint, (2) an answer to the cross-complaint, and (3) a cross-complaint against Cross-Defendants Alla, Marpac, MF, and Zoes 1-20 for “Equitable, Total and/or Implied Indemnity” and contribution.
On September 15, 2022, the Court dismissed the complaint against Vortex and RRAM Services without prejudice at Plaintiff’s request.
On October 10, 2022, the Court dismissed Vortex without prejudice from the cross-complaint filed by Alla, Marpac, and MF at their request. The Court also dismissed Vortex’s cross-complaint without prejudice at Vortex’s request.
On February 14, 2023, Shrader filed an amended answer to the cross-complaint of Alla, Marpac, and MF.
On March 11, 2022, Alla, Marpac and MF (“Defendants”) filed a motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication to be heard on May 25, 2022. The Court continued the hearing to February 13, 2024 based on the parties’ requests. On January 29, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On February 8, 2024, Defendants filed a reply.
Trial is currently scheduled for April 5, 2024.
PARTIES’ REQUESTS
Defendants request that the Court grant summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication.
Plaintiff requests that the Court deny the motion.
EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS
Plaintiff’s objections: The Court sustains the objections in part and strikes the words “and tenantable” from the declaration of Kathy Stimson, ¶ 6. In all other respects, the Court overrules the objections and denies the motion to strike.
Defendants’ objections: Overruled
DEFENDANTS’ REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
Granted. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 453.)
LEGAL STANDARD
A. Summary judgment and summary adjudication
“‘[F]rom commencement to conclusion, the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” (LAOSD Asbestos Cases (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 949, 945, quoting Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (Aguilar).) “[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.)
“Supporting and opposing affidavits or declarations . . . shall set forth admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (d).) “Matters which would be excluded under the rules of evidence if proffered by a witness in a trial as hearsay, conclusions or impermissible opinions, must be disregarded in supporting affidavits.” (Hayman v. Block (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 629, 639.)
In addition, a party moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication must support the motion with “a separate statement setting forth plainly and concisely all material facts which the moving party contends are undisputed. Each of the material facts stated shall be followed by a reference to the supporting evidence.” (Parkview Villas Assn. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (2006) 133 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1209 (Parkview Villas), quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(1) [motion for summary judgment]; see Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(2) [motion for summary adjudication “shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment”].) The party opposing the motion must file with the opposition papers “a separate statement that responds to each of the material facts contended by the moving party to be undisputed, indicating whether the opposing party agrees or disagrees that those facts are undisputed. The statement also shall set forth plainly and concisely any other material facts that the opposing party contends are disputed. Each material fact contended by the opposing party to be disputed shall be followed by a reference to the supporting evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(3).) If either party fails to comply with the applicable separate statement requirement, that failure may in the court’s discretion constitute a sufficient ground to decide the motion adversely to the offending party. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (b)(1), (3).)
In ruling on the motion, the court must consider all of the evidence and all of the inferences reasonably drawn from it and must view such evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the opposing party. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.) “[A] court cannot grant summary judgment based on inferences that are contradicted by other inferences or evidence. And a triable issue of fact exists when the evidence permits a reasonable trier of fact to find a contested fact in favor of the party opposing the motion. [Citation.] Put slightly differently, a summary judgment may not be granted unless the evidence is incapable of supporting a judgment for the losing party.” (California-American Water Co. v. Marina Coast Water Dist. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1272, 1296.)
B. Negligence and premises liability
“The
elements of a negligence claim and a premises liability claim are the same: a
legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in
injury.” (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1159.)
DISCUSSION
A. The complaint
The complaint alleges the following:
Plaintiff was employed by Tesla, Inc. (“Tesla”), which leased the premises at 4755 Alla Road, Los Angeles, California 90041 (“premises”) from Defendants. On August 15, 2018, Plaintiff was in charge of closing the gate to the premises. The gate was approximately 20 feet long and 10 feet tall. Defendants owned, operated, and maintained the gate.
While Plaintiff was attempting to pull the gate across, the gate fell off its track and towards Plaintiff. Plaintiff braced himself and caught the gate, suffering injuries in the process.
