Judge: Lisa R. Jaskol, Case: 21STCV38984, Date: 2025-05-06 Tentative Ruling

All parties are urged to meet and confer with all parties concerning this tentative ruling to see if they can reach an agreed-upon resolution of their matter.  If you are able to reach an agreement, please notify the courtroom staff in advance of the hearing if you wish to submit on the tentative ruling rather than argue the motion by notifying the court by e-mailing the court at: SSCDEPT28@lacourt.org.  Include the word "SUBMITS" in all caps and the Case Number in the Subject line.  In the body of the email, please provide the date and time of the hearing, your name, your contact information, the party you represent, and whether that party is a plaintiff, defendant, cross-complainant, cross-defendant, claimant, intervenor, or non-party, etc.

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Case Number: 21STCV38984    Hearing Date: May 6, 2025    Dept: 28

Having considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers, the Court rules as follows. 

BACKGROUND 

A.   Prior proceedings 

On October 21, 2021, Plaintiff Andrew Arellano (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants J.B. Hunt Transport Services, Inc., Dirt Cheap, Inc. dba DCG Fulfillment (“DCG”), Intergrated Design, and Does 1-20 for general negligence. 

On December 14, 2021, Plaintiff amended the complaint to include Defendant California Distribution Center, LLC as Doe 1. 

On January 7, 2022, DCG filed an answer.  On January 11, 2022, DCG filed a cross-complaint against Cross-Defendants J.B. Hunt Transport Services, Inc., Intergrated Design, California Distribution Center, LLC (“CDC”), and Roes 1-50 for contribution, equitable indemnity, express indemnity, and implied indemnity. 

On January 20, 2022, the Court dismissed Defendant Intergrated Design from Plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice at Plaintiff’s request. 

On February 2, 2022, Defendant J.B. Hunt Transportation, Inc. (erroneously sued as J.B. Hunt Transport Services, Inc.) (“Hunt”) filed an answer to Plaintiff’s complaint. 

On May 5, 2022, the Court dismissed DCG from Plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice at Plaintiff’s request. 

On June 3, 2022, CDC filed an answer and a cross-complaint against Cross-Defendants J.B. Hunt Transportation Services, Inc., Brand Buzz Consumer Products, ES Sutton, Inc., BNSF Railway, DCG, Intergrated Design, and Roes 1-50 for total equitable indemnity, comparative indemnity, and declaratory relief.  On September 21, 2022, Hunt filed an answer to CDC’s cross-complaint.  On November 28, 2022, Cross-Defendants BNSF Railway Company (erroneously sued and served as BNSF Railway) filed an answer to CDC’s cross-complaint.  On February 14, 2024, the Court dismissed CDC’s claims against Hunt without prejudice at CDC’s request. 

On December 13, 2022, Cross-Defendants and Cross-Complainants Brand Buzz Limited Liability Company, erroneously sued as Brand Buzz Consumer Products (“Buzz”), and E.S. Sutton, Inc. (“Sutton”) filed an answer to CDC’s cross-complaint and filed a cross-complaint against Cross-Defendants Moes 1-20 for indemnification, apportionment of fault, and declaratory relief. 

On June 7, 2023, Plaintiff amended the complaint to include Defendant MJM Transportation, Inc. (“MJM”) as Doe 2.  On July 20, 2023, MJM filed an answer and a cross-complaint against Cross-Defendants Roes 1-20 for express indemnification, equitable indemnification, equitable contribution, declaratory relief: duty to defend, and declaratory relief: duty to indemnify. 

On July 27, 2023, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against Hunt without prejudice at Plaintiff’s request. 

On August 8, 2024, the Court granted the unopposed motion for summary judgment of CDC’s cross-complaint filed by Buzz and Sutton. 

Trial is scheduled for July 2, 2025. 

B.   This motion 

On February 26, 2024, MJM filed a motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, motion for summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s complaint.  The motion was set for hearing on February 24, 2025.  On February 4, 2025, Plaintiff filed an opposition.  On February 10, 2025, CDC filed an opposition.  On February 13, 2025, MJM filed a reply to Plaintiff’s opposition.  On February 19, 2025, MJM filed a reply to CDC’s opposition.  The Court continued the hearing to May 6, 2025. 

MJM’S EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS 

Overruled: 1-3, 10, 14-19

Sustained:  12, 13 

PARTIES’ REQUESTS 

MJM asks the Court to grant summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s complaint. 

