Judge: Lisa R. Jaskol, Case: 21STCV45421, Date: 2025-05-22 Tentative Ruling
All parties are urged to meet and confer with all parties concerning this tentative ruling to see if they can reach an agreed-upon resolution of their matter. If you are able to reach an agreement, please notify the courtroom staff in advance of the hearing if you wish to submit on the tentative ruling rather than argue the motion by notifying the court by e-mailing the court at: SSCDEPT28@lacourt.org. Include the word "SUBMITS" in all caps and the Case Number in the Subject line. In the body of the email, please provide the date and time of the hearing, your name, your contact information, the party you represent, and whether that party is a plaintiff, defendant, cross-complainant, cross-defendant, claimant, intervenor, or non-party, etc.
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Case Number: 21STCV45421 Hearing Date: May 22, 2025 Dept: 28
Having considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers, the Court rules as follows.
BACKGROUND
A. Prior proceedings
On December 13, 2021, Plaintiff Francesca Montenotte (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Roger Beepot (“Beepot”), Lyft, Inc. (“Lyft”), and Does 1-25 for negligence. On August 29, 2024, Plaintiff amended the complaint to include Defendant Steadfast Insurance Company, successor-in-interest (“Steadfast”) as Doe 1.
On July 3, 2023, the Court dismissed Lyft without prejudice at Plaintiff’s request.
On July 19, 2023, Beepot filed an answer.
On March 11, 2024, Beepot filed a motion for summary judgment. On August 30, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On September 6, 2024, Beepot filed a reply. On September 13, 2024, the Court denied the motion.
B. This motion
On December 31, 2024, Beepot filed a “Notice of Motion and Second Motion for Summary Judgment.” The motion was set for hearing on March 24, 2025.
On February 14, 2025, Beepot filed a notice of errata and continuance of the hearing to May 22, 2025. Beepot also re-filed his moving papers.
On April 25, 2025, the Court denied Beepot’s ex parte application for an order granting him permission to proceed with a second motion for summary judgment, stating the Court would address the appropriateness of filing a second motion for summary judgment when it addressed the other issues raised by the motion.
On May 2, 2025, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On May 9, 2025, Beepot filed a reply.
On May 12, 2025, Beepot filed additional reply papers, including a supplemental declaration. On May 15, 2025, Plaintiff filed an objection to the supplemental declaration. (The Court has not considered these additional filings.)
Trial is scheduled for July 8, 2025.
PARTIES’ REQUESTS
Beepot asks the Court to grant summary judgment.
Plaintiff
asks the Court to deny the motion.
PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR
JUDICIAL NOTICE
The Court denies Plaintiff’s request to take judicial notice of the Court’s docket. In all other respects, the Court grants the request.
EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS
A. Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections
Overruled.
“Plaintiff also appears to make evidentiary objections to Defendant’s facts in his separate statement. The Court declines to rule on these evidentiary objections for failure to comply with the procedural requirements.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1354(b)-(c) [requirement of two separate documents, i.e., evidentiary objections and a proposed order on those objections].)” (September 6, 2024 order denying Beepot’s first motion for summary judgment.)
B. Beepot’s evidentiary objections
Overruled.
LEGAL STANDARD
A. Summary judgment
“‘[F]rom commencement to conclusion, the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” (LAOSD Asbestos Cases (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 949, 945, quoting Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (Aguilar).) “[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.)
“Supporting and opposing affidavits or declarations . . . shall set forth admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (d).) “Matters which would be excluded under the rules of evidence if proffered by a witness in a trial as hearsay, conclusions or impermissible opinions, must be disregarded in supporting affidavits.” (Hayman v. Block (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 629, 639.)
In ruling on the motion, the court must consider all of the evidence and all of the inferences reasonably drawn from it and must view such evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the opposing party. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.) “[A] court cannot grant summary judgment based on inferences that are contradicted by other inferences or evidence. And a triable issue of fact exists when the evidence permits a reasonable trier of fact to find a contested fact in favor of the party opposing the motion. [Citation.] Put slightly differently, a summary judgment may not be granted unless the evidence is incapable of supporting a judgment for the losing party.” (California-American Water Co. v. Marina Coast Water Dist. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1272, 1296.)
B. Renewal under Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (b)
Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (b) provides:
“(b) A party who originally made an application for an order which was refused in whole or part, or granted conditionally or on terms, may make a subsequent application for the same order upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, in which case it shall be shown by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown. For a failure to comply with this subdivision, any order made on a subsequent application may be revoked or set aside on ex parte motion.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (b).)
“When a motion has been denied in whole or in part, the moving party . . . may apply again for the same relief at a later time, but only on the following conditions: [¶] . . . The motion must be based on ‘new or different facts, circumstances or law’ [citation] [and] [¶] . . . “The motion must be supported by [a] declaration showing the previous order, by which judge it was made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to exist [citation] [citations].” (L. Edmon & C. Karnow, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (Rutter 2024) ¶ 9:337, p. 9(l)-166 (Cal. Practice Guide).)
