Judge: Lisa R. Jaskol, Case: 21STCV40142, Date: 2024-03-25 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV40142    Hearing Date: March 25, 2024    Dept: 28

Having considered the moving and opposing papers, the Court rules as follows. 

BACKGROUND 

On November 1, 2021, Plaintiffs Arsen Mesropyan (“Mesropyan”) and Emiliya Davtyan (“Davtyan”) filed this action against the Defendants City of Glendale, California (“City”), Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (“Defendant”), MV Transportation, Inc. (“MV”), and Does 1-50 for motor vehicle tort, general negligence, and negligence per se. 

On March 28, 2022, the City filed an answer. On March 29, 2022, Defendant filed an answer. 

On May 13, 2022, the Court dismissed MV without prejudice at Plaintiffs’ request. On March 24, 2023, the Court dismissed the City without prejudice at Plaintiffs’ request. 

On May 24, 2023, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication to be heard on March 19, 2024. On March 6, 2023, Davtyan filed an opposition.  The Court continued the hearing to March 25, 2024. 

Trial is scheduled for May 13, 2024. 

PARTIES’ REQUESTS 

Defendant asks the Court to grant summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication. 

Davtyan asks the Court to deny the motion. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

A.   Summary judgment and summary adjudication 

“‘[F]rom commencement to conclusion, the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”  (LAOSD Asbestos Cases (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 949, 945, quoting Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (Aguilar).) “[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.”  (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.)  

          When the moving party is a defendant, it must show that the plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of action.  (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 853.) “The defendant has shown that the plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of action by showing that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.”  (Id. at p. 854.) The defendant must “present evidence, and not simply point out that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.”  (Ibid.) Thus, “the defendant must ‘support[ ]’ the ‘motion’ with evidence including ‘affidavits, declarations, admissions, answers to interrogatories, depositions, and matters of which judicial notice’ must or may ‘be taken.’ [Citation.] The defendant may, but need not, present evidence that conclusively negates an element of the plaintiff’s cause of action. The defendant may also present evidence that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence—as through admissions by the plaintiff following extensive discovery to the effect that he has discovered nothing.”  (Id. at p. 855, original emphasis.)  

          “Supporting and opposing affidavits or declarations . . . shall set forth admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (d).) “Matters which would be excluded under the rules of evidence if proffered by a witness in a trial as hearsay, conclusions or impermissible opinions, must be disregarded in supporting affidavits.”  (Hayman v. Block (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 629, 639.) 

          In addition, a party moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication must support the motion with “a separate statement setting forth plainly and concisely all material facts which the moving party contends are undisputed. Each of the material facts stated shall be followed by a reference to the supporting evidence.” (Parkview Villas Assn. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (2006) 133 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1209 (Parkview Villas), quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(1) [motion for summary judgment]; see Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(2) [motion for summary adjudication “shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment”].) The party opposing the motion must file with the opposition papers “a separate statement that responds to each of the material facts contended by the moving party to be undisputed, indicating whether the opposing party agrees or disagrees that those facts are undisputed. The statement also shall set forth plainly and concisely any other material facts that the opposing party contends are disputed. Each material fact contended by the opposing party to be disputed shall be followed by a reference to the supporting evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(3).)  If either party fails to comply with the applicable separate statement requirement, that failure may in the court’s discretion constitute a sufficient ground to decide the motion adversely to the offending party. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (b)(1), (3).)   

          In ruling on the motion, the court must consider all of the evidence and all of the inferences reasonably drawn from it and must view such evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the opposing party.  (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.)  “[A] court cannot grant summary judgment based on inferences that are contradicted by other inferences or evidence. And a triable issue of fact exists when the evidence permits a reasonable trier of fact to find a contested fact in favor of the party opposing the motion.  [Citation.] Put slightly differently, a summary judgment may not be granted unless the evidence is incapable of supporting a judgment for the losing party.” (California-American Water Co. v. Marina Coast Water Dist. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1272, 1296.) 

B.   Claim presentation requirement 

Government Code section 910 provides: 

“A claim shall be presented by the claimant or by a person acting on his or her behalf and shall show all of the following: 

“(a) The name and post office address of the claimant. 

“(b) The post office address to which the person presenting the claim desires notices to be sent. 

“(c) The date, place and other circumstances of the occurrence or transaction which gave rise to the claim asserted. 

“(d) A general description of the indebtedness, obligation, injury, damage or loss incurred so far as it may be known at the time of presentation of the claim. 

“(e) The name or names of the public employee or employees causing the injury, damage, or loss, if known. 

“(f) The amount claimed if it totals less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) as of the date of presentation of the claim, including the estimated amount of any prospective injury, damage, or loss, insofar as it may be known at the time of the presentation of the claim, together with the basis of computation of the amount claimed. If the amount claimed exceeds ten thousand dollars ($10,000), no dollar amount shall be included in the claim.  However, it shall indicate whether the claim would be a limited civil case.” 

(Gov. Code, § 910.) 

