Judge: Lisa R. Jaskol, Case: 21STCV11790, Date: 2023-10-18 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV11790 Hearing Date: February 5, 2024 Dept: 28
Having considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers, the Court rules as follows.
BACKGROUND
On March 29, 2021, Plaintiffs Katelyn Hiller, Kaylie Branch, and Kylie Branch filed a complaint against Defendants Ryan Scott Davis, John E. Davis, and Valerie L. Davis for motor vehicle and general negligence (case no. 21STCV11946).
On April 26, 2021, Plaintiffs Katelyn Hiller, Kaylie Branch, and Kylie Branch filed a first amended complaint for motor vehicle and general negligence.
On September 26, 2022, Defendants filed an answer.
On April 3, 2023, the Court dismissed Defendant Valerie L. Davis without prejudice at Plaintiffs’ request.
On June 7, 2023, the Court found that this case (case no. 21STCV11946) and case numbers 21STCV11790 and 23CHCV00411 are related within the meaning of California Rules of Court, rule 3.300(a). The cases were assigned to Department 28 of the Spring Street Courthouse with case no. 21STCV11790 as the lead case.
On July 13, 2023, the Court granted a motion to consolidate and consolidated case numbers 21STCV11946, 21STCV11790, and 23CHCV00411 for pretrial purposes only with case no. 21STCV11790 as the lead case.
On August 1, 2023, Plaintiffs Katelyn Hiller, Kaylie Branch, and Kylie Branch filed a second amended complaint.
On October 11, 2023, the Court granted in part the motion to strike the second amended complaint filed by Defendants Ryan Scott Davis and John E. Davis. The Court struck (1) the punitive damages claim, (2) the portions of the complaint that alleged that Defendant John E. Davis violated Vehicle Code section 21352, subdivision (f), and (3) the portions of the complaint that suggest that Defendant John E. Davis can be held responsible for taking or failing to take particular actions at the accident location. The Court denied the motion to strike in all other respects and granted Plaintiffs Katelyn Hiller, Kaylie Branch, and Kylie Branch 30 days leave to amend.
On October 18, 2023, the court granted in part another motion to consolidate and consolidated case numbers 21STCV11946, 21STCV11790, and 23CHCV00411 for purposes of (1) pretrial proceedings and (2) trial of liability issues. The Court denied the request to consolidate the cases for trial of the damages issues but recognized that the Court to which the cases are assigned for trial has authority to determine how the cases will be tried.
On November 9, 2023, Plaintiffs Katelyn Hiller, Kaylie Branch, and Kylie Branch (“Plaintiffs”) filed a third amended complaint against Defendants Ryan Scott Davis, John E. Davis, and Does 1-25 for negligence.
On November 30, 2023, Defendants Ryan Scott Davis and John E. Davis (“Defendants”) filed a motion to strike portions of the third amended complaint, to be heard on February 5, 2024. On January 24, 2024, Plaintiffs filed an opposition. On January 29, 2024, Defendants filed a reply.
LEGAL STANDARD
A. Motion to strike
“Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1).) The Court may “[s]trike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).) “The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading of from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).) “Where the motion to strike is based on matter of which the court may take judicial notice pursuant to Section 452 or 453 of the Evidence Code, such matter shall be specified in the notice of motion, or in the supporting points and authorities, except as the court may otherwise permit.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (b).)
“In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255 (Clauson).) “In ruling on a motion to strike, courts do not read allegations in isolation.” (Ibid.)
B. Punitive damages
Civil Code section 3294 provides in part:
“(a) In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.
* * *
“(1) “Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.
“(2) “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.
“(3) “Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury. . . .”
(Civ. Code, § 3294, subds. (a), (c).)
To survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, a plaintiff must plead the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief. (See Clauson, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 1255; Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166; Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550 [“the complaint ordinarily is sufficient if it alleges ultimate rather than evidentiary facts”].)
“In addition to the requirement that the complaint set forth the elements as stated in [Civil Code] section 3294, it must include specific factual allegations showing that defendant's conduct was oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious to support a claim for punitive damages.” (Today's IV, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1137, 1193, citing Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872 (Brousseau).) “Punitive damages may not be pleaded generally.” (Ibid., citing Brousseau, supra, 73 Cal.App.3d at p. 872.)
