Judge: Lisa R. Jaskol, Case: 22STCV00450, Date: 2023-08-31 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV00450 Hearing Date: December 13, 2023 Dept: 28
Having considered the moving papers, the Court rules as follows.
BACKGROUND
On January 5, 2022, Plaintiff Ramses Gonzalez (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Mike Leroy Bowen, Ronald Alonza Bowen, and Does 1-50 for motor vehicle tort and general negligence.
On April 28, 2022, the clerk entered Defendant Mike Leroy Bowen’s default. On July 28, 2022, the Court set aside the default.
On June 6, 2022, Plaintiff amended the complaint to add Estate of Ronald Alonza Bowen, Deceased, as Doe 1.
On September 12, 2022, Defendants Mike Bowen and Estate of Ronald Alonza Bowen, Deceased, filed an answer.
On September 5, 2023, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint against Defendants Mike Bowen (“Defendant”) and Does 1-50 for motor vehicle tort, general negligence, and “exemplary damages.”
On October 2 and 11, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s counsels’ motions to be relieved as counsel.
On November 1, 2023, Defendant filed a motion to strike to be heard on December 13, 2023. Plaintiff has not filed an opposition.
Trial is currently scheduled for January 8, 2024.
PARTY’S REQUESTS
Defendant requests that the Court strike the requests for exemplary and punitive damages and the reference to $25,000.00 in the prayer for relief.
LEGAL STANDARD
A. Motion to strike
“Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1).) The Court may “[s]trike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).) “The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading of from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).) “Where the motion to strike is based on matter of which the court may take judicial notice pursuant to Section 452 or 453 of the Evidence Code, such matter shall be specified in the notice of motion, or in the supporting points and authorities, except as the court may otherwise permit.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (b).)
“In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff.” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255 (Clauson).) “In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.” (Ibid.) “In ruling on a motion to strike, courts do not read allegations in isolation.” (Ibid.)
B. Punitive damages
Civil Code section 3294 provides in part:
“(a) In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.
* * *
“(c) As used in this section, the following definitions shall apply:
“(1) “Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.
“(2) “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.
“(3) “Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury. . . .”
(Civ. Code, § 3294, subds. (a), (c).)
DISCUSSION
A. The first amended complaint
The first amended complaint alleges the following:
On January 10, 2020, on the I-405 northbound just north of Constitution Avenue in Los Angeles, CA, Defendants negligently, carelessly and recklessly owned, operated, and/or entrusted a motor vehicle, causing a collision between Defendants’ vehicle and the motor vehicle Plaintiff was traveling in.
Defendant was experiencing vertigo and loss of vision at the time of the collision. Defendant had prior knowledge and history of vertigo and knew of the dangers of driving while experiencing vertigo symptoms. Defendant, prior to the incident, knew that his vertigo would be brought upon and/or triggered by stress and, at the time of the collision, Defendant was overly stressed from his job as a manager of a co-op. Defendant knew that his stress from his job would lead to a vertigo episode, yet, despite this knowledge, made the conscious decision to operate his vehicle, knowing that a vertigo episode was imminent. Defendant’s conduct was outrageous and supremely reckless. Defendant had significant prior history of vertigo. He had numerous prior vertigo episodes, including with loss of vision and, despite significant history of vertigo, never consulted with a medical professional.
Defendant knew, prior to the collision, that stress would cause him to have vertigo and have a loss of vision. Defendant, prior to the collision and prior to getting into his vehicle, was feeling significant stress from his work managing a co-op. Defendant knew that he was feeling stress and that stress would cause him to have vertigo, yet consciously made the decision to operate his vehicle knowing that a vertigo episode was imminent. Such conduct constitutes a conscious disregard for the safety of others and constitutes malice.
Defendant engaged in the foregoing acts knowingly, maliciously, wantonly and with reckless disregard for the safety of Plaintiff and others. Defendant was operating his vehicle with such conscious disregard for the safety of others that his conduct is to be considered willful and malicious. Defendant’s conduct, which evidences a clear choice to subject himself and others on the road to the high probability of an automobile collision and substantial harm and/or death raises a reasonable inference of a conscious and callous disregard for the safety of others that constitutes the type of malice actionable under Code of Civil Procedure section 3924.
B. Defendant’s motion
1. Punitive damages request
Defendant argues the complaint does not allege facts that support a punitive damage claim against Defendant.
In general, to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, a plaintiff must plead the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief. (See Clauson, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 1255; Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166; Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550 [“the complaint ordinarily is sufficient if it alleges ultimate rather than evidentiary facts”].)
“In addition to the requirement that the complaint set forth the elements as stated in [Civil Code] section 3294, it must include specific factual allegations showing that defendant's conduct was oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious to support a claim for punitive damages.” (Today's IV, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1137, 1193, citing Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872 (Brousseau).) “Punitive damages may not be pleaded generally.” (Ibid., citing Brousseau, supra, 73 Cal.App.3d at p. 872.)
Here, Defendant asserts: “There are no facts alleged against Defendant supporting the general contention that Defendant was distracted, disabled, and/or impaired. Plaintiff provides no facts that led to the conclusion and only states the conclusory opinion.”
The complaint alleges that “Defendant was experiencing vertigo and loss of vision at the time of the collision.” The complaint also alleges that Defendant made a conscious decision to operate his vehicle even though he knew that a vertigo episode was imminent and knew of the dangers of driving while experiencing vertigo symptoms, including loss of vision.
The Court finds that the complaint adequately alleges that Defendant drove his vehicle under circumstances which disclose a conscious disregard of the probable dangerous consequences of driving while experiencing his medical condition. (Cf. Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 892 [“the act of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated may constitute an act of ‘malice’ under section 3294 if performed under circumstances which disclose a conscious disregard of the probably dangerous consequences”].)
Therefore, the Court denies the motion to strike the punitive damages claim.
2. Reference to $25,000
Defendant asks the Court to strike the reference in the prayer to damages of “over $25,000.” In personal injury cases, the complaint is not supposed to state the amount of damages sought. Moreover, the complaint already asserts on page 1 that the action is an unlimited civil case. The Court strikes the reference to “over $25,000” from the prayer.
CONCLUSION
The Court DENIES IN PART AND GRANTS IN PART the motion to strike filed by Defendant Mike Leroy Bowen as follows:
The Court DENIES the motion to strike the punitive damages claim and related allegations.
The Court GRANTS the request to strike the reference to “over $25,000” from the prayer. The Court strikes the reference to “over $25,000” without leave to amend.
Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.
Moving party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.