Judge: Lisa R. Jaskol, Case: 20STCV14497, Date: 2024-11-12 Tentative Ruling
All parties are urged to meet and confer with all parties concerning this tentative ruling to see if they can reach an agreed-upon resolution of their matter. If you are able to reach an agreement, please notify the courtroom staff in advance of the hearing if you wish to submit on the tentative ruling rather than argue the motion by notifying the court by e-mailing the court at: SSCDEPT28@lacourt.org. Include the word "SUBMITS" in all caps and the Case Number in the Subject line. In the body of the email, please provide the date and time of the hearing, your name, your contact information, the party you represent, and whether that party is a plaintiff, defendant, cross-complainant, cross-defendant, claimant, intervenor, or non-party, etc.
Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may still appear at the hearing and argue the matter, and the court could change its tentative based upon the argument. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If you submit, but still intend to appear, include the words "SUBMITS, BUT WILL APPEAR" in the Subject line. If you elect to argue your matter, you are urged to do so remotely, via Court-Connect.
Note that once the Court has issued a tentative, the Court has the inherent authority not to allow the withdrawal of a motion and to adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the court. This does not excuse a moving party's need to do one of the following: appear; submit; or take a matter off calendar by canceling the motion in the case reservation system before issuance of the tentative ruling if the matter moving party does not intend to proceed.
If you submitted a courtesy copy of your papers containing media (such as a DVD or thumb drive), unless you request the return of the media in your papers, the court will destroy it following the hearing of your matter.
Case Number: 20STCV14497 Hearing Date: November 12, 2024 Dept: 28
Having considered the documents submitted in support of the request for default judgment, the Court rules as follows.
BACKGROUND
On April 15, 2020, Plaintiff Mark Rufin (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Abraham Dominguez (“Defendant”) and Does 1-25 for motor vehicle negligence and general negligence.
On September 28, 2021, the clerk entered Defendant's default.
On January 27, 2023, the Court dismissed the complaint without prejudice. On May 30, 2023, the Court vacated the dismissal.
On November 30, 2023, the Court vacated the September 28, 2021 default because Plaintiff did not properly serve a statement of damages on Defendant before the clerk entered Defendant’s default.
On January 25, 2024, the Court dismissed the Doe defendants with prejudice at Plaintiff’s request.
On April 29, 2024, Plaintiff filed a proof of substituted service of the summons, complaint, statement of damages, and other documents on Defendant on April 28, 2024.
On July 29, 2024, the clerk entered Defendant’s default.
Also on July 29, 2024, Plaintiff filed an application for entry of default judgment against Defendant.
PARTY’S REQUEST
Plaintiff
asks the Court to enter a default judgment against Defendant and award
Plaintiff $313,281.20, consisting of $111,586.85 in special damages,
$200,000.00 in general damages, and $1,694.00 in costs.
A. Default judgment
California Rules of Court, rule 3.1800(a), provides:
“[With exceptions that do not apply here,] [a] party seeking a default judgment on declarations must use mandatory Request for Entry of Default (Application to Enter Default) (form CIV-100) . . . The following must be included in the documents filed with the clerk:
“(1) Except in unlawful detainer cases, a brief summary of the case identifying the parties and the nature of plaintiff's claim;
“(2) Declarations or other admissible evidence in support of the judgment requested;
“(3) Interest computations as necessary;
“(4) A memorandum of costs and disbursements;
“(5) A declaration of nonmilitary status for each defendant against whom judgment is sought;
“(6) A proposed form of judgment;
“(8) Exhibits as necessary; and
“(9) A request for attorney fees if allowed by statute or by the agreement of the parties.”
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1800(a).)
B. Damages
The relief granted to a plaintiff upon entry of a defendant's default cannot exceed the amount demanded in the complaint or, for personal injury cases where damages may not be stated in the complaint, the amount listed in the statement of damages. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 580, subd. (a), 585, subd. (b).) “The notice requirement of section 580 was designed to insure fundamental fairness.” (Becker v. S.P.V. Construction Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 489, 494.) The statute insures that “defendants in cases which involve a default judgment have adequate notice of the judgments that may be taken against them. [Citation.] ‘If a judgment other than that which is demanded is taken against him, [the defendant] has been deprived of his day in court—a right to a hearing on the matter adjudicated.’ ’’ (Id. at p. 493.) A trial court exceeds its jurisdiction if it awards damages in excess of the amount specified in the complaint or statement of damages. (Id. at p. 494.)
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff has provided evidence that he incurred medical expenses of $1,528.00 for an ambulance and $5,670.00 for treatment at LAC/USC.
Plaintiff also requests $104,388.85 in special damages based on treatment provided by the Veterans Administration (“VA”). Plaintiff’s counsel asserts that “the VA has established their right to reimbursement for medical treatment billed in treating Plaintiff.” (Yadidi dec. ¶ 61, citing Exh. N.) Documentation from the VA attached to counsel’s declaration states: “VA’s right of recovery from the tortfeasor . . . for reasonable charges for medical care provided or paid for by VA is independent of that of the VA beneficiary. Payment to VA beneficiary and a VA beneficiary-signed release do not impact liability of a tortfeasor . . . for payment to VA. Payment for VA medical treatment must be made directly to the Department of Veterans Affairs.” (Exh. N.)
Plaintiff, however, asks the Court to order Defendant to pay the amount owed to the VA ($104,388.85) not to the VA but to Plaintiff. The request appears to be inconsistent with the VA’s directive. At a minimum, Plaintiff has not explained how including $104,388.85 in Plaintiff’s special damages award is consistent with the VA’s right to reimbursement of this amount.
The Court grants in part Plaintiff’s application for default judgment and awards Plaintiff special damages of $7,198.00 (consisting of $1,528.00 for an ambulance and $5,670.00 for treatment at LAC/USC), $200,000.00 in general damages, and $1,694.35 in costs, for a total award of $208,892.35. The Court denies Plaintiff’s request for an additional $104,388.85 in special damages.
CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS in part Plaintiff Mark Rufin’s application for default judgment against Defendant Abraham Dominguez filed on July 29, 2024. The Court awards Plaintiff Mark Rufin $208,892.35. In all other respects, the Court DENIES the application.
Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of this ruling.