B. Undisputed facts
On October 19, 2017, Marpac and MF entered into a Lease Agreement with Tesla for a 10-year term with options to extend. (UMF 6.) Marpac and MF are partners in 4755 Alla, LP. (UMF 14.) Section 5.1 of the Lease Agreement provided that the tenant (Tesla) agreed to repair and maintain the premises in good and tenantable condition “including but not limited to the basic maintenance, repair and, when necessary, non-capital replacement of . . . other mechanical and Building Systems (collectively, the “Building Systems”), to the extent such Building Systems are within the Premises and exclusively serving the Premises, . . . all Tenant’s signs, locks and closing devices, and all window sash, casement or frames, window cases, window frames, security grilles or similar enclosures, doors and door frames, all of Tenant's signage (both interior and exterior) and all other facilities and equipment of Tenant located outside of the Building and otherwise located on the Premises….” (UMF 7.)
Tesla subcontracted with RRAM Services, Inc. for RRAM Services, Inc. to perform the maintenance of the gate. (UMF 12.)
Before the commencement of the Lease Agreement on October 19, 2017, Defendants’ property manager and representative, Kathy Stimson (“Stimson”), performed a walkthrough inspection of the premises with Tesla and she has personally inspected the gate on other occasions. (UMF 8.) Stimson noted that the premises, including the gate, were in good working condition. (UMF 9.) Stimson did not observe any issues with the gate and she was not aware of the gate not functioning properly at any time prior to the transfer of the premises to Tesla. (UMF 10.) Before she learned about Plaintiff’s complaint in this action, Stimson had never received a complaint about the gate and she was not aware of any issue with the gate not functioning properly. (UMF 11.)
Prior to Plaintiff’s injury, Defendants were not aware of any malfunctions involving the gate and had no records of any maintenance or repair to the gate. (UMF 13.)
C. Legal arguments
Defendants argue that they did not owe Plaintiff a duty of care because they did not have possession, control, or the right to reenter the premises when Plaintiff’s accident occurred and they did not have notice of the dangerous condition.
“ ‘ “Generally, one owes a duty of ordinary care not to cause an unreasonable risk of harm to others....” ' [Citation.]” (Salinas v. Martin (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 404, 411 (Salinas), quoting Padilla v. Rodas (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 742, 747 (Padilla).) “ ‘Civil Code section 1714 sets forth the general duty of a property owner toward others: “Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or herself.” The application of this provision entails an inquiry . . . “whether in the management of his property he has acted as a reasonable [person] in view of the probability of injury to others....” [Citations.]’ ” (Id. at pp. 411-412, quoting Laico v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 649, 659 (Laico).) “A landowner ‘ “ ‘has an affirmative duty to exercise ordinary care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition, and therefore must inspect them or take other proper means to ascertain their condition. And if, by the exercise of reasonable care, he would have discovered the dangerous condition, he is liable.’ ” ’ [Citation.]’ ” (Id. at p. 412, quoting Portillo v. Aiassa (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1134.)
“ ‘An exception to the statutory rule of liability for failure to use ordinary care in the management of one's property requires clear support in public policy.’ ” (Salinas, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 412, quoting Laico, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at pp. 659–660.) “ ‘ “In the case of a landowner's liability for injuries to persons on the property, the determination of whether a duty exists, ‘involves the balancing of a number of considerations; the major ones are the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and the consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.’ [Citations.]” [Citation.]’ ” (Ibid., quoting Rinehart v. Boys & Girls Club of Chula Vista (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 419, 430.) “ ‘Foreseeability and the extent of the burden to the defendant are ordinarily the crucial considerations, but in a given case one or more of the other Rowland factors may be determinative of the duty analysis.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Castaneda v. Olsher (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1205, 1213.) “The existence and scope of a defendant's duty is a question of law for the court's resolution.” (Ibid., citing Shin v. Ahn (2007) 42 Cal.4th 482, 488; Padilla, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 747.)
