Judge: Lisa R. Jaskol, Case: 21STCV46609, Date: 2025-04-30 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 21STCV46609 Hearing Date: April 30, 2025 Dept: 28
Having considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers, the Court rules as follows.
BACKGROUND
A. Prior proceedings
On December 22, 2021, Plaintiff Patricia Durazo-Perez (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants State of California (“State”), City of Los Angeles (“City”), County of Los Angeles (“County”), and Does 1-15 for general negligence and premises liability—negligence and dangerous condition of public property.
On November 1, 2022, the County filed an answer.
On April 11, 2023, the clerk entered the City’s default. On December 8, 2023, the Court granted the City’s motion to vacate the default.
On June 6, 2023, the City filed an answer to Plaintiff’s complaint and a cross-complaint against the State, the County, and Roes 1-10 for apportionment of fault, indemnification, and declaratory relief.
On August 4, 2023, the State filed an answer.
On January 10, 2024, the City filed another answer to Plaintiff’s complaint and another cross-complaint against Cross-Defendants the State, the County, and Roes 1-20 for apportionment of fault, indemnification, and declaratory relief.
On June 11, 2024, the Court denied the State’s motion for summary judgment.
On March 14, 2025, the Court granted the State’s motion to compel the County’s responses to request for production of documents, set one. The Court orders the County to serve verified code-compliant responses without objections to the State’s requests for production of documents and ordered the County to produce the documents, electronically stored information, and/or other things requested without objections by March 24, 2025.
The Court also granted the State’s motion to deem admitted matters specified in requests for admission, set one, served on the County and deemed the matters admitted. The Court ordered the County to pay the State $900.00 in sanctions by April 14, 2025.
Trial is scheduled for June 25, 2025.
B. This motion
On October 28, 2024, the County filed a motion for summary judgment or, alternatively, summary adjudication. The motion was set for hearing on April 30, 2025. On April 15, 2025, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On April 25, 2025, the County filed a reply.
PARTIES’ REQUESTS
The County asks the Court to grant summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication.
Plaintiff asks the Court to deny the motion.
LEGAL STANDARD
A. Summary judgment and summary adjudication
“‘[F]rom commencement to conclusion, the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” (LAOSD Asbestos Cases (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 949, 945, quoting Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (Aguilar).) “[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.)
When the moving party is a defendant, it must show that the plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of action. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 853.) “The defendant has shown that the plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of action by showing that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.” (Id. at p. 854.) The defendant must “present evidence, and not simply point out that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.” (Ibid.) Thus, “the defendant must ‘support[ ]’ the ‘motion’ with evidence including ‘affidavits, declarations, admissions, answers to interrogatories, depositions, and matters of which judicial notice’ must or may ‘be taken.’ [Citation.] The defendant may, but need not, present evidence that conclusively negates an element of the plaintiff’s cause of action. The defendant may also present evidence that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence—as through admissions by the plaintiff following extensive discovery to the effect that he has discovered nothing.” (Id. at p. 855, original emphasis.)
“Supporting and opposing affidavits or declarations . . . shall set forth admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (d).) “Matters which would be excluded under the rules of evidence if proffered by a witness in a trial as hearsay, conclusions or impermissible opinions, must be disregarded in supporting affidavits.” (Hayman v. Block (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 629, 639.)
In ruling on the motion, the court must consider all the evidence and all the inferences reasonably drawn from it and must view such evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the opposing party. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.)
B. Public entity liability for dangerous condition of public property
Government Code section 835 provides:
“Except as provided by statute, a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either:
“(b) The public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under Section 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.”
(Gov. Code, § 835.)
Government Code section 830 provides:
“As used in this chapter:
“(a) “Dangerous condition” means a condition of property that creates a substantial (as distinguished from a minor, trivial or insignificant) risk of injury when such property or adjacent property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used.
“(b) “Protect against” includes repairing, remedying or correcting a dangerous condition, providing safeguards against a dangerous condition, or warning of a dangerous condition.
“(c) “Property of a public entity” and “public property” mean real or personal property owned or controlled by the public entity, but do not include easements, encroachments and other property that are located on the property of the public entity but are not owned or controlled by the public entity.”
(Gov. Code, § 830.)
DISCUSSION
A. The complaint
The complaint alleges the following:
On October 19, 2020, Plaintiff was injured on Defendants’ property when she tripped and fell over broken tile in the courtyard plaza of the Van Nuys Courthouse, located at 6240 Sylmar Avenue, Van Nuys, CA 91401. Defendants created and/or maintained the courtyard in such a condition that it was broken and/or uneven, making it a dangerous condition which created a reasonably foreseeable substantial risk of injury to pedestrians using due care.
B. The County has carried its initial burden on summary judgment or summary adjudication
The County argues it did not owe Plaintiff a duty because it did not own, possess, or control the premises where Plaintiff allegedly tripped and fell.
To support its argument, the County relies on the September 4, 2022 declaration of Rachael Millsap (“Millsap”), an Investigator in the Claims and Litigation Section of the Survey/Mapping & Property Management Division of the L.A. County Department of Public Works. Millsap declares that, based on her position, she is aware (or has the ability to make herself aware) that the County “does not have any authority and/or control over the Van Nuys Courthouse exterior facilities, nor does the COUNTY have any authority and/or control to hire, train and/or supervise employees who manage the exterior of the Van Nuys Courthouse.” (Millsap dec. ¶ 7.)
Millsap also states that October 19, 2020 (the date of Plaintiff’s alleged accident) was within the County’s Fiscal Year 2020-2021, which ran from July 1, 2020, until June 30, 2021. (Millsap dec. ¶ 9.) The County “may provide services to cities located within the County of Los Angeles upon specific request; however the COUNTY had no agreement with or received any specific request from the State of California during Fiscal Year 2020-2021, or for the five prior fiscal years, to perform any periodic inspection and/or maintenance at the Van Nuys courthouse.” (Millsap dec. ¶ 10.) As a result, the County “did not on October 19, 2020, nor does it now, have any authority, duty, or responsibility to own, maintain, control, possess, repair, inspect, operate, design, build, manage, and/or clean the area involved in the subject incident.” (Millsap dec. ¶ 11; see also Gov. Code, § 70321 & Cal. Rules of Court, rule 10.183(a) [addressing transfer of responsibility for court facilities from counties to Judicial Council].)
Plaintiff contends that Millsap’s declaration fails to carry the County’s initial burden because it refers to a bus, it is old, it is not notarized, and it is based on hearsay rather than personal knowledge. Plaintiff also observes that Millsap does not specify which of the two Van Nuys courthouses her declaration discusses.
The Court finds that Millsap’s declaration provides competent evidence supporting the County’s motion. Based on Millsap’s declaration, the County has carried its initial burden on summary judgment or summary adjudication of showing that the County did not own, possess, or control the premises where Plaintiff allegedly tripped and fell and therefore did not owe Plaintiff a duty of care. The burden shifts to Plaintiff.
C. Plaintiff has not raised a triable issue of fact
The Court grants the County’s motion.
CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS Defendant County of Los Angeles’s motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication.
Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.
Moving party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.