Plaintiff and CDC ask the Court to deny the motion. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

A.   Summary judgment and summary adjudication 

“ ‘[F]rom commencement to conclusion, the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ”  (LAOSD Asbestos Cases (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 949, 945, quoting Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (Aguilar).) “[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.”  (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) 

When the moving party is a defendant, it must show that the plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of action.  (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 853.) “The defendant has shown that the plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of action by showing that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.”  (Id. at p. 854.) The defendant must “present evidence, and not simply point out that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.”  (Ibid.) Thus, “the defendant must ‘support[ ]’ the ‘motion’ with evidence including ‘affidavits, declarations, admissions, answers to interrogatories, depositions, and matters of which judicial notice’ must or may ‘be taken.’ [Citation.] The defendant may, but need not, present evidence that conclusively negates an element of the plaintiff’s cause of action. The defendant may also present evidence that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence—as through admissions by the plaintiff following extensive discovery to the effect that he has discovered nothing.”  (Id. at p. 855, original emphasis.) 

“Supporting and opposing affidavits or declarations . . . shall set forth admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (d).) “Matters which would be excluded under the rules of evidence if proffered by a witness in a trial as hearsay, conclusions or impermissible opinions, must be disregarded in supporting affidavits.”  (Hayman v. Block (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 629, 639.)  

In ruling on the motion, the court must consider all the evidence and all the inferences reasonably drawn from it and must view such evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the opposing party.  (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.) 

B.   Negligence 

The elements of a negligence claim are: a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury.  (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158.) 

“The underlying principle, set forth in Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a), is that “ ‘[e]veryone is responsible ... for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person . . . .’ ” (Williams v. Fremont Corners, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 654, 663 (Williams).)  This rule “‘establishes the general duty of each person to exercise, in his or her activities, reasonable care for the safety of others.’” (Ibid., quoting Vasilenko v. Grace Family Church (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1077, 1083 (Vasilenko); see Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 214).) 

“ ‘ “ ‘Courts ... invoke[ ] the concept of duty to limit generally “the otherwise potentially infinite liability which would follow from every negligent act ....” ’ ” ’ ” (Williams, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 663, quoting Vasilenko, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1083.) “Our Supreme Court has explained that an exception to the general rule of Civil Code section 1714 must be “ ‘ “ ‘clearly supported by public policy.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid., quoting Vasilenko, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1083.) “Courts look to what are commonly called ‘the Rowland factors’ in determining whether policy considerations favor such an exception.” (Ibid., citing Vasilenko, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1083.)  “These are “ ‘ “the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.”’ ” (Ibid., quoting Vasilenko, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1083; see Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 113.) 

DISCUSSION 

A.   The complaint 

The complaint includes the following allegations: 

On or about March 13, 2021, at BNSF Hobart Rail Yard, 4940 Sheila Street, Los Angeles, CA 90040, Defendants, while acting in the course and scope of employment, negligently and improperly shipped, loaded, handled, transported, and provided a transportable cargo container bearing equipment No. 328509 which was unsafe and hazardous to persons, like Plaintiff, who were expected to use and/or further transport the container. 

Defendants’ negligence included the failure to ensure that the load in the container was stacked and arranged in a stable and secure manner to reduce the risk of the load falling, shifting, and causing instability in the transport, handling, and unloading of the container. 

On or about March 13, 2021, while attempting to move and transport the container, due to Defendants’ negligence, the load in the container shifted and fell causing the container, truck, and carriage which Plaintiff was driving to overturn, injuring Plaintiff. 

B.   Undisputed facts 

1.    Facts which MJM and Plaintiff do not dispute 

On or about March 12, 2021, MJM’s driver, Tereso Margarito Lopez Reyna (“Reyna”), arrived at CDC to pick up cargo.  (UMF 1; see also Plaintiff’s Undisputed Material Fact (“PUMF”) 4.)  After picking up the cargo, Reyna did not make additional stops and went straight to BNSF.  (UMF 3; PUMF 5.)  The seal on the trailer was never broken on the way to BNSF.  (UMF 4.)  Reyna delivered the container to BNSF’s Hobart Railyard.  (PUMF 6.) 

Plaintiff’s employer Parsec is a contractor for BNSF at the Hobart Railyard and is responsible for intrayard transportation and train loading.  (PUMF 7.)  Plaintiff was assigned to move the container from a parking space on the lot in the Hobart Railyard to a queue for loading onto a BNSF train.  (PUMF 8.)  In the course of pulling the container from its parking space to the queue, Plaintiff’s truck rolled over.  (PUMF 9.)  BNSF employee Juan Lopez was assigned to investigate the rollover. 

