Judge: Lisa R. Jaskol, Case: 20STCV47921, Date: 2024-04-16 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 20STCV47921 Hearing Date: April 16, 2024 Dept: 28
Having considered the moving, opposing and reply papers, the Court rules as follows.
BACKGROUND
On December 16, 2020, Plaintiff Angel Zamora (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Alexander Maeda, Edward Maeda, and Does 1-50 for negligence.
On September 20, 2022, Plaintiff’s counsel informed the Court that the case had settled. On November 16, 2022 and April 21, 2023, counsel informed the Court that the case against one defendant had settled.
On June 5, 2023, Defendants Alexander Maeda and Edward Maeda (“Defendants”) filed an answer.
On February 28, 2024, Defendants filed a motion to enforce a settlement, to be heard on March 21, 2024. The Court continued the hearing to April 16, 2024. On March 25, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On April 9, 2024, Defendants filed a reply.
Trial is scheduled for May 31, 2024.
PARTIES’ REQUESTS
Defendants ask the Court to enforce a settlement agreement.
Plaintiff asks the Court to deny the motion.
LEGAL STANDARD
Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 provides in part:
“(b) For purposes of this section, a writing is signed by a party if it is signed by any of the following:
“(1) The party.
“(2) An attorney who represents the party.
“(3) If the party is an insurer, an agent who is authorized in writing by the insurer to sign on the insurer’s behalf.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 664.6, subds. (a), (b).)
In deciding motions made under section 664.6, courts “must determine whether the parties entered into a valid and binding settlement.” (Kohn v. Jaymar-Ruby (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1530, 1533.) On a motion to enforce a settlement under section 664.6, courts have the power to decide disputed facts and to interpret the agreement. (Fiore v. Alvord (1985) 182 Cal.App.3d 561, 566; L. Edmon & C. Karnow, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (Rutter 2023) ¶¶ 12:977–12:978.5, pp. 12(ll)-139 to 12(ll)-140.) Courts may receive evidence, determine disputed facts including the terms the parties previously agreed on, and enter the terms of a settlement agreement as a judgment, but they may not create new material terms. (Osumi v. Sutton (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1360.)
DISCUSSION
On October 19, 2022, Plaintiff signed a “Release in Full Settlement and Compromise” naming Alexander Maeda and Edward Maeda as “Releasees.” The release stated that in consideration of payment of $25,000.00 to Plaintiff, Plaintiff released, discharged, and acknowledged as fully paid and compromised all claims, demands, or causes of action that Plaintiff had or might hereafter have against Releasees for injuries, losses, and damages (not including property damages). (Exh. A to Mader dec.)
On or about October 26, 2022, Defendants’ insurer paid Plaintiff $25,000.00. (Mader dec. ¶ 4.) However, Plaintiff did not file a request to dismiss the matter.
On November 3, 2023, Plaintiff’s counsel’s office requested that the $25,000.00 settlement check be stopped and reissued to Plaintiff, which was done. (Mader dec. ¶ 5.) On November 6, 2023 Defendants’ counsel followed up on the request for dismissal of the matter. (Mader dec. ¶ 6 & exh. B.) However, Plaintiff has not dismissed the matter against Defendants. (Mader dec. ¶¶ 7-8.)
Plaintiff
argues the settlement agreement is not enforceable because Defendants did not
sign the release. In response, citing
Fiege v. Cooke (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 1350 (Fiege), Defendants argue that a defendant is not required to sign a settlement agreement when a
liability insurer providing a defense without reservation of rights has agreed
to settle the claims within the policy limits. (Reply p. 4.)
In Fiege, the plaintiff sued the defendants for injuries resulting
from an automobile accident. The plaintiff accepted settlement offers from the
defendants’ insurers but later tried to avoid the settlement. The trial court
granted the defendants’ motion to enforce the settlement under Code of Civil
Procedure section 664.6. On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the defendants
had to be present and consent to make the settlement enforceable and that an
agreement by their insurers was not sufficient. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the
defendants were not required to consent to the settlement because their
insurance policies expressly gave the insurers the right to settle without the
defendants’ consent and the settlement was within policy limits. (Fiege, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 1354–1355; see W. Bradley Electric, Inc. v. Mitchell Engineering
(2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1, __, fn. 3 [“A client's consent to a settlement may
not be required where the client's insurance policy gives the insurer the right
to settle within policy limits without such consent”]; Critzer v. Enos
(2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1260 [distinguishing Fiege on ground that “HOA
does not cite to any portion of the record that demonstrates that the HOA was
being defended under a general liability insurance policy under which the HOA
gave its insurer the right to settle without the HOA’s consent and the right to
bind the insured to the settlement”]; Elnekave v. Via Dolce Homeowners Assn.
(2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1199 [“As the HOA points out, its liability policy
is not in the record and there is no evidence that it gave State Farm the right
to settle without the HOA’s consent”].)
Defendants
do not contend or show that their insurance policies gave their insurers the
right to settle without the Defendant’s consent. Therefore, Defendants have not established that
the settlement agreement is enforceable without their signatures.
The Court denies the motion.
CONCLUSION
The Court DENIES the motion of Defendants Alexander Maeda and Edward Maeda to enforce a settlement agreement with Plaintiff Angel Zamora.
Moving parties are ordered to give notice of this ruling.
Moving parties are ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.