DISCUSSION
A. Punitive damages allegations
Defendants argue the third amended complaint does not allege facts that support a punitive damage claim against Defendant Ryan Scott Davis (“Ryan Davis”). The third amended complaint alleges in part:
“16. PLAINTIFFS are informed, and believe, and thereupon allege, that prior to the SUBJECT COLLISION, Defendant RYAN DAVIS voluntarily consumed narcotics with full knowledge and awareness that he would be operating a motor vehicle and of the probable consequences of driving a motor vehicle while impaired. Despite this knowledge, PLAINTIFFS are further informed and believe, and thereupon allege, that Defendant RYAN DAVIS willfully, deliberately, and with a conscious disregard for the safety of others, including PLAINTIFFS herein, operated DEFENDANT VEHICLE while under the influence of said narcotics, resulting in the SUBJECT COLLISION and serious bodily harm to PLAINTIFFS.
* * *
“32.
Because Defendant RYAN DAVIS engaged in the despicable conduct hereinabove
alleged with a willful and conscious disregard for the safety and rights of
Plaintiffs KATELYN,
KAYLIE, and KYLIE such as to constitute malice under
California Civil Code Section 3294,
Plaintiffs KATELYN, KAYLIE, and KYLIE are
entitled to, and do hereby demand, punitive or
exemplary damages in a sum
sufficient to deter Defendant RYAN DAVIS from so acting in
the future."
(Third amended complaint ¶¶ 16, 32.)
B. Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiffs' punitive damage claim
Defendants argue the third amended complaint, like the previous complaints, does not plead facts supporting a punitive damage claim. According to Defendants, the allegations in paragraph 16 of the third amended complaint are merely “conclusory statements.” (Motion p. 11.) Plaintiffs counter that the allegations are sufficient to support the punitive damage claim.
“[C]onclusory allegations will not be stricken where they are supported by other, factual allegations in the complaint.” (L. Edmon & C. Karnow, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (Rutter 2023) ¶ 7:181, p. 7(l)-80, emphasis omitted (Cal. Practice Guide).) But “[t]he plaintiff is required to plead only ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts.” (C. W. Johnson & Sons, Inc. v. Carpenter (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 165, 169.) And the Court is not concerned, on a motion to strike, with whether the plaintiff can prove the ultimate facts the complaint alleges.
Here, Plaintiffs have alleged ultimate facts which bring their punitive damage claim within the rule of Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 896 (Taylor). Under Taylor, a complaint states facts that support a punitive damage claim when it alleges that “ ‘[d]efendant became intoxicated and thereafter drove a car while in that condition, despite his knowledge of the safety hazard he created thereby.’ ” (Peterson v. Superior Court (1983) 31 Cal.3d 147, 163, quoting Taylor, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 896.) “[T]he act of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated may constitute an act of ‘malice’ under section 3294 if performed under circumstances which disclose a conscious disregard of the probably dangerous consequences.” (Taylor, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 892.) The Court in Taylor explained: “There is a very commonly understood risk which attends every motor vehicle driver who is intoxicated. One who willfully consumes alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing that he thereafter must operate a motor vehicle, thereby combining sharply impaired physical and mental faculties with a vehicle capable of great force and speed, reasonably may be held to exhibit a conscious disregard of the safety of others. The effect may be lethal whether or not the driver had a prior history of drunk driving incidents.” (Id. at pp. 896-897.)
In alleging that Ryan Davis voluntarily consumed narcotics with full knowledge and awareness that he would be operating a motor vehicle and of the probable consequences of driving a motor vehicle while impaired, and that he drove a motor vehicle while under the influence of narcotics with a conscious disregard for the safety of others, Plaintiffs have alleged ultimate facts supporting a punitive damage claim. Plaintiffs were not required to allege “evidentiary facts,” that is, the evidence they would use to support these allegations at trial. Therefore, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiffs’ punitive damage claim.
CONCLUSION
The Court DENIES the motion to strike filed by Defendants Ryan Scott Davis and John E. Davis.
Moving parties are ordered to give notice of this ruling.
Moving parties are ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.