Judge Lisa R. Jaskol, Case Number: 20STCV48398, Date: 2025-03-14 Tentative Ruling

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Having considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers, the Court rules as follows.

On December 18, 2020, Plaintiff Francisco Perez Sanchez (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Kuldeep Shukla (“Shukla”), Lyft, Inc. (“Lyft”), and Does 1-50 for negligence, negligent hiring, training, and supervision, and strict products liability.

On March 29, 2021, Lyft filed an answer. On May 7, 2021, Shukla filed an answer.

On January 25, 2024, the Court granted Lyft’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on Plaintiff’s third cause of action for strict products liability with 30 days leave to amend.

On February 13, 2024, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint against Shukla, Lyft, and Does 1-50 for negligence, negligent hiring, training, and supervision, and “strict products liability pursuant to CPUC 5354.”

On March 27, 2024, Lyft filed an admission of vicarious liability for Shukla’s negligence, if any.

On May 30, 2024, the Court sustained Lyft’s demurrer to the third cause of action under Public Utilities Code section 5354 in Plaintiff’s first amended complaint because the Court did not authorize Plaintiff to add an entirely new cause of action when the Court granted leave to amend the third cause of action in the original complaint. The Court stated that Plaintiff may file a motion to amend the first amended complaint to add a new cause of action.

On August 15, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint including a claim under Public Utilities Code section 5354. The Court explained that in deciding whether to grant the motion, it was not considering the validity of the proposed amended pleading.

On August 22, 2024, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint against Shukla, Lyft, and Does 1-50 for negligence, negligent hiring, retention, training, and supervision, and statutory liability under Public Utilities Code section 5354.

On September 20, 2024, Shukla filed an answer to the second amended complaint. On November 22, 2024, Lyft filed an answer to the second amended complaint.

On October 30, 2024, Lyft filed a motion for summary adjudication. The motion was set for hearing on March 14, 2025. On February 28, 2025, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On March 6, 2025, Plaintiff filed additional opposition papers after the statutory filing deadline, which the Court does not consider. On March 7, 2025, Lyft filed a reply.

The Court grants Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice of Public Utilities Code section 5354. (See Evid. Code, § 451, subd. (a).)

The Court denies Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice of federal district court rulings. (See Bolanos v. Superior Court (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 744, 761.)

Lyft's evidentiary objections are not material to the Court's disposition of the motion for summary adjudication. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (q).)

“A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).)

“A motion for summary adjudication may be made by itself or as an alternative to a motion for summary judgment and shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(2).)

For purposes of motions for summary adjudication, “[a] defendant . . . has met that party’s burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto. The plaintiff . . . shall not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)

“In construing and enforcing the provisions of this chapter relating to the prescribed privileges and obligations of the holder of a permit or certificate issued hereunder, the act, omission, or failure of any officer, agent, or employee, or person offering to afford the authorized service with the approval or consent of the permit or certificate holder, is the act, omission, or failure of the permit or certificate holder.”

On December 24, 2018, Shukla was a driver/transportation provider who was employed by, and/or operating for the benefit of, and/or as an agent of, and/or as a partner of Lyft and was driving as a Lyft driving using the Lyft app. Plaintiff was a passenger in Shukla’s vehicle.

The first cause of action for negligence alleges that Defendants negligently, carelessly and unlawfully entrusted, managed, maintained, drove, and operated Shukla’s vehicle, causing the vehicle to collide with yellow attenuator barrels on the freeway and injuring Plaintiff.

The second cause of action for negligent hiring, retention, training, and supervision alleges that Defendants were negligent in hiring, retention, training and/or supervision of Shukla, who was unfit to be a provider of transportation and was not adequately trained or supervised in his driving.

The third cause of action for statutory liability under Public Utilities Code section 5354 alleges:

· Lyft is a Transportation Network Company, charter party passenger carrier, common carrier and holder of California Public Utilities Commission Permit No. TCP0032513 – P N and is governed by the California Public Utilities Commission’s rules and regulation, including Public Utilities Code section 5354.