“[W]here a landlord has relinquished control of property to a tenant, a ‘bright line’ rule has developed to moderate the landlord's duty of care owed to a third party injured on the property as compared with the tenant who enjoys possession and control.” (Salinas, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 412.) “ ‘ “Because a landlord has relinquished possessory interest in the land, his or her duty of care to third parties injured on the land is attenuated as compared with the tenant who enjoys possession and control. Thus, before liability may be thrust on a landlord for a third party's injury due to a dangerous condition on the land, the plaintiff must show that the landlord had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition in question, plus the right and ability to cure the condition.” [¶] Limiting a landlord's obligations releases it from needing to engage in potentially intrusive oversight of the property, thus permitting the tenant to enjoy its tenancy unmolested.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Stone v. Center Trust Retail Properties, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 608, 612; see Mora v. Baker Commodities, Inc. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 771, 789 (Mora) [“If the property or equipment necessary for the functioning of the property . . . was safe when transferred to the tenant, used in the manner for which it was intended and the lessor/owner has given up control of the property, the commercial landlord cannot be held responsible for accidents occurring after the property is transferred”].)
Commercial landowners cannot totally abrogate their landowner responsibilities merely by signing a lease. (Mora, supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 781.) “At the time the lease is executed and upon renewal a landlord has a right to reenter the property, has control of the property, and must inspect the premises to make the premises reasonably safe from dangerous conditions. [Citations.] Even if the commercial landlord executes a contract which requires the tenant to maintain the property in a certain condition, the landlord is obligated at the time the lease is executed to take reasonable precautions to avoid unnecessary danger. [Fn. omitted.].” (Ibid.)
“However, the landlord's responsibility to inspect is limited. Like a residential landlord, the duty to inspect charges the lessor ‘only with those matters which would have been disclosed by a reasonable inspection.’ [Citations.] The burden of reducing or avoiding the risk and the likelihood of injury will affect the determination of what constitutes a reasonable inspection. The landlord's obligation is only to do what is reasonable under the circumstances. The landlord need not take extraordinary measures or make unreasonable expenditures of time and money in trying to discover hazards unless the circumstances so warrant. When there is a potential serious danger, which is foreseeable, a landlord should anticipate the danger and conduct a reasonable inspection before passing possession to the tenant. [Fn. omitted.] However, if no such inspection is warranted, the landlord has no such obligation.” (Mora, supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at pp. 781-782.)
“The
obligation to inspect arises ‘only if [the landowner] had some reason to know
there was a need for such action.’ ” [Citation.] (Lin Joon Oh v. Teachers Insurance &
Annuity Association of America (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 71, 86, quoting Garcia
v. Holt (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 600, 605.)
Defendants
have presented evidence that they relinquished control of the premises to Tesla
on October 19, 2017, that they inspected
the premises before the Lease Agreement with Tesla went into effect, that they were
not aware of any problems with the gate, and that the Lease Agreement gave Tesla
the responsibility to maintain and repair the gate. Based on this evidence, Defendants have
carried their initial burden on summary judgment, shifting the burden to Plaintiff.
In response, Plaintiff objects to Stimson’s testimony about her inspection of the premises, arguing that Stimson was not qualified to provide opinions. However, Plaintiff has failed to present evidence showing that Stimson lacked qualifications to conduct an inspection and report on her conclusions. Plaintiff also relies on Evidence Code section 1523, which provides in part that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, oral testimony is not admissible to prove the content of a writing.” (Evid. Code, § 1523, subd. (a).) Evidence Code section 1523 does not apply here because Stimson may testify about her inspection even if she did not prepare a written report.
Plaintiff argues that “Defendants had a non-delegable duty to maintain their property in safe condition, including the gate which injured Plaintiff, and yet had never repaired, inspected, or performed any maintenance to the gate or its safety mechanisms in twenty-two years.” (Opposition p. 2.) Yet Plaintiff has not presented evidence that creates a triable issue of fact regarding (1) whether Defendants relinquished control of the premises to Tesla on October 19, 2017, (2) whether Defendants inspected the premises before the Lease Agreement went into effect, (3) whether Defendants were aware of any problems with the gate, and (4) whether the Lease Agreement gave Tesla the responsibility to maintain and repair the gate.
Plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of raising a triable issue of material fact. The Court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS the motion for summary judgment of Defendants 4755 Alla LP, Marpac Company, and MF One, LP.
Moving parties are ordered to give notice of this ruling.
Moving parties are ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.