Plaintiff responded to MJM’s special interrogatory no. 1 by stating: “The cargo was loaded by Defendant California Distribution Center, LLC, into Defendant J.B. Hunt Transport’s container in an unsafe manner which did not adhere to customary industry safety practices. Defendant MJM Transportation, Inc.’s driver also failed to ensure that the cargo load was reasonably safely secured to prevent movement/shifting of the load in transit despite having every opportunity to do so and despite any lack of instruction by any other responsible party not to do so. As a result, the load shifted in transit, thereby causing the incident and Plaintiff’s injuries and damages.”  (UMF 6.) 

Plaintiff responded to MJM’s form interrogatory no. 14.1 by stating: “Yes. Defendant MJM Transportation, Inc., violated the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Act regulations set forth under 49 C.F.R. sections 392.9 and 393.100, et seq., for failing to ensure that the load inside the subject container was properly distributed and secured to prevent load shifting before putting the subject load into transit.”  (UMF 7.) 

2.    Facts which MJM and CDC do not dispute 

On or about March 12, 2021, Reyna arrived at CDC to pick up cargo.  (UMF 1.)  Reyna did not participate in the loading of his trailer while at CDC. (UMF 2.) 

In response to MJM s form interrogatory no. 14.1, Plaintiff stated, Yes. Defendant MJM Transportation, Inc., violated the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Act regulations set forth under 49 C.F.R. sections 392.9 and 393.100, et seq., for failing to ensure that the load inside the subject container was properly distributed and secured to prevent load shifting before putting the subject load into transit.  (UMF 7.) 

C.   MJM has carried its initial burden on summary judgment or summary adjudication 

MJM contends that it cannot be liable for Plaintiff’s injuries, which allegedly resulted from an improperly loaded container, because (1) MJM did not participate in loading the container and (2) MJM had no duty to Plaintiff to ensure the container was properly loaded. 

To support these arguments, MJM cites evidence that its driver, Reyna, did not participate in loading the container before Reyna drove the container to BNSF on or about March 12, 2021.  (See MJM’s exh. 2, Reyna deposition pp. 39, 139-140.) 

MJM also contends that Plaintiff’s accident took place on or about March 13, 2021, after Reyna had delivered the container to BNSF on or about March 12, 2021.  At that point, MJM contends, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSR) on which Plaintiff relies did not apply because Reyna’s vehicle was no longer in transit.  (See AmeriGas Propane, LP v. Landstar Ranger, Inc. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1169 [FMCSR parts 390.3, 390.11, 391.13, 393.104(d), and 393.106(c)(1), which require a carrier to ensure its drivers have adequate training or experience in securing loads on their trucks to ensure its drivers adhere to proper securement methods and procedures, “concern loading cargo so that it can be transported safely and not endanger the public or truck drivers during transport on public highways”].) 

MJM has carried its initial burden on summary judgment or summary adjudication, shifting the burden to Plaintiff. 

D.   Plaintiff has raised a triable issue of fact 

Plaintiff asserts that, when Reyna picked up the contained on or about March 12, 2021, “he observed what he knew to be an unsecured and improperly distributed loading pattern of twenty tons of cargo.”  (Opposition p. 2.)  According to Plaintiff, “When Mr. Reyna delivered the load in that condition, he assumed a duty towards Plaintiff, as it was foreseeable that the dangerous loading pattern could cause Plaintiff’s truck to overturn and injure him.”  (Opposition p. 3.) 

 To support these assertions, Plaintiff points to evidence that: 

·       Reyna looked at the load in the container before he closed the container door and saw material loaded on pallets.  (Reyna depo. p. 114.)

·       At his deposition, Reyna testified that the pallets were double-stacked and the load was distributed toward the nose of the trailer when it left CDC.  (Reyna depo. p. 116.)

·       Over objection, Reyna testified: “It’s possible that it’s a little bit dangerous because of the way that the pallets are distributed.”  (Reyna depo. p. 119.)

·       In response to the question whether there was a safer way to load the cargo in the container, Reyna testified over objection that, “If I had realized this at the time, I would have told them that the load was not properly distributed.”  (Reyna depo. p. 120.) 

Based on this evidence, the Court finds that Plaintiff has raised a triable issue of fact concerning whether Reyna, MJM’s employee, acted negligently because he knew the container was improperly loaded before he delivered it to BNSF, posing a danger to people like Plaintiff who would come in contact with the container as part of the shipping process. 

Because the Court has concluded that Plaintiff has raised a triable issue of fact, the Court does not address CDC’s separate opposition to MJM’s motion. 

The Court denies MJM’s motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication. 

CONCLUSION 

The Court DENIES Defendant MJM Transportation, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication of Plaintiff Andrew Arellano’s complaint. 

Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling. 

Moving party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.