· Under Public Utilities Code section 5354, Shukla’s acts and omissions are Lyft’s acts and omissions, making Lyft statutorily and/or strictly liable for Shukla’s acts and omissions.

· Plaintiff has suffered harm, loss and damage and is entitled to recover damages.

Plaintiff’s third cause of action for statutory liability under Public Utilities Code section 5354 seeks to impose vicarious liability on Lyft for Shukla’s alleged negligence. (UMF 3.)

On March 27, 2024, Lyft filed a document titled “Defendant Lyft, Inc.’s Admission of Vicarious Liability Under Diaz.” The document stated:

“In the interests of judicial economy and in accordance with the principles stated in Diaz v. Carcamo (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1148, Defendant Lyft, Inc. (‘Lyft’), hereby offers this unconditional admission limited to this action:

“Lyft admits that it is vicariously liable for Defendant Kuldeep Shukla’s negligence, if any, in only the underlying motor vehicle accident giving rise to this lawsuit and only for purposes of the claims brought by Plaintiff Francisco Perez Sanchez in this action.” (Bold omitted.)

Lyft asks the Court to grant summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s claim for statutory liability under Public Utilities Code section 5354 because Lyft’s admission of vicarious liability for Shukla’s alleged negligence renders the claim moot and irrelevant. It is undisputed that the claim for statutory liability under Public Utilities Code section 5354 seeks to impose vicarious liability for Shukla’s alleged negligence. (UMF 3.) Therefore, Lyft argues, under Diaz v. Carcamo (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1148 (Diaz), Plaintiff may not pursue an additional vicarious liability claim based on Public Utilities Code section 5354.

Plaintiff opposes the motion, arguing that Public Utilities Code section 5354 provides an independent source of liability which Lyft’s admission of vicarious liability does not affect.

In Diaz, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in Armenta v. Churchill (1954) 42 Cal.2d 448 (Armenta) that “an employer’s admission of vicarious liability for an employee’s negligent driving in the course of employment bars a plaintiff from pursuing a claim for negligent entrustment.” (Diaz, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1161.) The Court reasoned that “[n]o matter how negligent an employer was in entrusting a vehicle to an employee, . . . it is only if the employee then drove negligently that the employer can be held liable for negligent entrustment, hiring, or retention.” (Id. at p. 1159.) But “[i]f . . . an employer offers to admit vicarious liability for its employee’s negligent driving, then claims against the employer based on theories of negligent entrustment, hiring, or retention become superfluous. To allow such claims in that situation would subject the employer to a share of fault in addition to the share of fault assigned to the employee, for which the employer has already accepted liability. To assign to the employer a share of fault greater than that assigned to the employee whose negligent driving was a cause of the accident would be an inequitable apportionment of loss.” (Id. at p. 1160.)

The same reasoning applies here. Lyft cannot have a greater share of fault than the fault assigned to Shukla, the allegedly negligent driver. Therefore, Lyft’s admission of vicarious liability “ ‘remove[s] from the case’ ” the issue of Lyft’s liability for damage caused by Shukla’s negligent driving, leaving “no ‘material issue’ ” to which Plaintiff’s claim for statutory liability under Public Utilities Code section 5354 can be relevant. (See Diaz, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 1157-1158.)

Accordingly, Lyft has carried its initial burden on summary adjudication, shifting the burden to Plaintiff.

Plaintiff has presented no evidence and cited no legal authority which raises a triable issue of fact concerning whether Lyft’s admission of vicarious liability makes Plaintiff’s claim for statutory liability under Public Utilities Code section 5354 superfluous.

The Court GRANTS Defendant Lyft, Inc.’s motion for summary adjudication of the third cause of action for statutory liability under Public Utilities Code section 5354 in Plaintiff Francisco Perez Sanchez’s second amended complaint.

Moving party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.

[1] The request for judicial notice states that the materials to be judicially noticed are attached “hereto,” but they are not. The failure to attach the materials does not affect the Court’s decision.