“Unlike a motion for reconsideration, there is no time limit under [section 1008] for renewal of a previous motion.” (Cal. Practice Guide, supra, ¶ 9:338.5, p. 9(l)-166; see id., ¶ 9:340.1, p. 9(l)-167, citing Graham v. Hansen (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 965, 971 [trial court properly granted renewed motion for summary judgment filed almost one year after court denied previous motion].)
C. Negligence
“The
elements of a negligence cause of action are (1) the existence of a duty, (2) a
breach of that duty, (3) injury to the plaintiff caused by the defendant’s
breach, and (4) actual damages.” (Romero
v. Los Angeles Rams (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 562, 567.)
DISCUSSION
A. The complaint
The complaint includes the following allegations:
On June 26, 2018, Plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle owned and/or operated by Beepot and Doe defendants. Due to the negligence of Beepot and the Doe defendants, Plaintiff was involved in a collision causing injury to Plaintiff.
B. Undisputed facts
Plaintiff alleges that on June 26, 2018, she was a passenger in Beepot’s vehicle when they were involved in an accident and Plaintiff was injured. Beepot’s vehicle was rearended while stopped at a stoplight behind another stopped vehicle waiting for the traffic light to turn green. The complaint alleges a negligence claim against Beepot.
Beepot was a Lyft driver transporting passengers to a location in Santa Monica using the Lyft rideshare application. Plaintiff was one of Beepot’s three passengers. The other two passengers were Plaintiff’s friends.
During the transport, Beepot had to stop his vehicle at a red light at the intersection. There was nothing unusual, sudden, or unexpected in the way in which Beepot came to a stop.
Beepot decelerated his vehicle gradually until it came to a stop a safe distance behind the vehicle that stopped at the red light in front of his vehicle. Beepot was completely within his lane of travel while he decelerated and came to a stop. While Beepot’s vehicle was at a complete stop at the intersection with his foot pressing the brake, he was waiting for the traffic light to turn green.
While Beepot’s vehicle was at a complete stop, it was struck from behind by a vehicle driven by Lorenzo Lopez. Beepot’s vehicle was stopped for about one minute before the accident occurred. While stopped at the stop light before the accident waiting for the light to turn green, Beepot had his foot on the brake. Prior to being hit from behind, Beepot and his passengers heard no sounds of skidding or squealing of tires.
Plaintiff and her two friends had their seat belts fastened when the accident occurred. Before the accident, Beepot checked to make sure his three passengers were wearing their seat belts.
C. Beepot renewed motion for summary judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (b), was not subject to statutory amendments which became effective January 1, 2025
Beepot filed his second motion for summary judgment on December 31, 2024. Although the second motion is properly titled “Second Motion for Summary Judgment,” the motion appears on the Court’s online docket under the heading “joinder to motion for summary judgment/adjudication.” Plaintiff has cited no support for her assertion that “defense counsel erred in naming the document at the time of filing . . . .” (Opposition p. 7.) Beepot later filed a notice of errata, continued the hearing, and re-filed the moving papers.
Based on these facts, the Court finds that Beepot filed the motion on December 31, 2024, making the motion subject to statutes in effect on that date. The motion is not subject to statutory amendments which came into effect on January 1, 2025 limiting parties’ ability to file second summary judgment motions. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a)(4)-(a)(4) (2025).)
Plaintiff also asserts that the second motion for summary judgment is an improper renewal motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (b). (Opposition p. 13.) However, the Court finds that Beepot has satisfied the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (b), by submitting the declaration of Brad Rutledge and a copy of the Court’s September 13, 2024 order.
D. Beepot has carried his initial burden on summary judgment
In denying Beepot’s first motion for summary judgment, the Court found: “Defendant has set forth sufficient evidence that he was at a complete stop at a red light and was rear-ended by another vehicle. However, Defendant’s declaration regarding the seat belts [footnote] and the lack of mechanical problems with the car lacks foundation and constitutes improper lay opinion testimony. [Footnote.] Accordingly, Defendant has failed to meet his burden regarding the lack of defects in the car. [Footnote.]”
In footnotes, the Court explained: “Regarding the seat belts, [Beepot] relies on his own declaration and two excerpts of Plaintiff’s deposition, which do not establish that the seat belts were working properly at the time of the accident. [Citation.].” The Court also observed: “[Beepot] presents the deposition testimony of [Beepot] in reply. The Court declines to consider new evidence submitted for the first time in reply to establish the foundation for the opinions in Beepot’s declaration, when the declaration filed with the motion could have attempted to lay the foundation for Beepot’s opinions and where Plaintiff has requested a continuance to obtain maintenance records not produced at the time of his deposition.” In light of the Court’s ruling, the Court did not reach Plaintiff’s alternative arguments that Beepot owed a heightened duty of care as a common carrier or that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied.
