Judge: Lisa R. Jaskol, Case: 21STCV32863, Date: 2023-11-15 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV32863 Hearing Date: November 15, 2023 Dept: 28
Having considered the moving, opposing and replying papers, the Court rules as follows.
BACKGROUND
On September 7, 2021, Plaintiff Jose Munoz (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants RCF Development, Richard Cooper Francis, Ridgewood Properties, LLC, Ocean Spaulding, Inc. dba Ocean Construction, Tiran “Terry” Avgi, Eadan Avgi, and Does 1-25 for negligence, premises liability, and negligent hiring, supervision and retention.
On December 22, 2021, Defendant Ocean Spaulding, Inc. filed an answer. On August 9, 2022, Defendants Richard Cooper Francis, Tiran “Terry” Avgi, and Eadan Avgi filed an answer. On October 31, 2022, Defendant RCF Development filed an answer. On January 6, 2023, Defendant Ridgewood Properties, LLC filed an answer.
On August 29, 2023, non-party Topa Insurance Company (“Topa”) filed a motion to quash a deposition subpoena for records served by Plaintiff. On November 1, 2023, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On November 7, 2023, Topa filed a reply.
Trial is currently scheduled for September 17, 2024.
REQUESTS
Topa requests that the Court quash Plaintiff’s subpoena for business records or issue a protective order.
Plaintiff requests that the Court deny the motion and impose sanctions on Topa.
LEGAL STANDARD
Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1 provides:
"(a) If a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, electronically stored information, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision (b), or upon the court’s own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person.
"(b) The following persons may make a motion pursuant to subdivision (a): (1) A party. (2) A witness. (3) A consumer described in Section 1985.3. (4) An employee described in Section 1985.6. (5) A person whose personally identifying information, as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 1798.79.8 of the Civil Code, is sought in connection with an underlying action involving that person’s exercise of free speech rights."
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1.)
Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.2, subdivision (a), provides:
“(a) Except as specified in subdivision (c), in making an order pursuant to motion made under subdivision (c) of Section 1987 or under Section 1987.1, the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney’s fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.2, subd. (a).)
As a general rule, all unprivileged information that is relevant to the subject matter of the action is discoverable if it would be admissible evidence at trial or if it appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010; Schnabel v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 704, 711.) When the information sought to be discovered impacts a person’s constitutional right to privacy, limited protections come into play for that person. (Shaffer v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 993, 999.) The protections cover both a person’s personal and financial matters. (Ibid.) The court must balance competing rights — the right of a litigant to discover relevant facts and the right of an individual to maintain reasonable privacy — in determining whether the information is discoverable. (Ibid.) For discovery purposes, information is relevant if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement. (Gonzalez v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546.)
DISCUSSION
A. Complaint
The complaint alleges the following:
On or about December 13, 2019, Plaintiff was performing roofing work on a multistory construction project at 1002 N. Ridgewood Avenue, Los Angeles, California while employed by Defendants. Plaintiff fell from a great height, suffering serious injuries including permanent paralysis and paraplegia.
Before the date of the injury Defendants were aware of dangerous conditions at the worksite but failed to take any remedial measures to provide a safe work environment.
B. Subpoena
On July 19, 2023, Plaintiff served a deposition subpoena for production of business records on Topa, the insurer for Defendant Ocean Spaulding, Inc. dba Ocean Construction (“Ocean”). Topa objected to the subpoena and filed this motion.
C. Analysis
1. Insurance Code
Topa argues that Insurance Code section 791.13 prevents it from complying with the deposition subpoena because the statute requires the insured’s written authorization before disclosing “personal or privileged information about an individual collected or received in connection with an insurance transaction . . . .” (Motion p. 5, citing Ins. Code, § 791.13, subd. (a); see Motion p. 6 [“Topa’s insured have not authorized any disclosure of their insurance information to Plaintiff. Ins. Code § 791.13(a). Therefore, Topa is forbidden from disclosing it to anyone, and this Court should quash the subpoena in its entirety”].)
The argument is frivolous. Insurance Code section 791.13, subdivisions (g) and (h), authorize an insurer to disclose this information if the disclosure is “Otherwise permitted or required by law” or “In response to a facially valid administrative or judicial order, including a search warrant or subpoena.”
Topa’s attempt to shoehorn the subpoena into other provisions of the Insurance Code is equally meritless. (See Ins. Code, § 791.02, subds. (m)(1), (m)(2) [defining term “insurance transaction”].)
2. Attorney client privilege and work product doctrine
Topa asserts that, as Ocean’s insurer, it “would or could suffer prejudice if [Ocean’s] insurance information, which includes, or could include, information related to the defense of the instant lawsuit, is required to be produced. See Code Civ. Proc. § 2018.010, et seq. (attorney work product doctrine), Evid. Code § 954 [attorney-client privilege].” (Motion p. 7.) Topa does not explain how its attorney client privilege or an attorney’s work product protection would be jeopardized by compliance with the subpoena.
3. Overbreadth
Topa states: “As the [subpoena’s] categories are described, there is no limitation on the documents/communications sought, where the subpoena seeks all documents/communications in Topa’s possession, custody, or control, which “reflects, discusses, mentions, comments upon or otherwise refers to” the various individuals/entities named in the subpoena. Without conceding that responsive documents and/or information exist, a response to such an overly broad category would undoubtedly contain privileged communications/documents, including those reflecting confidential attorney communications and work-product.” (Motion p. 7.)
4. Relevance
According to Topa, “[t]he subpoena seeks business records regarding a [number] of overly broad categories of documents, seeking ‘any and all’ documents/communications for ‘any time’ not limited to the issues, persons, properties, or projects at issue in the litigation. Without conceding that responsive documents and/or information exist, even absent the applicable privileges set forth above, the burden, expense, cumulativeness and intrusiveness of the discovery sought outweighs the likelihood that the records sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, further supporting quashing the subpoena.” (Motion p. 7.)
Topa has not identified any specific requests for irrelevant information. It has not explained why any particular request seeks information that (1) would be not admissible at trial and (2) does not appear reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
The Court denies Topa’s motion to quash or for a protective order.
5. Sanctions
Plaintiff requests sanctions, arguing Topa filed its motion in bad faith or without substantial justification.
Topa’s motion lacked the required separate statement (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(a)(5)) and included a frivolous argument based on inapplicable Insurance Code provisions. The Court has found that the motion lacked merit.
Nonetheless, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions. The Court does not conclude that Topa filed the motion in bad faith or without substantial justification.
CONCLUSION
The
Court DENIES Topa Insurance Company’s motion to quash the deposition subpoena
served by Plaintiff Jose Munoz or for a protective order.
The Court DENIES Plaintiff Jose Munoz's request for sanctions.
Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.
Moving party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.