Judge: Lisa R. Jaskol, Case: 20STCV48398, Date: 2023-08-29 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV48398 Hearing Date: January 25, 2024 Dept: 28
Having considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers, the Court rules as follows.
BACKGROUND
On December 18, 2020, Plaintiff Francisco Perez Sanchez (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Kuldeep Shukla (“Shukla”), Lyft, Inc. (“Lyft”), and Does 1-50 for negligence, negligent hiring, training, and supervision, and strict products liability.
On March 29, 2021, Lyft filed an answer. On May 7, 2021, Shukla filed an answer.
On December 28, 2023, Lyft filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on Plaintiff’s third cause of action for strict products liability, to be heard on January 25, 2024. On January 12, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition and request for judicial notice. On January 18, 2024, Lyft filed a reply. (The Court exercises its discretion to consider late filings.)
Trial is currently scheduled for March 18, 2024.
PARTIES’ REQUESTS
Lyft requests that the Court grant judgment on the pleadings on Plaintiff’s third cause of action for strict products liability without leave to amend.
Plaintiff requests that the Court grant leave to amend the claim.
LEGAL STANDARD
Code of Civil Procedure section 438 provides in part:
“(a) As used in this section:
“(1) “Complaint” includes a cross-complaint.
“(2) “Plaintiff” includes a cross-complainant.
“(3) “Defendant” includes a cross-defendant.
“(b) (1) A party may move for judgment on the pleadings.
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“(i) The court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the complaint.
“(ii) The complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant.
“(2) The motion provided for in this section may be made as to either of the following:
“(A) The entire complaint or cross-complaint or as to any of the causes of action stated therein.
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“(2) Where a motion is granted pursuant to this section with leave to file an amended complaint or answer, as the case may be, then the court shall grant 30 days to the party against whom the motion was granted to file an amended complaint or answer, as the case may be. . . .”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subds. (a), (b), (c), (d), (h)(1), (h)(2).)
‘‘A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer, and [thus] attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Pointe San Diego Residential Community, L.P. v. Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch, LLP (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 265, 274.) “In reviewing the motion, [the Court] deem[s] true all properly pleaded material facts, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law, and [the court] may also consider judicially noticed matters. [Citation.]” (Bear Creek Master Assn. v. Southern California Investors, Inc. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 809, 817.)
A motion for judgment on the pleadings “normally lies only for defects fully disclosed on the face of the pleading under attack or by matters of which judicial notice may be taken. Declarations or other extrinsic matters are improper. Therefore, the judge hearing the motion cannot consider discovery admissions or other evidence controverting the pleadings. Rather, the pleading under attack must be accepted as true.” (L. Edmon and C. Karnow, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (Rutter 2023) ¶ 7:320, pp. 7(l)-95 to 7(l)-96.)
PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
The Court grants Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice. (Evid. Code, § 452, subds. (a), (c), (d).)
DISCUSSION
A. Complaint
The complaint alleges the following:
On December 24, 2018, Lyft driver Shukla’s vehicle, in which Plaintiff was a passenger, collided with yellow attenuator barrels on the side of the Harbor freeway, injuring Plaintiff. Shukla was using the Lyft app, a computer-based technology platform which matches drivers with passengers in real time.
Lyft required Shukla to use the Lyft app. However, Lyft knew or should have known that its drivers’ use of the Lyft app “would require use in such a manner as to violate one and/or more provisions of the California Vehicle Code and create a significant risk of harm of the type suffered by the Plaintiff in this action.” (Complaint ¶ 32.) Specifically, “[t]he LYFT APP is defective in its design as it requires a driver, such as Defendant, KULDEEP SHUKLA, to engage in distracted driving including but not limited to conduct that requires the driver to constantly monitor the LYFT APP and its associated hardware for incoming messages, to respond and communicate through the LYFT APP and its attendant hardware in such a manner which constitutes instant messaging and/or text messaging and/or distracted driving and/or which causes the driver to redirect their attention from the roadway.” (Complaint ¶ 33.)
In addition, “the location of the LYFT APP within the vehicle, as directed and instructed by Defendants, LYFT, INC. and/or Does 31-40, so as to monitor and interface with it, creates a visual block which limits and restricts visibility of the driver creating a danger to those who are outside the vehicle.” (Complaint ¶ 34.)
“The LYFT APP failed to perform as safely as the ordinary consumer would expect, or have a right to expect, when using the product in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner.” (Complaint ¶ 35.) The risk of injury, damage, harm, and death inherent in the Lyft app’s design outweighed the benefits of the design. (Complaint ¶ 36.)
The defective product was a proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injury.
B. Analysis
A defendant “may be held strictly liable for its product if the plaintiff was injured while using the product in a reasonably foreseeable way. In order for there to be strict liability, the product does not have to be unreasonably dangerous—just defective. Products liability may be premised upon a theory of design defect, manufacturing defect, or failure to warn.” (Romine v. Johnson Controls, Inc. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 990, 1000, internal quotations and citations omitted.) “Whether or not a product was defectively designed or manufactured is a factual issue to be determined by the trier of fact. However, whether or not the subject object or instrumentality is a ‘product’ is a question of law for the trial court[.]” (Brooks v. Eugene Burger Management Corp. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1611.)
Lyft assert that the Lyft app is not a “product” because Lyft is a service provider and the Lyft app is incidental to the provision of Lyft’s services: facilitating rideshares. The Court agrees. As the Court of Appeal has explained:
“The doctrine of strict liability in tort applies to producing and marketing enterprises responsible for placing products in the stream of commerce. Where purchase of a product is the primary objective or essence of the transaction, strict liability applies even to those who are mere conduits in distributing the product to the consumer. Courts have not extended the doctrine of strict liability to transactions whose primary objective is obtaining services. Courts have also declined to apply strict liability where the transaction’s service aspect predominates and any product sale is merely incidental to the provision of the service.”
(Pierson v. Sharp Memorial Hospital, Inc. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 340, 344, internal citations omitted.)
Here, the complaint alleges that Lyft required its driver Shukla to use the Lyft app to locate passengers who require transportation from one location to another. In other words, the Lyft app enables people to obtain and provide transportation services. The Court therefore concludes, as a matter of law, that the Lyft app is not a “product” for purposes of Plaintiff’s claim for strict products liability. The Court grants the motion for judgment on the pleadings.
CONCLUSION
Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.
Moving party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.