In Beepot’s second motion for summary judgment, Beepot presents the declaration of Brad Rutledge (“Rutledge”), a licensed professional mechanical engineer. Based on his review and analysis, Rutledge testified in his declaration that Plaintiff’s seatbelt was in proper working order and worked when the accident took place. (Rutledge dec. ¶ 9b.) According to Rutledge, “Plaintiffs seat belt was in proper working condition and worked at the time of the Accident. At the time of the manufacture of Beepot's Vehicle, its seat belts had only two working mechanisms, which were (i) the latching mechanism and (i) the locking mechanism. Both mechanisms were fully functional in the Vehicle at the time of Accident. Beepot testified in his deposition that he checked to make sure his Vehicle's seat belts were latching properly on a weekly basis. Beepot testified that he had confirmed that Plaintiff was wearing her seat belt before the Accident by asking each of his passengers, including Plaintiff, and each said "yes" that they were wearing their seat belts. Plaintiff also testified in her deposition that she was wearing her seat belt, and that the seat belt locking mechanism worked at the time of the Accident.” (Rutledge dec. ¶ 9b.)
Rutledge also testified: “There is no evidence that Beepot's Vehicle's airbags were not working as designed at the time of the Accident. For the severity of the rear and front collisions to the Vehicle in the Accident, there is no guarantee that the Vehicle's airbags would have deployed. Furthermore, if the airbags had deployed in the Accident it would have been in response to the subsequent frontal impact with deployment of the Vehicle's frontal airbags. The Vehicle's frontal airbags are positioned in front of the driver and right front passenger seat. Therefore, if the Vehicle's airbags had deployed, their benefit would be only to someone sitting in the front seat, and Plaintiff was in the back seat. If the Vehicle's airbags had deployed in the Accident, they would not have interacted with nor benefited Plaintiff.” (Rutledge dec. ¶ 9c.)
In addition, according to Rutledge: “The Vehicle's taillights were working at the time of the Accident. Beepot testified in his deposition that when he stepped on the brakes while driving on the day of the Accident, he could see them glowing red in the rear of his Vehicle. Beepot also testified that as he was stopped behind the car in front waiting for the stoplight to turn green before the Accident, he was pressing on the brake pedal.” (Rutledge dec. ¶ 9d.)
Based on Rutledge’s declaration and the undisputed evidence, the Court finds that Beepot has carried his initial burden on summary judgment, shifting the burden to Plaintiff.
E. Plaintiff has not raised a triable issue of fact
Plaintiff contends that Beepot’s inattention just before and during the accident, the presence of Beepot’s dog in the front seat, and Beepot’s alleged failure to ensure the vehicle’s safety features were working were responsible for Plaintiff’s injuries. To support these arguments, Plaintiff has submitted the declaration of Stephen L. Plourd (“Plourd”), whose area of expertise is accident investigation and reconstruction. (Plourd dec. ¶ 4.) In his declaration, Plourd states that Rutledge’s opinions are not supported by the documents which Rutledge reviewed. (Plourd dec. ¶¶ 8-9.)
Instead, Plourd believes “it was more likely than not that Mr. Beepot caused or contributed to the Accident. Mr. Beepot testified at deposition that, at the time of the Accident, his rear window was tinted, and he did not clean it before operating his vehicle for Lyft. He testified that he was driving while using two different navigation systems with his 11-pound dog in the front passenger seat. Mr. Beepot admitted that for entire minute prior to the Accident, he was staring at and admiring the Porsche Cayenne in front of him. Mr. Beepot did not see the incoming car that struck his vehicle because he was staring at the Porsch Cayenne in front of his vehicle. Since Mr. Beepot never saw the incoming vehicle before impact, he could not possibly know whether any evasive or protective action could have been taken to minimize the impact or mitigate Plaintiff’s damages. Mr. Beepot even admits that he believes he could have done something to minimize the impact or Plaintiffs damages had he seen Mr. Ortiz's vehicle before impact.” (Plourd dec. ¶ 10.)
In addition, according to Plourde, “it was more likely than not that Mr. Beepot could have taken reasonable steps to have lessened and/or avoided the injuries sustained by Plaintiff. Had Mr. Beepot been paying attention, which he admits he failed to do, he could have warned Plaintiff of an oncoming vehicle o attempted to move his car to mitigate the impact or, better yet, avoided the collision all together. Due to his inattentiveness, Mr. Beepot failed to take any affirmative evasive action or maneuvers, whatsoever, to protect Plaintiff.” (Plourd dec. ¶ 10.)
Plourd’s declaration does not raise a triable issue of fact. “[A]n expert's opinion based on assumptions of fact without evidentiary support [citation], or on speculative or conjectural factors [citation], has no evidentiary value [citation] and may be excluded from evidence. [Citations.] [¶] Similarly, when an expert's opinion is purely conclusory because unaccompanied by a reasoned explanation connecting the factual predicates to the ultimate conclusion, that opinion has no evidentiary value because an ‘expert opinion is worth no more than the reasons upon which it rests.’ [Citation.]” (Jennings v. Palomar Pomerado Health Systems, Inc. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1117.)
Here, Plourde’s opinion that Beepot could have prevented or reduced the impact of the collision is based not on evidence but on speculation. Plourde does not explain how any of the facts which he discusses – Beepot’s staring at the Porsche, the dog in the front seat, the tinted window, the two navigation systems – made any difference in Beepot’s ability to take “evasive or protective action” to avoid or mitigate the impact of a rear-end collision.
The Court grants Beepot’s motion.
CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS Defendants Roger Beepot’s motion for summary judgment.
Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.
Moving party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.