“Under the Tort Claims Act, a plaintiff may not maintain an action for money or damages against a public entity unless first a written claim has been presented to the public entity and rejected in whole or in part or deemed rejected by operation of law.”  (Sofranek v. County of Merced (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1246 (Sofranek), quoting Gov. Code, §§ 905, 905.2, 945.4.)  “Failure to timely present a claim for money or damages to a public entity bars a plaintiff from filing a lawsuit against that entity.”  (Ibid., citing State of California v. Superior Court (Bodde) (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1245.) “Before a cause of action may be stated, a plaintiff must allege either compliance with this procedure or circumstances excusing compliance.” (Ibid.) 

Under Government Code section 911.2, subdivision (a), “personal injury claims against a local governmental entity must be presented to the entity within six months after accrual of the cause of action . . . .”  (Sofranek, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 1246.)  Claims relating to other causes of action must be presented within one year after the accrual of the cause of action.  (Ibid.) A party may amend his or her claim during these time periods if the claim as amended relates to the same transaction or occurrence which gave rise to the original claim, but the amendment “shall be considered a part of the original claim for all purposes.” (Ibid., quoting Gov. Code, § 910.6, subd. (a).)  If the governmental entity provides the claimant with written notice of rejection, “the claimant must bring an action against the entity within six months after ‘the date such notice is personally delivered or deposited in the mail.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Gov. Code, § 945.6, subd. (a)(1).) “This six-month deadline ‘is mandatory and must be strictly complied with.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Julian v. City of San Diego (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 169, 176.) 

DISCUSSION 

A.   The complaint 

The complaint alleges that on April 18, 2021, on Glendale Avenue in Glendale, California, Defendant’s bus was involved in a motor vehicle accident with Plaintiffs.  Defendant allegedly (1) employed the bus driver, who operated the bus in the course and scope of the driver’s employment, (2) owned the bus, and (3) entrusted the bus to the driver.  Defendant’s actions allegedly were negligent and Defendant’s negligence allegedly caused Plaintiffs’ injuries. 

B.   Undisputed facts 

Mesropyan was the driver of the motor vehicle which an MTA bus sideswiped, injuring Mesropyan.  Mesropyan’s wife Davtyan was a passenger in the motor vehicle. (Davtyan’s UMF.) 

On April 21, 2021, Plaintiffs’ counsel submitted a Claim for Damages to Defendant which listed Mesropyan in the “Claimant Information” section of the claim form.  The claim form did not identify Davtyan or provide any information about her in the form's ‘Claimant Information’ section.  (Exh. 1 [requesting occupation, date of birth, Social Security number, address, and phone number]; Defendant’s UMF.) 

In the section of the form asking, “Describe what occurred,” Plaintiffs' counsel wrote:  “Claimant was struck by a Metro Bus as he was parked on Glendale Avenue.  After the collision, the Metro Bus fled the scene.”  (Exh. 1.)  In the section of the form asking for the amount being claimed, counsel wrote: “$100,000 for special damages and general damages of claimant and his passenger, [Davtyan].  Medical bills and repair estimate will be submitted as soon as they are available.”  (Exh. 1.) 

In response to Defendant’s discovery requests asking for evidence that Davtyan complied with the claim presentation requirement, Davtyan identified the Claim For Damages form that lists Mesropyan in the form's ‘Claimant Information’ section. 

C.   Legal arguments 

Defendant has presented evidence that Davtyan did not submit a claim for damages and the time to submit a claim has now passed.  Defendant has carried its initial burden on summary judgment, shifting the burden to Davtyan. 

Davtyan argues that Mesropyan’s claim satisfied the requirements of Government Code section 910 because it identified Davtyan as a passenger in the vehicle and requested damages for her injuries. 

“Generally, each claimant must file his or her own tort claim.”  (Castaneda v. Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1062.) “When people suffer separate and distinct injuries from the same act or omission, they must each submit a claim. One claimant cannot rely on a claim presented by another.” (Ibid., citing California Restaurant Management Systems v. City of San Diego (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1581, 1592.) 

“Because this rule is based on the purpose of the claim statutes—which is to provide sufficient information to enable the entity to adequately investigate claims and to [settle them], if appropriate, without the expense of litigation [citation]—the statutory requirements have not been met by the person who has not filed a claim, and the doctrine of substantial compliance (which applies only when there is a defect in form but the statutory requirements have otherwise been met) does not apply.”  (Nelson v. County of Los Angeles (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 783, 797.) 

The parties have not cited, and the Court has not found, any published California decision which squarely addresses the question whether a person substantially complies with the claim presentation requirement when (1) the person does not file a claim but (2) a claimant files a claim which requests damages for the non-filing person. 

On the facts presented here, the Court finds that Davtyan’s failure to file a separate claim was not merely a defect in form.  Mesropyan’s claim did not sufficiently inform Defendant that Davtyan wished to seek separate damages or give Defendant sufficient information to investigate Davtyan's claim.  Therefore, Davtyan did not substantially comply with the claim presentation requirement as a matter of law. 

Davtyan has not raised a triable issue of fact.  The Court grants Defendant’s motion. 

CONCLUSION 

The Court GRANTS Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s motion for summary judgment. 

Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling. 

Moving party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.