Judge: Lisa R. Jaskol, Case: 20STCV35011, Date: 2023-08-31 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV35011    Hearing Date: January 12, 2024    Dept: 28

Having considered the moving, opposing and reply papers, the Court rules as follows. 

BACKGROUND 

On September 14, 2020, Plaintiff Theresa Giannette (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (“Metro”), Doe Driver (“Doe Driver”), and Does 1-100 for motor vehicle tort and “Motor Vehicle Code 17001, 17002, 17150. Govt. Code 815.2.” 

On November 9, 2020, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint against Metro, Doe Driver, and Does 1-100 for motor vehicle tort and “Motor Vehicle Code 17001, 17002, 17150.” 

On December 11, 2020, Metro filed an answer. 

On July 14, 2022, the Court found that this case (20STCV35011) and 22STLC01576 are related within the meaning of California Rules of Court, rule 3.300(a). 20STCV35011 became the lead case.  The cases were assigned to Department 28 in the Spring Street Courthouse for all purposes. 

On October 25, 2023, Metro filed a motion for summary judgment to be heard on January 12, 2024. On December 29, 2023, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On January 5, 2024, Metro filed a reply. 

Trial is scheduled for March 7, 2024. 

PARTIES’ REQUESTS 

Metro requests that the Court grant the motion for summary judgment. 

Plaintiff requests that the Court deny the motion. 

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS 

Plaintiff’s objections: Overruled 

Metro’s objections: Overruled 

LEGAL STANDARD 

          “‘[F]rom commencement to conclusion, the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”  (LAOSD Asbestos Cases (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 949, 945, quoting Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (Aguilar).) “[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.”  (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) 

          When the moving party is a defendant, it must show that the plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of action.  (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 853.) “The defendant has shown that the plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of action by showing that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.”  (Id. at p. 854.) The defendant must “present evidence, and not simply point out that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.”  (Ibid.) Thus, “the defendant must ‘support[ ]’ the ‘motion’ with evidence including ‘affidavits, declarations, admissions, answers to interrogatories, depositions, and matters of which judicial notice’ must or may ‘be taken.’ [Citation.] The defendant may, but need not, present evidence that conclusively negates an element of the plaintiff’s cause of action. The defendant may also present evidence that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence—as through admissions by the plaintiff following extensive discovery to the effect that he has discovered nothing.”  (Id. at p. 855, original emphasis.)  

          “Supporting and opposing affidavits or declarations . . . shall set forth admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (d).) “Matters which would be excluded under the rules of evidence if proffered by a witness in a trial as hearsay, conclusions or impermissible opinions, must be disregarded in supporting affidavits.”  (Hayman v. Block (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 629, 639.) 

          In addition, a party moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication must support the motion with “a separate statement setting forth plainly and concisely all material facts which the moving party contends are undisputed. Each of the material facts stated shall be followed by a reference to the supporting evidence.” (Parkview Villas Assn. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (2006) 133 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1209 (Parkview Villas), quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(1) [motion for summary judgment]; see Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(2) [motion for summary adjudication “shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment”].) The party opposing the motion must file with the opposition papers “a separate statement that responds to each of the material facts contended by the moving party to be undisputed, indicating whether the opposing party agrees or disagrees that those facts are undisputed. The statement also shall set forth plainly and concisely any other material facts that the opposing party contends are disputed. Each material fact contended by the opposing party to be disputed shall be followed by a reference to the supporting evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(3).)  If either party fails to comply with the applicable separate statement requirement, that failure may in the court’s discretion constitute a sufficient ground to decide the motion adversely to the offending party. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (b)(1), (3).)   

          In ruling on the motion, the court must consider all of the evidence and all of the inferences reasonably drawn from it and must view such evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the opposing party.  (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.)  

DISCUSSION 

A.   The first amended complaint 

The first amended complaint alleges the following: 

On or about March 25, 2020, at or near 26151 Vermont Avenue, Harbor City, CA 90710, “Plaintiff was operating a motor vehicle when defendants and each of them were negligent, reckless, careless and unreasonable in their use, operation, control, management, maintenance, inspection and repair of a motor vehicle so that it proximately caused or was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff personal injury and damages. Further Defendants and each of them violated Motor Vehicle Codes 17001, 17002, 17150.”  Doe driver, a Metro employee, drove one of the vehicles in the course and scope of his employment. 

B.   Undisputed facts 

On March 25, 2020, Plaintiff was driving her car south on South Normandie Avenue when she crossed over a divider, comprised of two solid painted white lines, and merged into South Vermont Street.  Plaintiff crossed over the double white painted lines before the two solid white lines converge and South Normandie merges with South Vermont. 

As Plaintiff began to merge, a Metro bus was travelling south on South Vermont Street in the Number 2 lane.  The two vehicles collided. 

Plaintiff asserts a single cause of action for motor vehicle negligence against Metro. 

C.   Analysis 

Metro argues that Plaintiff caused the collision by crossing over a solid white line, merging prematurely into the next lane, and running into the side of the Metro bus.  To support this argument, Metro has provided photographs, deposition testimony, and other evidence which, according to Metro, shows that “the facts of how the accident occurred are not in dispute—that is, the cause, as well as the absence of any breach of duty by the bus operator . . . .”  (Motion pp. 2-3.) 

Specifically, citing Plaintiff’s deposition testimony and evidence of the point of impact and point of rest, Metro asserts that Plaintiff was driving on South Normandie before merging, “which means, logically, that Plaintiff’s vehicle (1) could not have made contact with the bus driving in South Vermont and (2) could not have come to rest in South Vermont, unless she merged prematurely, crossing the double solid white lines shown in the photograph above.” 

Plaintiff, in response, argues that she was “established” in her lane and the Metro bus struck her vehicle after she merged into the lane. 

Metro has not carried its initial burden on summary judgment.  Metro argues that “undisputed evidence that photographically documents the [point of impact] and [point of rest] establishes that the bus driver (Metro) did not breach any duty of care owed by the Metro driver to Plaintiff: the bus remained in its lane of travel, the bus had the right-of-way in its lane, and there is zero evidence that the bus driver took any action to encroach on Plaintiff’s lane/right-of-way.”  (Motion pp. 6-7, citing UMF 6.)  But this evidence does not negate Metro’s potential liability based on the bus driver’s negligent failure either to see Plaintiff before the collision or, having seen Plaintiff’s vehicle, to avoid the accident.  Even assuming that Plaintiff prematurely merged into the lane in front of Metro’s bus and the bus had the right-of-way, Metro’s evidence does not demonstrate as a matter of law either that (1) the bus driver saw Plaintiff’s vehicle before the accident and nonetheless could not prevent the collision, or that (2) the bus driver did not see Plaintiff’s vehicle before the accident despite complying with the bus driver’s duty to observe surrounding traffic.  While these scenarios might not relieve Plaintiff from the consequences of her alleged negligence in prematurely merging in front of a vehicle with the right of way, they might be relevant to a consideration of comparative fault. 

This is not to say that the Court agrees with Metro that the undisputed facts show Plaintiff was negligent.  Triable issues of fact also exist concerning where Plaintiff’s vehicle merged into the next lane, how long Plaintiff’s vehicle was in that lane before the collision, and whether Metro’s bus merged lanes.  Despite Metro’s arguments, the cause of the accident is a triable issue of fact. 

The Court denies the motion. 

CONCLUSION 

The Court DENIES Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s motion for summary judgment. 

          Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling. 

Moving party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.